World happiness report 2013 by John F. Helliwell et al.
Edited by John Helliwell, Richard Layard and Jeffrey Sachs
WORLD 
HAPPINESS
REPORT 
2013
TABLE OF CONTENTS
  
1. Introduction
2. World Happiness: Trends, Explanations and  Distribution 
3. Mental Illness and Unhappiness 
4. The Objective Benefits of Subjective Well-Being 
5. Restoring Virtue Ethics in the Quest for Happiness 
6. Using Well-being as a Guide to Policy
7. The OECD Approach to Measuring Subjective Well-Being 
8. From Capabilities to Contentment: Testing the Links 
Between Human Development and Life Satisfaction
WORLD 
 HAPPINESS
 REPORT
 2013
Edited by John Helliwell, Richard Layard and Jeffrey Sachs
The World Happiness Report was written by a group of independent experts acting in their personal 
JHWHJP[PLZ(U`]PL^ZL_WYLZZLKPU[OPZYLWVY[KVUV[ULJLZZHYPS`YLÅLJ[[OL]PL^ZVMHU`VYNHUPaH[PVU
agency or programme of the United Nations.
3W O R L D  H A P P I N E S S  R E P O R T  2 0 1 3
23
Chapter 1.
INTRODUCTION
JOHN F. HELLIWELL, RICHARD LAYARD AND JEFFREY D. SACHS
John F. Helliwell: Vancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia, and the Canadian Institute for 
Advanced Research (CIFAR) 
Richard Layard: Director, Well-Being Programme, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics
Jeffrey D. Sachs: Director, The Earth Institute, Columbia University 
4W O R L D  H A P P I N E S S  R E P O R T  2 0 1 3
3
The world is now in the midst of a major policy 
debate about the objectives of public policy. What 
should be the world’s Sustainable Development 
Goals for the period 2015-2030? The World 
Happiness Report 2013 is offered as a contribution 
to that crucial debate. 
In July 2011 the UN General Assembly passed a 
historic resolution.1 It invited member countries 
to measure the happiness of their people and 
to use this to help guide their public policies. 
This was followed in April 2012 by the first UN 
high-level meeting on happiness and well-being, 
chaired by the Prime Minister of Bhutan. At the 
same time the first World Happiness Report was 
published,2 followed some months later by the 
OECD Guidelines setting an international 
standard for the measurement of well-being.3 
The present Report is sponsored by the Sus-
tainable Development Solutions Network.
Happiness
The word “happiness” is not used lightly. Happiness 
is an aspiration of every human being, and can 
also be a measure of social progress. America’s 
founding fathers declared the inalienable right to 
pursue happiness. Yet are Americans, or citizens 
of other countries, happy? If they are not, what if 
anything can be done about it? 
The key to proper measurement must begin 
with the meaning of the word “happiness.” The 
problem, of course, is that happiness is used 
in at least two ways — the first as an emotion 
(“Were you happy yesterday?”) and the second 
as an evaluation (“Are you happy with your life 
as a whole?”). If individuals were to routinely mix 
up their responses to these very different questions, 
then measures of happiness might tell us very 
little. Changes in reported happiness used to 
track social progress would perhaps reflect little 
more than transient changes in emotion. Or 
impoverished persons who express happiness in
 terms of emotion might inadvertently diminish 
society’s will to fight poverty. 
Fortunately, respondents to happiness surveys do 
not tend to make such confusing mistakes. As we 
showed in last year’s World Happiness Report and 
again in this year’s report, respondents to surveys 
clearly recognize the difference between happiness 
as an emotion and happiness in the sense of life 
satisfaction. The responses of individuals to these 
different questions are highly distinct. A very poor 
person might report himself to be happy emotion-
ally at a specific time, while also reporting a much 
lower sense of happiness with life as a whole; and 
indeed, people living in extreme poverty do express 
low levels of happiness with life as a whole. Such 
answers should spur our societies to work harder 
to end extreme poverty.   
As with last year’s report, we have again assembled 
the available international happiness data on how 
people rate both their emotions and their lives as a 
whole. We divide the available measures into three 
main types: measures of positive emotions (positive 
affect) including happiness, usually asked about 
the day preceding the survey; measures of negative 
emotions (negative affect) again asked about the 
preceding day; and evaluations of life as a whole. 
Together, these three types of reports constitute 
the primary measures of subjective well-being.4 
The three main life evaluations are the Cantril 
ladder of life,5 life satisfaction,6 and happiness 
with life as a whole.7 Happiness thus appears 
twice, once as an emotional report, and once as 
part of a life evaluation, giving us considerable 
evidence about the nature and causes of happiness 
in both its major senses.  
Outline of Report
The first World Happiness Report presented the 
widest body of happiness data available, and 
explained the scientific base at hand to validate and 
understand the data. Now that the scientific stage has 
been set, we turn this year to consider more specific 
issues of measurement, explanation, and policy. 
4W O R L D  H A P P I N E S S  R E P O R T  2 0 1 3
t In Chapter 2 we update our ranking of life 
evaluations from all over the world, making 
primary use of the Gallup World Poll, since it 
continues to regularly collect and provide com-
parable data for the largest number of countries. 
We also present tentative explanations for the 
levels and changes of national-level and regional 
averages of life evaluations.
t In Chapter 3 we learn that mental illness is the 
single most important cause of unhappiness, 
but is largely ignored by policy makers.
t Chapter 4 adopts a different perspective, looking 
at the many beneficial consequences of well-being 
(rather than its causes).
t Chapter 5 discusses values; returning to the 
ancient insights of Buddha, Aristotle, and others 
teachers and moralists, that an individual’s values 
and character are major determinants of the 
individual’s happiness with life as a whole. 
t Chapter 6 looks at the way policy makers can 
use well-being as a policy goal.
t Chapter 7 presents the OECD’s Guidelines on 
Measuring Subjective Well-being and general 
approach, and;
t Chapter 8 explores the link between the UN’s 
Human Development Index and subjective 
well-being.
We briefly review the main findings of each chapter.
Trends, explanations and distribution
Chapter 2 presents data by country and continent, 
and for the world as a whole, showing the levels, 
explanations, changes and equality of happiness, 
mainly based on life evaluations from the Gallup 
World Poll. Despite the obvious detrimental 
happiness impacts of the 2007-08 financial 
crisis, the world has become a slightly happier 
and more generous place over the past five years. 
Because of continuing improvements in most 
supports for better lives in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
and of continued convergence in the quality of 
the social fabric within greater Europe, there has 
also been some progress toward equality in the 
distribution of well-being among global regions. 
There have been important continental cross-
currents within this broader picture. Improvements 
in quality of life have been particularly notable in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, while reductions 
have been the norm in the regions most affected 
by the financial crisis, Western Europe and other 
western industrial countries; or by some combi-
nation of financial crisis and political and social 
instability, as in the Middle East and North Africa.
Mental health and unhappiness
The next chapter focuses on mental health. It 
shows that mental health is the single most 
important determinant of individual happiness 
(in every case where this has been studied). 
About 10% of the world’s population suffers from 
clinical depression or crippling anxiety disorders. 
They are the biggest single cause of disability and 
absenteeism, with huge costs in terms of misery 
and economic waste.
Cost-effective treatments exist, but even in advanced 
countries only a third of those who need it are in 
treatment. These treatments produce recovery rates 
of 50% or more, which mean that the treatments 
can have low or zero net cost after the savings 
they generate. Moreover human rights require that 
treatment should be as available for mental illness as 
it is for physical illness.
Effects of well-being
Chapter 4 considers the objective benefits of 
subjective well-being. The chapter presents a broad 
range of evidence showing the people who are 
emotionally happier, who have more satisfying lives, 
and who live in happier communities, are more 
likely both now and later to be healthy, productive, 
and socially connected. These benefits in turn flow 
more broadly to their families, workplaces, and 
communities, to the advantage of all.
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The authors of Chapter 4 show that subjective 
well-being has an objective impact across a broad 
range of behavioral traits and life outcomes, and 
does not simply follow from them. They observe 
the existence of a dynamic relationship between 
happiness and other important aspects of life 
with effects running in both directions.
Values and happiness
Chapter 5 discusses a riddle in the history of 
thought. In the great pre-modern traditions 
concerning happiness, whether Buddhism in the 
East, Aristotelianism in the West, or the great 
religious traditions, happiness is determined not 
by an individual’s material conditions (wealth, 
poverty, health, illness) but by the individual’s 
moral character. Aristotle spoke of virtue as the 
key to eudaimonia, loosely translated as “thriving.” 
Yet that tradition was almost lost in the modern 
era after 1800, when happiness became associated 
with material conditions, especially income and 
consumption. This chapter explores that transition 
in thinking, and what has been lost as a result. 
It advocates a return to “virtue ethics” as one part 
of the strategy to raise (evaluative) happiness in 
society. 
Policy making
Chapter 6 explains how countries are using 
well-being data to improve policy making, with 
examples from around the world. It also explains 
the practical and political difficulties faced by 
policy makers when trying to use a well-being 
approach. The main policy areas considered include 
health, transport and education. The main con-
clusion is that the well-being approach leads to 
better policies and a better policy process.
OECD Guidelines
Chapter 7 describes the OECD approach to 
measuring subjective well-being. In particular 
the OECD approach emphasizes a single primary 
measure, intended to be collected consistently 
across countries, as well as a small group of core 
measures that data producers should collect 
where possible.8 The content and underpinnings 
of the OECD approach are laid out more fully in 
the recent OECD Guidelines on Measuring Subjective 
Well-being. The chapter also outlines progress that 
has been made by national statistical offices, both 
before and after the release of the guidelines.
Human Development Report
Chapter 8 investigates the conceptual and empirical 
relationships between the human development 
and life evaluation approaches to understanding 
human progress. The chapter argues that both 
approaches were, at least in part, motivated by a 
desire to consider progress and development in 
ways that went beyond GDP, and to put people at 
the center.  And while human development is at 
heart a conceptual approach, and life evaluation 
an empirical one, there is considerable overlap 
in practice: many aspects of human development 
are frequently used as key variables to explain 
subjective well-being.  The two approaches 
provide complementary lenses which enrich our 
ability to assess whether life is getting better. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, there is now a rising worldwide 
demand that policy be more closely aligned with 
what really matters to people as they themselves 
characterize their lives. More and more world 
leaders including German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel, South Korean President Park Geun-hye 
and British Prime Minister David Cameron, are 
talking about the importance of well-being as a 
guide for their nations and the world. We offer 
the 2013 World Happiness Report in support of 
these efforts to bring the study of happiness into 
public awareness and public policy. This report 
offers rich evidence that the systematic measure-
ment and analysis of happiness can teach us 
much about ways to improve the world’s well-
being and sustainable development.  
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1 UN General Assembly (19 July 2011).
2 Helliwell et al. (2012).
3 OECD (2013).
4 The use of “subjective well-being” as the generic description was recommended by Diener et al. (2010, x-xi), reflecting a 
conference consensus, later adopted also by the OECD Guidelines (2013, summarized in Chapter 7), that each of the three 
components of SWB (life evaluations, positive affect, and negative affect) be widely and comparably collected.
5 Used in the Gallup World Poll (GWP). The GWP included the life satisfaction question on the same 0 to 10 scale on an 
experimental basis, giving a sample sufficiently large to show that when used with consistent samples the two questions 
provide mutually supportive information on the size and relative importance of the correlates, as shown in Diener et al. 
(2010, Table 10.1).
6 Used in the World Values Survey, the European Social Survey and many other national and international surveys. It is the 
core life evaluation question recommended by the OECD (2013), and in the first World Happiness Report.
7 The European Social Survey contains questions about happiness with life as a whole, and about life satisfaction, both on the 
same 0 to 10 numerical scale. The responses provide the scientific base to support our findings that answers to the two questions 
give consistent (and mutually supportive) information about the correlates of a good life. 
8 There are two elements to the OECD core measures module. The first is the primary measure of life evaluation, a question 
on life satisfaction. The second element consists of a short series of affect questions and the experimental eudaimonic question. 
The specifics are in Box 1 of Chapter 7.
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The first World Happiness Report attracted most 
attention with its rankings of average life evalua-
tions, especially at the national level, based on 
data from all available years of the Gallup World 
Poll, mainly 2005 to 2011.2 This year we dig deeper. 
First, we repeat our summary of average levels 
for the Cantril ladder, this year using the most 
recent data available, now covering 2010-12. We 
will also compare international differences in life 
evaluations with average measures of positive and 
negative emotions. This will set the stage for our 
later analysis of the happiness trends that have 
appeared in some countries and regions since 
the beginning of the Gallup World Poll in 2005. 
At the same time as we present the levels, we shall 
also provide a breakdown of the likely reasons why 
life evaluations are higher in each region or country 
than in a hypothetical comparison country called 
Distopia. Distopia is faced with the world’s lowest 
national average values of each of six key variables 
that we have found to explain three-quarters of the 
international differences in average life evaluations: 
GDP per capita, years of healthy life expectancy, 
having someone to count on in times of trouble 
(sometimes referred to as “social support” in this 
chapter), perceptions of corruption, prevalence of 
generosity, and freedom to make life choices.3 
After making these current comparisons based on 
the three most recent survey years, we then look for 
changes and trends in happiness in countries, 
regions, and for the world as a whole. Finally, we 
will look for differences and trends in the equality 
or inequality with which happiness is distributed 
within and among countries and regions.  
As we found last year, whether we are interested 
in comparing levels or looking for trends, there is 
a necessary trade-off between sample size and 
the ability to identify the latest levels and trends. 
The Gallup World Poll, which still provides the 
most comparable data for a large group of countries, 
typically interviews 1,000 respondents per country 
in each survey year. We average the three most 
recent years (2010–12) in order to achieve a 
typical sample size of 3,000, thus reducing 
uncertainty in the resulting estimates of country 
averages. In looking for possible trends, we com-
pare these most recent three years with average 
values in the earliest years (2005–07) of data 
available for each country. In the future, when 
collection of data on subjective well-being (SWB) 
has a longer history, is based on larger samples, 
and has been made a part of large official surveys 
in many countries, as outlined in the recent OECD 
Guidelines for the Measurement of Subjective Well-
Being,4 it will be possible to recognize and explain 
international and sub-national happiness changes 
and trends in a more timely way. But there are 
nonetheless some interesting findings in the data 
already in hand.
Throughout this chapter, we shall make primary 
use of the answers given by individual respondents 
asked to evaluate their current lives by imagining life 
as a ladder, with the best possible life for them 
as a 10, and the worst possible life as a zero. We 
shall then examine the average levels and distri-
butions of these responses, sometimes referring 
to the measures as the Cantril ladder,5 and some-
times as life evaluations or measures of happiness 
about life as a whole. 
Another two SWB measures are reports of 
emotional states. They are based on a list of 
survey questions on emotional experience the 
day before the interview: 1) Did you smile or 
laugh a lot yesterday? 2) Did you experience the 
following feelings during a lot of the day yesterday? 
How about enjoyment? 3) How about happiness? 
4) How about worry? 5) How about sadness? 6) 
How about anger? The answers to the first three 
questions reveal positive emotional feelings. The 
answers to the other three questions reveal negative 
feelings. We use the first three questions to 
construct a score of positive emotions, which is 
essentially the number of “yes” answers. The score 
has four steps from zero to three. Zero means that 
the respondent reports no positive experiences; 
three means all three positive experiences are 
reported. In a symmetrical manner, we construct 
the score of negative emotions based on the three 
questions about negative emotions.
10
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Using alternative descriptions for life evaluations 
and favoring life evaluations over measures of 
positive and negative affect follows from the analysis 
contained in the first World Happiness Report. There 
it was shown that while the three main types of 
life evaluation in frequent use — satisfaction with 
life as a whole, happiness about life as a whole, 
and the Cantril ladder — have different average 
values and distributions, they provide equivalent 
information about the sources of differences among 
individuals and nations.6 It was also shown there, 
and in Table 2.1 in this chapter, that life evaluations 
are much more fully explained by enduring life 
circumstances than are measures of the previous 
day’s positive and negative emotions. Emotional 
measures are nonetheless of fundamental impor-
tance for experimental work, and for the analysis 
of daily life, as they respond to short-term events 
and surroundings much more than do the more 
stable life evaluations.7 Emotional states, especially 
positive ones, are nonetheless closely related to 
life evaluations, as we shall see in the next section. 
If life evaluations are more closely determined by 
life circumstances than are emotions, we might 
also expect to find that that they line up more closely 
with other measures of human development, such 
as the United Nations Development Programme’s 
Human Development Index (HDI), which is the 
subject of Chapter 8 in this report. We find that 
this is indeed so, as the simple correlation 
between the HDI and national averages of the 
Cantril ladder is 0.77, several times as great as 
that between the HDI and measures of positive 
and negative affect.8   
If it is true that life evaluations are more determined 
by the circumstances of life, and if life circum-
stances are more unevenly distributed among 
nations than are the supports for emotions, then 
we would expect to find that the international 
distribution of life evaluations matches that of 
key life circumstances, while emotional states, 
like the personality differences that partially underlie 
them, might be expected to differ relatively more 
among individuals than among nations. The data 
support this expectation.
Figure 2.1 shows for each of eight variables the share 
of their total variation among more than 500,000 
Gallup World Poll respondents in 2010–12 that is 
among rather than within nations.9 The eight 
variables include the Cantril ladder, positive and 
negative affect, and five variables we use to explain 
international differences in our three measures of 
subjective well-being.10 Of all the variables, house-
hold income is by far the most unevenly divided 
among countries, with more than half of its global 
variation being among countries. International 
differences in perceived corruption and in the 
Cantril ladder are next in the extent to which their 
global variation is among countries, followed by 
generosity, freedom, positive affect, and social 
support. The variance of negative affect is almost 
entirely within rather than among countries, with 
an international share well below 10%. 
To further compare life evaluations and emotions, 
we use six key variables to explain international 
differences in the Cantril ladder, positive affect, 
and negative affect. These equations, as shown in 
Table 2.1, use a pooled sample of all available annual 
national average scores for each of the three 
measures of well-being regressed on a set of 
variables, similar to those used in Table 3.1 of the 
first World Happiness Report. These variables, which 
span the main range of factors previously found 
to be important in explaining differences in life 
evaluations, include the log of GDP per capita, years 
of healthy life expectancy, having someone to count 
on in times of trouble, perceptions of corruption, 
prevalence of generosity, and freedom to make 
life choices. 
As can be seen in Table 2.1, and in Table 3.1 of the 
first World Happiness Report, and as Figure 2.1 
leads us to suppose, the six variables explain 
much more of the differences of life evaluations 
than of emotions.11 There is also a difference in 
their relative importance. The more objective 
circumstances of life (income and healthy life 
expectancy) are very strong determinants of the 
Cantril ladder life evaluations, but they have no 
significant links to positive and negative affect.12 
Having someone to count on in times of trouble 
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and feeling a sense of freedom to make key life 
choices are both strong determinants of life 
evaluations and emotions. Perceived corruption 
provides an interesting contrast, as negative 
affect is much worse, and life evaluations lower, 
where corruption is perceived to be more prevalent. 
But there is no link between corruption perceptions 
and positive affect. Generosity is also interesting, 
as it has a strong positive link with life evaluations 
and positive affect, but no relation to negative 
affect. This latter result is supported by recent 
experimental evidence that subjects who behave 
generously when given the chance become 
significantly happier, but there is no change in 
their level of negative affect. Their initial levels of 
positive and negative affect, on the other hand, do 
not influence significantly the likelihood of them 
acting generously.
The fourth column of Table 2.1 repeats the first 
column, but adds the national averages, in each 
year, of positive and negative affect. Positive affect 
enters the equation strongly, but negative affect 
does not. Positive affect is itself strongly connected 
to generosity, freedom, and social support, as 
shown in column 2 of Table 2.1, and the addition 
of positive affect to the life evaluation equation in 
column 4 suggests that some substantial part of 
the impact from those variables to life evaluations 
flows through positive affect. 
Partly because of their more robust connections 
with the established supports for better lives, life 
evaluations remain the primary statistic for mea-
suring and explaining international differences 
and trends in subjective well-being. Although life 
satisfaction, happiness with life as a whole, and 
the Cantril ladder all tell similar stories about 
the sources of a good life, we shall concentrate 
here on the Cantril ladder, since it is the only life 
evaluation in continuous use in the Gallup World 
Poll, and the latter provides by far the widest and 
most regular country coverage. An online data ap-
pendix provides comparable data for positive and 
negative affect. 
Global and Regional Happiness   
Levels and Explanations
Figure 2.2 shows life evaluation averages for each of 
10 regional groupings13 of countries, as well as for 
the world as a whole, based on data for the years 
2010-12. For this figure, the levels and the 95% 
confidence bounds (shown by a horizontal line at 
the right-hand side of each bar) are based on all the 
individual-level observations available for each 
country in the survey, weighted by total population 
in each country.14 This population-weighting is 
done so that the regional averages, like the national 
averages to be presented later, represent the best 
estimate of the level and changes of the ladder 
scores for the entire population. The results for 
the world as a whole are similarly weighted by 
population in each country, just as was done in 
Figure 2.1 in the first World Happiness Report. 
Figure 2.2 shows not only the average ladder scores 
for the world, and for each of 10 regional groupings, 
but also attempts to explain why average ladder 
scores are so much higher in some regions than 
in others. To do this, we make use of the coefficients 
found in the first column of Table 2.1. The length 
of each sub-bar in Figure 2.2 shows how much 
better life is for having a higher value of that variable 
than in Distopia. Distopia is a fictional country 
that has the world’s lowest national average value 
(for the years 2010-12) for each of the six key 
variables used in Table 2.1. We calculate 2010–12 
happiness in Distopia to have been 1.98 on the 
10-point scale, less than one-half of the average 
score in any of the country groupings.15
Each region’s bar in Figure 2.2 has seven com-
ponents. Starting from the left, the first is the sum 
of the score in Distopia plus each region’s average 
2010-12 unexplained component.16 For many 
reasons, the six available variables cannot fully 
explain the differences in ladder scores among 
regions, so that the combined effect of all of the 
missing factors (to the extent that they are not 
correlated with the variables in the equation) turns 
up in the error term. The top-ranking regions and 
countries tend to have higher average positive 
12
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values for their error terms since the country 
rankings are based on the actual survey results, 
and not on what the model predicts. It is somewhat 
reassuring that even for the top-ranked and 
bottom-ranked countries and regions, most of 
the differences between their scores and those 
in Distopia are explained by having values of at 
least most variables that are better than those 
in Distopia. No country has the world’s lowest 
values for more than one of the six variables, and 
this is why actual national scores in all countries, 
and of course in all regions, are well above the 
calculated ladder score in Distopia.     
The second segment in each regional bar is the 
amount by which the regional ladder score exceeds 
that in Distopia by dint of having average per 
capita incomes higher than those in the poorest 
country in the world. To take a particular example, 
GDP per capita in the richest region is over 16 
times higher than in the poorest of the 10 regions. 
This difference in GDP per capita between the 
richest and poorest regions translates into an 
average life evaluation difference of 0.80 points 
on the 10-point range of the scale.17 Similarly, 
the fraction of the population reporting having 
someone to count on is 0.93 in the top region 
compared to 0.56 in the region with the lowest 
average social support. This interregional difference 
translates into a 0.86 difference in ladder averages.18 
The corresponding ladder differentials between 
the top region and the region with the lowest 
national average for that variable are 0.20 for 
perceived absence of corruption,19 0.66 for the 
28-year life expectancy difference between the 
top (Western Europe) and bottom (Sub-Saharan 
Africa) regions,20 0.46 for generosity differences 
(adjusted for income levels) between the most and 
least generous regions,21 and 0.26 for freedom 
to make life choices.22 Thus there are substantial 
regional differences in each of the six variables 
used in Table 2.1 to explain international differences 
in ladder scores, with correspondingly large 
effects on average happiness. 
Our regional results show some echo of cultural 
differences that have been found in a variety of 
survey and experimental contexts.23 Our explanatory 
framework assumes that the ladder question is seen 
and answered the same way in every language and 
culture, that the six measured variables do an 
equally good or bad job in capturing the main 
features of happy lives, that response scales are 
used similarly in all cultures, and that the variables 
have similar effects everywhere. These are 
unrealistically strong assumptions, and there is 
substantial evidence that for different reasons24 
these assumptions might lead our equation to 
underestimate reported happiness in Latin America, 
and to overestimate it in East Asia. In terms of 
Figure 2.2, this would lead us to expect the 
left-hand bar, which measures the estimated 
happiness in Distopia plus each region’s average 
amount of unexplained happiness, to be smaller 
for East Asia, and larger for the region including 
Latin America and the Caribbean. That is indeed 
what Figure 2.2 shows, with average ladder 
scores being higher than predicted in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and lower in East 
Asia. If we compute average country errors in 
each region for the 2010-12 period covered by 
Figure 2.2, we find that average ladder scores are 
significantly higher than predicted in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and significantly 
lower in East Asia, by about half a point in each 
case. There are three other regions where average 
measured happiness is significantly different in 
2010–12 than what the equation in Table 2.1 
would predict, in all cases by between one-fifth 
and one-quarter of a point. On the one hand, life 
assessments in Central and Eastern Europe, and 
in Southeast Asia, are lower than the model 
predicts, while in the small group comprising the 
United States, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand (NANZ), the average scores are higher 
than predicted. These calculations all treat each 
country with an equal weight, and hence reflect 
the average of the country-by-country predicted 
and actual ladder scores in Figure 2.3. Figure 2.2 
and the remaining discussion in this section, 
consider average lives in each region, and hence 
weight the data by each country’s population.
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Figure 2.2 shows that there are large inter-regional 
differences in average ladder scores, which range 
from 4.6 to over 7.1. The explanations, as revealed 
by the width of the individual bars, show that 
all factors contribute to the explanation, but 
the amounts explained by each factor differ by 
region. For example, while Sub-Saharan Africa 
has the lowest average ladder score, corruption is 
seen as a smaller problem there than in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
Central and Eastern Europe, and South-East Asia. 
Similarly, a higher fraction of respondents have 
someone to count on in Sub-Saharan Africa than 
in either South Asia or the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA). Generosity, even before 
adjusting for income differences, is higher in 
Sub-Saharan Africa than in three regions— the 
CIS, East Asia, and MENA. After adjusting for 
income differences, Sub-Saharan generosity is 
also higher than in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and Central and Eastern Europe. And 
the sense of freedom to make key life decisions is 
higher in Sub-Saharan Africa than in either the 
CIS or MENA. In fact, only for the two traditional 
development measures — GDP per capita and years 
of healthy life expectancy — are the average values 
lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa.
However, as might be expected, each region 
contains a wide variety of individual and country 
experiences. Having now illustrated how our 
explanatory framework operates, we turn in the 
next section to use it to explain the much greater 
differences that appear at the national level.
National Happiness Levels and        
Explanations
In this section, we first present in Figure 2.3 the 
2010–12 national averages for life evaluations, 
with each country’s average score divided into 
seven pieces.25 The overall ladder rankings differ 
from those in Figure 2.3 of the first World 
Happiness Report. First, they include more up-to-
date data, with the ending point of the new data 
coverage moving forward from mid-2011 to the 
end of 2012. Second, in last year’s report we 
averaged all available data, running from 2005 
until mid-2011, while this year we present averages 
for the three years 2010-12, giving a sample size of 
3,000 for most countries.26 We focus on the more 
recent data for two reasons. First, we expect that 
readers want the data presented in our key tables 
to be as current as possible, consistent with having 
sample sizes large enough to avoid too many 
ranking changes due to sampling fluctuations. 
Second, we want to be able to look for changes 
through time in the average happiness levels for 
countries, regions, and the world as a whole.
The three panels of Figure 2.3 divide the 156 
countries into three groups. The top five countries 
are Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, Netherlands, 
and Sweden, and the bottom five are Rwanda, 
Burundi, Central African Republic, Benin, and 
Togo. The gap between the top and the bottom is 
quite large: the average Cantril ladder in the top 
five countries is 7.48, which is over 2.5 times the 
2.94 average ladder in the bottom countries. 
As was the case in the first World Happiness 
Report, there are no countries with populations 
over 50 million among the 10 top-ranking countries. 
Does this mean that it is harder for larger countries 
to create conditions supporting happier lives? A 
closer look at the data shows no evidence of this 
sort. There are two large countries in the top 20 
countries, and none among the bottom 20. The 
24 countries with populations over 50 million tend 
not to be at either end of the global distribution, in 
part because they each represent averages among 
many differing sub-national regions. Looking at 
the three parts of Figure 2.3, there are eight large 
countries in the top third, and five in the bottom 
third, with the other 11 in the middle group. There 
is no simple correlation between average ladder 
scores and country size, although if we look at the 
part of life evaluations not explained by the six key 
variables, ladder scores are if anything higher in 
larger countries.27
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Global and Regional Happiness 
Trends
On average, on a global and regional basis, as shown 
in Figure 2.4, there has been some evidence of 
convergence of Cantril ladder scores between 
2007 and 2012. There have been significant 
increases for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(+7.0%), the CIS (+5.9%), Sub-Saharan Africa 
(+5.4%), and East Asia (+5.1%),28 up to almost 
half a point on the zero to 10 scale of the Cantril 
ladder. There were significant declines in four 
regions: the Middle East and North Africa (-11.7%), 
South Asia (-6.8%), the group of four miscellaneous 
industrial countries (United States, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand, -3.2%), and Western 
Europe (-1.7%). In Central and Eastern Europe 
there was no significant change in the regional 
average, but here too, as in the other regions, 
there were offsetting increases and decreases. 
For the world as a whole, there was an insignificant 
0.5% increase.  
Figure 2.5 gives some idea of the variety of trend 
experiences within each region, for the 130 
countries with adequate sample size at both the 
beginning and the end of the 2005–07 to 2010–12 
period. It shows the percentages of countries in 
which life evaluations have grown significantly 
(in yellow), not changed by a significant amount 
(in blue), or fallen significantly (in red). The 
number of countries within each group is shown 
by numerals within each box. Overall, more 
countries have had significant increases (60) 
than decreases (41) in average life evaluations 
between 2005-07 and 2010-12, with a smaller 
group (29) showing no significant trend. 
On a regional basis, by far the largest gains in life 
evaluations, in terms of the prevalence and size of 
the increases, have been in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Latin 
America and the Caribbean, more than three-
quarters of all countries showed significant 
increases in average happiness, with a population-
weighted average increase amounting to 7.0% of 
the 2005-07 value.29 In Sub-Saharan Africa, 16 of 
the 27 countries covered by the surveys showed 
significant increases in life evaluations, and taking 
all of Sub-Saharan Africa together the average 
increase was over 5%.30 On the other hand, there 
have been significant decreases in two-thirds of the 
countries in South Asia. On average, there have 
been significant reductions in ladder scores in 
Western Europe, while average evaluations in 
Central and Eastern Europe were almost unchanged, 
as shown in Figure 2.4. The diversity of the Western 
European experiences is apparent. Six of the 17 
countries had significant increases, while seven 
countries had significant decreases, the largest of 
which were in four countries badly hit by the 
Eurozone financial crisis- Portugal, Italy, Spain and 
Greece.  In Central and Eastern Europe, there were 
significant increases in four transition countries 
showing upward convergence to European averages, 
balanced by four others with significant decreases. 
We turn to the country data for our more detailed 
analysis, recognizing that the increase in focus is 
matched by a reduction in sample size.
National Happiness Trends
Figure 2.6 compares the 2005–07 and 2010–12 
average ladder scores for each country, ranked by 
the size of their increases from the first period 
to the second. The horizontal lines at the end 
of each bar show the 95% confidence regions 
for the estimate, making it relatively easy to see 
which of the changes are significant. Because 
not all countries have surveys at both ends of the 
comparison period, this restricts to 130 the number 
of countries shown in Figure 2.6. 
Among the 130 countries, we focus here on those 
whose average evaluations have changed by 
half a point on the zero to 10 scale. Of these 32 
countries, 19 saw improvements, and 13 showed 
decreases. Over half (10) of the countries with in-
creased happiness were in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and more than one-fifth in Sub-Saha-
ran Africa. The rest of the large gainers included 
two in Eastern Europe, one in the CIS, and two 
Asian countries, South Korea31 and Thailand, but 
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none in Western Europe or elsewhere among the 
industrial countries, or in the Middle East and 
North Africa.
Of the 13 countries with average declines of 0.5 or 
more, there were four from the Middle East and 
North Africa, three from Sub-Saharan Africa, two 
from Asia, three from Western Europe, and only one 
from Latin America and the Caribbean.
Reasons for Happiness Changes
The various panels of Figure 2.7 show, for the 
world as a whole and for each of the 10 regions 
separately, the underlying changes in the material 
and social supports for well-being. Population 
weights are used, thereby representing regional 
populations as a whole, by giving more weight to 
the survey responses in the more populous coun-
tries in each region. As shown in Figure 2.7.1,32 
GDP per capita has increased in almost every 
region except the group of four miscellaneous 
industrial countries (United States, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand), with the absolute 
increases being greatest in East Asia, Central and 
Eastern Europe, the CIS, and Latin America, and 
proportionate increases the largest in South Asia, 
which is mainly caused by India. 
By contrast, the fraction of respondents having 
someone to count on was lower in most regions, 
and for the world as a whole. Social support was 
significantly up in Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast 
Asia and the CIS, and generally lower everywhere 
else, including for the world as a whole, with the 
reductions greatest in South Asia and in the Middle 
East and North Africa. The European Social 
Survey (ESS) has a broad range of questions 
relating to trust, and research suggests that social 
trust is a strong determinant of life evaluations. 
Furthermore, although trust levels remain much 
lower in the transition countries than in Western 
Europe, they have been converging, and have 
been more important than income in explaining 
why life evaluations have been rising since the 
economic crisis.33
Perceptions of corruption were significantly 
improved (i.e. lower) in Latin America, Western 
Europe and East Asia, and higher (worse) in 
NANZ, MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
prevalence of generosity, which here is not 
adjusted for differences in income levels, grew 
significantly throughout Asia, Central and Eastern 
Europe and the CIS, and for the world as a 
whole, while being significantly reduced in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Western Europe, Latin 
America and MENA. Perceived freedom to make life 
choices grew significantly in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Southeast Asia, and Latin America, and shrank 
significantly in South Asia, NANZ and MENA. 
Among individual countries, as already shown in 
the panels of Figure 2.3, there is an even greater 
variety of experiences, and of underlying rea-
sons.
We pay special attention here to the four Western 
European countries worst hit by the Eurozone 
crisis, since they provide scope for examining 
how large economic changes play out in subjective 
well-being, especially when they are accompanied 
by damage to a country’s social and institutional 
fabric. Table 2.2 shows for each of the four countries 
worst affected (in terms of lower average life 
evaluations) by the Eurozone crisis, the average 
size of the reductions in average happiness,34 the 
extent to which these decreases were explained 
by change in the variables included in the equation 
of Table 2.1, and estimates of how much of the 
remaining drop can be explained by the rising 
unemployment rates in each country.
The first thing to note is the large size of the 
effects of the economic crisis on the four countries. 
Their average fall in life evaluations, of two-thirds 
of a point on the 10-point scale, is roughly equal 
to moving 20 places in the international rankings 
of Figure 2.3, or equivalent to that of a doubling 
or halving of per capita GDP.35 Among the 
countries who have suffered well-being losses 
from 2005–07 to 2010–12, Greece ranks second, 
Spain sixth, Italy eighth and Portugal twentieth. 
We expect, and find, that these losses are far 
greater than would follow simply from lower 
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incomes. If per-capita GDP were pushed 10% 
below what might otherwise have happened 
without the crisis, the estimated loss in average 
subjective well-being would have been less than 
.04, which is less than one-tenth of the average 
drop in the four countries. As Table 2.2 shows, 
GDP per capita in three of the four countries 
actually fell, though not by as much as the 10% 
assumed above. The other five key factors in the 
Table 2.1 equation showed improvement in some 
countries and deterioration elsewhere, on average 
contributing to explaining the average decline. 
Healthy life expectancy was calculated to have 
continued to grow and improve subjective well-
being, but all other factors generally moved in 
the other direction. The biggest hit, in terms of 
the implied drop in life evaluations, was in 
respondents’ perceived freedom to make key life 
choices. In each country the crisis tended to limit 
opportunities for individuals, both through 
cutbacks in available services and loss of expected 
opportunities. In the three of the four countries 
there were also increases in perceived corruption 
in business and government. Social support and 
generosity also each fell in three of the four 
countries. Assembling the partial explanations 
from each of the six factors still left most of the 
well-being drop to be explained.
The most obvious candidate to consider is unem-
ployment, which grew significantly in each country, 
and has been shown to have large effects on the 
happiness of the unemployed themselves, and also 
on those who remain employed, but who either 
may be close to those who are unemployed, or 
may face possible future unemployment. Because 
of the lack of sufficiently widespread and compa-
rable data for national unemployment rates, 
unemployment does not appear among the six 
factors captured in Table 2.1. For now, we can fill 
this gap by using OECD data for national unem-
ployment rates to explain, for OECD countries, 
the remaining differences in life evaluations not 
explained by the model of Table 2.1.36 Our best 
estimate from this procedure is that each percentage 
point increase in the national unemployment 
rate will lower average subjective well-being by 
.033 points on the 10-point scale.37 This is several 
times more than would flow from the large and 
well-established non-pecuniary effects on each 
unemployed person, because it combines these 
effects with the smaller but more widespread 
effects on those who are still employed, or are not 
in the labor force. Although large, this estimate is 
very similar to that obtained from US data,38 and 
smaller than that implied by previous research for 
Europe39 and for Latin America.40 Thus we are 
fairly confident that we are not overstating the 
likely well-being effects of the higher unemploy-
ment rates in the four countries.
For Portugal, which had the smallest average 
drop in average life evaluations, adding unem-
ployment suffices to explain the whole drop in 
subjective well-being. For the other three coun-
tries the explained share was between one-half 
and three-quarters.  On average, as shown by the 
last line of Table 2.2, the six basic factors ex-
plained one-third of the drop in life evaluations, 
rising unemployment was responsible for an-
other third, leaving one-third to be explained by 
other reasons. This is probably because in each 
case the crisis has been severe enough in those 
four countries to damage not just employment 
prospects, but to limit the capacities of individu-
als, communities and especially cash-strapped 
governments to perform at the levels expected of 
them in times of crisis. The conclusion that the 
happiness effects in these countries are due to 
social as well as economic factors is supported by 
the evidence from measures of positive and 
negative affect, which have already been seen to 
depend more on social than economic circum-
stances. The patterns of affect change are consis-
tent in relative size with those for life evaluations. 
Positive affect fell, and negative affect grew in 
Greece and Spain, by proportions as great as life 
evaluations.41 For Italy the affect picture was 
mixed, while for Portugal there were no significant 
changes.42 The ranking changes for both affect 
measures, and for the ladder are shown in Table 
2.3. For Greece, but not the other countries, the 
affect changes are comparatively larger than for 
life evaluations, as reflected by the greater number 
of places lost in the international rankings.
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Greece stands out from the other countries in 
having the largest changes in life evaluations and 
affect measures, beyond what can be explained 
by average responses to the economic crisis. 
Research has shown that economic and other 
crises are more easily weathered and indeed 
provide the scope for cooperative actions that 
improve subjective well-being, if trust levels and 
other aspects of the social and institutional fabric 
are sufficiently high and well-maintained when 
the crisis hits.43 The European Social Survey 
(ESS) can provide useful evidence on this score, 
as it covers all four countries, and has two life 
evaluations and several trust measures. The ESS 
life evaluations, both for life satisfaction and 
happiness with life as a whole, mirror the Gallup 
World Poll in showing well-being losses that are 
greater in Greece than in the other countries.44 
The ESS trust data provide some insight into the 
reasons for this. Although generalized social 
trust is maintained roughly at pre-crisis levels, 
trust in police and in the legal system fall much 
more in Greece. Trust in police stayed stable at 
pre-crisis levels, or even grew slightly, in Spain 
and Portugal, while falling by 25% in Greece. 
Trust in the legal system fell significantly in all 
three countries, but by almost three times as 
much in Greece as in the other countries. Because 
trust measures have been shown to be strong 
supports for subjective well-being,45 this erosion 
of some key elements of institutional trust thus 
helps to explain the exceptionally large well-being 
losses in Greece.
How Equal is the Distribution of 
Happiness, and is it Changing?
In the first World Happiness Report, we emphasized 
that while average happiness levels in countries 
and regions are very important, it is equally 
important to track how happiness is distributed 
among individuals and groups. There has been 
much attention paid to measuring the levels and 
trends of income inequality, and concern over the 
increases in income inequality that have marked 
the recent economic history of many countries.46 
There have also been attempts to assess the 
empirical links between income inequality and 
average happiness in nations.47 In general, the 
results of this research have been mixed. It is 
time to pay more attention to the distribution of 
happiness itself.   
All of the data presented thus far in this chapter 
have been based on national and regional averages. 
Our analysis of the distribution of average 
happiness among countries and regions showed 
some evidence of global convergence, with the 
growth of happiness being generally higher in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the region with the lowest 
average level. We now turn to consider inequality 
among individuals within regions. Figure 2.8 
shows two measures of the inequality, and their 
95% confidence intervals, of the distribution of 
ladder scores among individuals in each of the 10 
regions, and for the world as a whole.48 The first 
measure includes 2005–2007, and the second 
covers the most recent period, 2010–2012. To 
make the analysis reflect the population of each 
region, and of the world as a whole, we use 
population weights to combine the individual 
observations to form regional and global totals.
Looking at the inequality of happiness measures 
for 2010–12, we see that inequality is highest in 
MENA, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia. It is 
lowest in Western Europe and NANZ. The world 
measure, which takes both inter-regional and 
intra-regional differences into account, is higher 
than in most regions taken separately, about 
equal to that for South Asia.
Has the inequality of happiness been growing 
or declining? Over the 2005–07 to 2010–12 
periods, inequality has been shrinking in Latin 
America and the CIS, while increasing in Western 
Europe, MENA, NANZ, South Asia, and the 
world as a whole.
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Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has presented data by country and 
region, and for the world as a whole, showing the 
levels, explanations, changes and equality of hap-
piness, mainly based on life evaluations from the 
Gallup World Poll. Despite the obvious happiness 
impacts of the financial crisis of 2007-08, the 
world has become a slightly happier and more 
generous place over the past five years. Because 
of continuing growth in most supports for better 
lives in Sub-Saharan Africa, and of continued 
convergence in the quality of the social fabric 
within greater Europe, there has also been some 
progress toward equality in the regional distribu-
tion of well-being. 
There have been important regional cross-cur-
rents within this broader picture. Improvements 
in the quality of life have been particularly preva-
lent in Latin America and the Caribbean, while 
reductions have been the norm in the regions 
most affected by the financial crisis, Western Eu-
rope and other western industrial countries, or by 
some combination of financial crisis and political 
and social instability, as in the Middle East and 
North Africa. Analysis of life evaluations in the 
four Western European countries most affected 
by the Eurozone crisis showed the happiness 
effects to be even larger than would be expected 
from their income losses and large increases in 
unemployment.
Other cross-currents were revealed also in South 
Asia, where there was a significant drop in aver-
age life evaluations. The positive contributions 
from continuing economic growth and greater 
generosity were more than offset by the effects 
of declining social support, and of less perceived 
freedom to make life choices. Inequality in the 
distribution of happiness also grew significantly 
within South Asia.
In summary, the global picture has many 
strands, and the slow-moving global averages 
mask a variety of substantial changes. Lives have 
been improving significantly in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, and in Sub-Saharan Africa; 
worsening in the Middle East and North Africa; 
dropping slightly in the western industrial world, 
and very sharply in the countries most affected by 
the Eurozone crisis. As between the two halves of 
Europe, the convergence of quality of life, in its 
economic, institutional and social dimensions, 
continues, if slowly. Within each of these broad 
regions, many complexities were evident, and 
others remain to emerge or to be noticed.  
The pictures of levels and changes in the qual-
ity of life emerging from the global data must 
be considered only indicative of what remains 
to be learned as there are increases in the avail-
able well-being data, and a better understanding 
of what contributes to a good life. The empirical 
conclusions we have been able to draw are tenta-
tive. They are nonetheless suggestive of what 
might and could become more routine analysis 
of how people assess the quality of their lives 
throughout the world, and of what might be done 
to improve their chances of leading better lives.
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Dependent Variable
Independent Variable Cantril Ladder Positive Affect Negative Affect Cantril Ladder
Log GDP per capita 0.283*** -0.005 0.010 0.293***
(0.073) (0.011) (0.008) (0.075)
Social support 2.321*** 0.238*** -0.220*** 1.780***
(0.465) (0.059) (0.046) (0.423)
Healthy life expectancy at birth 0.023** 0.001 0.002* 0.021*
(0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008)
Freedom to make life choices 0.902** 0.321*** -0.107* 0.144
(0.340) (0.044) (0.047) (0.333)
Generosity 0.858** 0.198*** 0.001 0.359
(0.274) (0.036) (0.030) (0.269)
Perceptions of corruption -0.713* 0.042 0.086** -0.843***
(0.283) (0.038) (0.026) (0.249)
Positive affect 2.516***
(0.438)
Negative affect 0.347
(0.546)
Year dummy (ref. year: 2012)
2005 0.289** -0.021* 0.019* 0.337**
(0.110) (0.010) (0.009) (0.104)
2006 -0.174*** -0.005 0.014+ -0.159**
(0.052) (0.009) (0.007) (0.052)
2007 0.079 0.002 -0.013* 0.084
(0.055) (0.008) (0.006) (0.053)
2008 0.149** 0.005 -0.018** 0.145**
(0.053) (0.007) (0.006) (0.054)
2009 0.059 0.002 -0.009 0.058
(0.050) (0.007) (0.006) (0.050)
2010 -0.011 -0.005 -0.016** 0.007
(0.044) (0.007) (0.005) (0.045)
2011 0.036 -0.007 -0.006 0.053
(0.041) (0.006) (0.005) (0.039)
Constant -0.383 0.267*** 0.249*** -1.149*
(0.498) (0.064) (0.055) (0.518)
Number of countries 149 149 149 149
Number of obs. 732 732 733 729
Adjusted R-squared 0.742 0.482 0.232 0.773
Notes: This is a pooled OLS regression for a tattered panel consisting of all available surveys for 149 countries 
over the eight survey years 2005-12. GDP per capita for most countries is Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted 
to constant 2005 international dollars, taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) released by the World 
Bank in April 2013. Data for Cuba, Puerto Rico, Taiwan, and Zimbabwe are missing in the World Development 
Indicators (WDI). Therefore we use the PPP-converted GDP per capita (chain series, “rgdpch”) at 2005 constant 
prices from the Penn World Table 7.1. GDP data is in year t-1 is matched with other data in year t. The most recent 
Table 2.1: Regressions to Explain Average Happiness across Countries (Pooled OLS)
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data on healthy life expectancy at birth is only available in 2007 from World Health Organization (WHO), but life 
expectancy at birth is available for all years from World Development Indicators. We adopt the following strategy to 
construct healthy life expectancy at birth for other country-years: first we generate the ratio of healthy life expectancy 
to life expectancy in 2007 for countries with both data, and assign countries with missing data the ratio of world 
average of healthy life expectancy over life expectancy; then we apply the ratio to other years (i.e. 2005, 2006, and 
2008-12) to generate the healthy life expectancy data. Social support (or having someone to count on in times of 
trouble) is the national average of the binary responses (either 0 or 1) to the question “If you were in trouble, do you 
have relatives or friends you can count on to help you whenever you need them, or not?” Freedom to make life 
choices is the national average of responses to the question “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your freedom to 
choose what you do with your life?” Generosity is the residual of regressing national average of response to the 
question “Have you donated money to a charity in the past month?” on GDP per capita. Perceptions of corruption 
are the average of answers to two questions: “Is corruption widespread throughout the government or not” and “Is 
corruption widespread within businesses or not?” Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors clustered by 
country in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate significance at the 0.1, 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.
Country
  Spain   Italy Greece Portugal Average
Δ Ladder -0.750 -0.691 -0.891 -0.305 -0.659
Explained by 
change (Δ) of 
each variable
Social support -0.035 -0.081 0.051 -0.101 -0.042
Freedom to make life choices -0.053 -0.106 -0.174 -0.083 -0.104
Generosity -0.013 -0.088 -0.109 0.044 -0.041
Perceptions of corruption -0.050 0.003 -0.079 -0.063 -0.047
Life expectancy 0.030 0.020 0.026 0.038 0.029
Ln(GDP per capita) -0.005 -0.015 -0.009 0.001 -0.007
Total -0.126 -0.267 -0.294 -0.162 -0.212
Δ Unemployment rate      13.7      2.3      9.2       5.3      7.6
Explained by Δ unemployment rate -0.443 -0.074 -0.297 -0.171 -0.246
             Country   
                       Spain          Italy      Greece      Portugal     Average
2005-07 – 2010-12    Δ Positive Affect              -0.033        -0.056       -0.113          0.023   -0.045
            Δ Negative Affect               0.096      -0.003       0.079         -0.025   0.037
       Δ Ladder Ranking                    -16          -17           -28   -12        -18
        Δ Positive Affect Ranking        -1           -5           -16      6         -4
             Δ Negative Affect Ranking            -15           -6           -34     10         -11
Table 2.2: Sources of Lower Life Evaluations in Four Hard-Hit Eurozone Countries
Table 2.3: Dynamics of Emotions and Life Evaluations in Four Hard-Hit Eurozone Countries
WHR I (2005-11) – 
WHR II (2010-12)
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Figure 2.1: International Shares of Variance: 2010–12
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Figure 2.2: Level and Decomposition of Happiness by Regions: 2010–12 
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Figure 2.3: Ranking of Happiness: 2010–12 (Part 1)
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Figure 2.3: Ranking of Happiness: 2010–12 (Part 2)
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Figure 2.3: Ranking of Happiness: 2010–12 (Part 3) 
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Figure 2.4: Comparing World and Regional Happiness Levels: 2005–07 and 2010–12
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Figure 2.5: Countries with Rising and Falling Happiness: 2005–07 and 2010–12
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Figure 2.6: Comparing Happiness: 2005–07 and 2010–12 (Part 1)  
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Figure 2.6: Comparing Happiness: 2005-07 and 2010-12 (Part 2)  
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Figure 2.6: Comparing Happiness: 2005–07 and 2010–12 (Part 2)  
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Figure 2.6: Comparing Happiness: 2005-07 and 2010-12 (Part 3)  
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Figure 2.6: Comparing Happiness: 2005–07 and 2010–12 (Part 3)  
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Figure 2.7.1: Population-Weighted GDP Per Capita by Regions: 2005–07 and 2010–12
Figure 2.7.2: Social Support by Regions: 2005–07 and 2010–12 
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Figure 2.7.3: Perceptions of Corruption by Regions: 2005–07 and 2010–12 
Figure 2.7.4: Prevalence of Donations by Regions: 2005–07 and 2010–12 
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Figure 2.7.5: Life-Choice Freedom by Regions: 2005–07 and 2010–12 
Figure 2.8: Comparing Gini of Happiness: 2005–07 and 2010–12  
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Appendix
Table A1: Imputation of Missing Values for Figure 2.3
Country GDP per capita Social support Perceptions of 
corruption
Generosity Freedom Healthy life 
expectancy
Myanmar PPP US dollar 
in 2011 from 
IMF
Corruption in 
business in 2012
Predicted by “donation-
a-b*ln(gdp)”1
Iran 2009 data 2008 data Predicted by “donation-
a-b*ln(gdp)”
2008 data
Palestinian 
Territories
2004 data from 
Washington 
Institute
Predicted by “donation-
a-b*ln(gdp)”
Somaliland 
Region
Ethiopia’s data Predicted by “donation-
a-b*ln(gdp)”
Ethiopia’s 
data
Kosovo Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s 
data
Predicted by “donation-
a-b*ln(gdp)”
North Cyprus Cyprus’s data Predicted by “donation-
a-b*ln(gdp)”
Cyprus’s 
data
Sudan 2008 data
Ethiopia Kenya’s data
Bahrain 2009 data
Jordan 2009 data
Uzbekistan 2006 data
Turkmenistan Uzbekistan’s data
Kuwait Corruption in 
business  in 
2010-11 
Saudi Arabia 2009 data
Qatar 2009 data
Oman Saudi Arabia’s 
data
Saudi Arabia’s 
data
United Arab 
Emirates
Corruption in 
business in 2010
1 The coefficients  a and b are generated by regressing national-level donations on GDP per capita in a pooled OLS regression.
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1 Our biggest debt of gratitude is to the Gallup Organization 
for complete and timely access to the data from all years of 
the Gallup World Poll. We are also grateful for continued 
helpful advice from Gale Muller and his team at Gallup, 
and for invaluable research support from the Canadian 
Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) and the Korea 
Development Institute (KDI) School of Public Policy and 
Management. Jerry Lee has provided fast and efficient 
research assistance, especially in the section relating to 
happiness changes in the Eurozone countries. Kind advice 
on chapter drafts has been provided by Chris Barrington-
Leigh, Angus Deaton, Martine Durand, Richard Easterlin, 
Carol Graham, Jon Hall, Richard Layard, Daniel Kahneman,  
Conal Smith, and Arthur Stone.
2 See Helliwell, Layard & Sachs, eds. (2012).
3 The detailed definitions of the variables are found in the 
notes to Table 2.1. The equations shown in Table 2.1 use 
pooled estimation from a panel of annual observations for 
each country, and thus explain differences over time and 
among countries. If a pure cross-section is run using the 
115 countries for which 2012 data are available, the equa-
tion explains 75.5% of the international variance, similar to 
what is found using the larger sample of Table 2.1.
4 See OECD (2013).
5 See Cantril (1965).
6 See World Happiness Report (Helliwell, Layard & Sachs, 
eds. 2012, pp. 14-15). The result is shown by triangulation, 
since no surveys asks all three questions. We were first 
able to show the explanatory equivalence of SWL and the 
Cantril ladder using Gallup World Poll data. The triangle 
was completed using ESS data to show the same thing for 
SWL and happiness with life as a whole. The fact that ESS 
equations were even tighter using the average of SWL and 
happiness with life as a whole, than using either variable 
on its own, led us to recommend (Helliwell, Layard and 
Sachs 2012, p. 94) the inclusion of both questions  in 
national surveys.
7 See, for example, Krueger et al. (2009). Measures of affect 
are also more useful in laboratory experiments, since these 
are generally expected to show only ephemeral effects, of a 
sort not likely to be revealed by life evaluations.
8 For the 606 country-years where there are observations for 
the HDI, ladder, and affect measures, there are significant 
positive correlations between the HDI and the Cantril ladder 
(+0.76), positive affect (+0.28), and happiness yesterday 
(+0.24). Thus the linkage with the HDI is three times as 
strong for the life evaluation as for positive emotions. The 
link is even weaker for negative affect, where the correlation 
with the HDI is anomalously positive but insignificant 
(+0.06).
9 The horizontal line at the right-hand end of each bar 
shows the estimated 95% confidence intervals. Boot-
strapped standard errors (500 bootstrap replications) are 
used to construct the confidence intervals.
10 The sixth variable used in Table 2.1, healthy life expectancy, 
is only available at the national level, so that all of its variance 
is among rather than within countries.  Figure 2.1 is based 
on the household income levels submitted by each Gallup 
respondent, made internationally comparable by the use of 
purchasing power parities. The income variable we use in 
Table 2.1 is GDP per capita at the national level.
11 This result holds for the individual emotions as well as 
their averages. If the base equation of Table 2.1 is fitted 
separately to each of the positive emotions, the proportion 
of variance explained ranges from 0.38 for enjoyment to 
0.48 for happiness, while for the negative emotions the 
share ranges from 0.17 for worry to 0.21 for anger. Since 
the patterns of coefficients are broadly similar, the aggrega-
tion into measures of positive and negative affect produces 
equations that are generally tighter–fitting than for the 
individual emotions.
12 Using a large sample of individual-level observations for 
the Cantril ladder and positive affect from the Gallup 
Healthways US survey, Kahneman & Deaton (2010) also 
find much higher and more sustained income effects for 
the ladder than for positive affect.
13 The regional groupings are the same as those used by the 
Gallup World Poll, except that we have split the European 
countries into two groups, one for Western Europe and the 
other for Central and Eastern Europe. The online appendix 
shows the allocation of countries among the 10 regions.
14 In most countries the sampling frame includes all those 
resident aged 14+ in the country, except for isolated 
or conflict-ridden parts of a few countries. In six Arab 
countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates) the sample is restricted to 
nationals and Arab expatriates. The sampling details and 
extent of current exclusions are reported in Gallup (2013). 
The population weight used here is the adult (14+) in 
each country in 2011. The population data are drawn from 
World Development Indicators (WDI) except in the case of 
Taiwan, for which data are taken from its Department of 
Statistics of Ministry of the Interior (http://www.moi.gov.
tw/stat/english/index.asp).
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15 From the actual average data in each country, we can find 
the lowest value for each of the variables, and then calcu-
late happiness in Distopia as the constant term of the equa-
tion plus each coefficient times the lowest observed average 
country’s value for the six key variables in 2010-12.
16 This unexplained component is the country’s average error 
term, for 2010-12, in the equation of Table 2.1.
17  There are 11 possible answers over the 10-point range 
of the scale, with 0 for the worst possible life and 10 for 
the best possible life.  The 0.8 is calculated as follows: 
0.80=0.283*2.82, where 0.283 is the income coefficient 
from Table 2.1 and 2.82 is the difference of log incomes 
between the richest and poorest of the 10 regions. These 
are, respectively, the artificial region comprising the United 
States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (NANZ) and 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
18 0.86=2.32*(0.93-0.56), where 0.93 and 0.56 are the aver-
age shares of respondents who have someone to count on 
in Western Europe and South Asia, respectively.
19   0.20=0.713*(0.35-0.07), where 0.35 and 0.07 are the average 
values for perceived absence of corruption in NANZ and 
Central & Eastern Europe, respectively.
20 0.66=0.023*(72.56-43.76), where 72.56 and 43.76 are the 
average life expectancies in Western Europe and Sub-Saharan 
Africa.
21 0.46=0.86*(0.28-(-0.25)),  where 0.28 and -0.25 are the 
average generosity values (adjusted for income levels) in the 
most (Southeast Asia) and least (MENA) generous regions.
22 0.26=0.90*(0.85-0.56), where 0.85 and 0.56 are the average 
freedom values in the most (NANZ) and least (MENA) free 
regions.
23 The issues and evidence are surveyed by Oishi (2010).
24 Higher positive affect, and greater sociability (beyond that 
captured by the social support variable) are advanced as 
possible sources of the Latin American boost, with ques-
tion response styles an identified contributor to the East 
Asian effect. The positive effect for Latin America is also 
found by Inglehart (2010) using the World Values Survey 
data for a smaller number of countries. The negative differ-
ence for East Asians becomes larger if it is compared to re-
spondents in North America, mirroring earlier studies sug-
gesting that East Asian respondents report lower subjective 
well-being, and are less likely to give answers at the top of 
the scale, than are similarly-aged and situated respondents 
in the United States, with Asian immigrants to the United 
States falling in between. See Heine & Hamamura (2007).
25 There are some missing values for GDP per capita, healthy 
life expectancy at birth, social support, freedom to make 
life choices, generosity, and corruption in some countries. 
To generate the decomposition for each country, we impute 
the 2010-12 average values for the missing data. Table A1 in 
the Appendix show the imputation details.
26 There were no surveys in either 2010 or 2011 in Iceland, 
Switzerland, and Norway. To increase the data coverage and 
therefore the robustness of estimation of national averages 
representing the 2010-12 period, we combine data from 2008 
and 2012 for Norway and Iceland, and data from 2009 and 
2012 for Switzerland.
27 There is a zero correlation between the log of national 
population and average ladder scores, but if the log of 
population is added to the equation of Table 2.1, it takes 
the coefficient +0.075 (t=2.7). A similar coefficient, +0.071 
(t=4.9), is obtained if the residuals from the Table 2.1 
equation are regressed on the log of population.
28 The increase for East Asia is almost exactly the same as that 
for China, which has a dominant population share (86% 
in 2011) in the region. The increase in China matches that 
found in several other surveys over the 2005-10 period, as 
documented by Easterlin et al. (2012).
29 For the 21 countries, the population-weighted average increase 
was 0.435 points, on a 2005-07 average ladder score of 6.22. 
30 For the 27 countries, the average increase was 0.241 points, 
or 5.5% of the 2005-07 average ladder score of 4.385. 
31 South Korea’s exceptional post-crisis performance, in both 
macroeconomic and happiness measures, is discussed in 
more detail in Helliwell, Huang & Wang (2013).
32 The units for GDP per capita on the horizontal axis are on 
a natural logarithmic scale.
33 See Helliwell, Huang & Wang (2013).
34 There are some slight differences among the four countries 
in survey coverage, and hence the comparability of the 
changes, at least with respect to Portugal. All four countries 
had surveys in each of 2010, 2011 and 2012, so no problems 
arise there. But for the starting points, they are based on the 
average of 2005 and 2007 surveys in each of Greece, Spain 
and Italy, but on a single survey, in 2006, in Portugal. 
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35 The losses are almost as large even when set against the 
rankings of the same countries in the first World Happiness 
Report. That report included all years from 2005 through 
2010 and into 2011, and hence included at least the start 
of the Eurozone crisis. The four countries had an average 
Cantril ladder ranking of 41st in Figure 2.3 of that report, 
compared to 59th in Figure 2.3 of this report, which is 
based on surveys carried out during 2010-12.
36 This is an appropriate empirical strategy, in the current 
case, because all of the four countries under the micro-
scope are members of the OECD.
37 For the 176 OECD observations, the unemployment rate 
explains 7.8% of the remaining variance, with a coefficient 
of 0.033 (t=3.8). 
38 See especially the updated version of Helliwell & Huang 
(2011).
39 Di Tella et al. (2001, 2003) use Eurobarometer data with 
a four-point scale, making direct comparisons difficult. 
However, we get an approximate comparison by compar-
ing the ratios of the country-level and individual-level 
unemployment coefficients in two-level estimation. These 
comparisons suggest a national unemployment rate effect 
about twice as large as that we employ.
40 Ruprah & Luengas (2011), using Latino-barometer data 
with the same scaling as the Eurobarometer results, find 
the same effect of aggregate unemployment as do Di Tella 
et al (2001), but a smaller effect of individual unemployment.
41 In Greece, average positive affect fell from 0.71 to 0.60, 
while negative affect grew from 0.24 to 0.32. In Spain, 
positive affect fell from 0.77 to 0.71, and negative affect 
grew from 0.25 to 0.35. In proportionate terms, or in terms 
of hypothetical shifts in country rankings, these are as 
large as the changes in life evaluations.
42 In Italy, positive affect fell from 0.70 to 0.64, while negative 
affect was unchanged. In Portugal, which had the smallest 
drops in life evaluations among the four countries, there 
were no significant changes in affect, with positive affect 
slightly up and negative affect slightly down.
43 Desmukh (2009) shows that the 2004 tsunami caused 
roughly the same physical damage and loss of life in Aceh 
(Indonesia) and in Jaffna (Sri Lanka), but had much better 
well-being outcomes in the Indonesian case. In Aceh, the 
physical disaster helped to deliver a “peace dividend” while 
the effect was the reverse in Sri Lanka. Helliwell et al. 
(2013) use evidence from a variety of sources to show the 
likely well-being benefits of social capital in times of crisis.
44 Although Italy was in the first two rounds of the ESS, it is 
missing from rounds three to five, covering 2006-10. Thus 
our comparisons here using ESS data are among Greece, 
Portugal and Spain.
45 See Helliwell & Wang (2011).
46 See, for example, OECD (2008, 2011) and Wilkinson & 
Pickett (2009).
47 See, for examples, Alesina et al. (2004), Diener & Oishi 
(2003), Graham & Felton (2006), Oishi et al. (2011), 
Schwarze & Härpfer (2007) and Van Praag & Ferrer-i-
Carbonell (2009).
48 Bootstrapped standard errors (500 bootstrap replications) 
are used to construct the confidence intervals.
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Mental illness is one of the main causes of 
unhappiness. This is not a tautology. For, as the first 
World Happiness Report showed,1 people can be 
unhappy for many reasons — from poverty to 
unemployment to family breakdown to physical 
illness. But in any particular society, chronic mental 
illness is a highly influential cause of misery. 
By far the most common forms of mental illness are 
depression and anxiety disorders, so we particularly 
concentrate on these in this chapter. We develop the 
following key points:
1. Mental illness is a highly influential — and in the 
countries we have assessed, the single biggest — 
determinant of misery (see Table 3.1).
2. Prevalence varies between countries, but these 
conditions affect about 10% of the world’s 
population at any one time.
3. Worldwide, depression and anxiety disorders 
account for up to a fifth of all disability. This 
involves massive costs in lost output as well as 
increased physical illness.
4. Even in rich countries, less than a third of people 
who suffer from mental illness are in receipt of 
treatment and care; in lower-resource settings, the 
situation is considerably worse. This is serious 
discrimination; it is also unsound economics.
5. Cost-effective treatments exist. For depression 
and anxiety disorders, evidence-based treatments 
can have low or zero net cost. They can and 
should be made far more universally available.
6. Schools and workplaces need to be much more 
mental health-conscious, and directed to the 
improvement of happiness, if we are to prevent 
mental illness and promote mental health.
Mental Illness As a Key Determinant 
of Unhappiness
Mental health or psychological well-being makes 
up an integral part of an individual’s capacity 
to lead a fulfilling life, including the ability to 
study, work or pursue leisure interests, and to 
make day-to-day personal or household decisions 
about educational, employment, housing or other 
choices. The importance of good mental health 
to individual functioning and well-being can be 
amply demonstrated by reference to values that 
sit at the very heart of the human condition: 
t Pleasure, happiness and life satisfaction: There is 
a long-standing and widely accepted proposition 
that happiness represents the ultimate goal in life 
and the truest measure of well-being. It is hard if 
not impossible to flourish and feel fulfilled in life 
when individuals are beset by health problems 
such as depression and anxiety. 
t Family relations, friendship and social interaction: 
Individuals’ self-identity and capacity to flourish 
are deeply influenced by their social surroundings, 
including the opportunity to form relationships 
and engage with those around them (family 
members, friends, colleagues). Difficulties in 
communication as well as loneliness and social 
isolation are well-documented concomitant 
consequences of mental illness.
t Independent thought and action: The capacity of 
individuals to manage their thoughts, feelings 
and behavior, as well as their interactions with 
others, is a pivotal element of the human 
condition. Health states or conditions that rob 
individuals of independent thought and action  
—  such as acute psychosis or profound intellectual 
disability  —  are regarded as among the most 
severely disabling. In the most recent Global 
Burden of Disease study, for example, acute 
schizophrenia has the highest disability weight 
out of 220 health state valuations made (0.76, 
where 0 equals no disability and 1 equals 
complete disability).2 
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It is in the interest of individuals, communities 
and countries to nurture and uphold these core 
human attributes. 
Misery
We can see the crucial role of mental health by 
asking: what are the most important determinants 
of misery? It is now possible to address this 
question because in many countries representative 
samples of the population are now asked how 
satisfied they are with their lives. In the following 
analysis we define misery as being in the bottom 
quarter of the population in terms of life satisfaction. 
We then attempt to explain which members of 
the population over 25 are in misery (on that 
definition) and which are not.
As the table shows, mental health problems represent 
the most important explanatory variable. They are 
more important than physical illness, which in turn 
is more important than income or unemployment.4 
These priorities differ markedly from those followed 
by most politicians, largely because stigma inhibits 
the public expression of the demand for better 
treatment for mental illness.
So how can we improve the mental health of the 
adult population? There are two main strategies. 
One is to provide better healthcare and social 
support for adults who are mentally ill. But a 
second is to intervene earlier, since half of adults 
who are mentally ill experienced the onset of 
their mental health problems by the age of 15.5
To see the importance of early mental health inter-
vention, we can look at a cohort of people born in 
one particular year and see what features of their 
childhood development best predict their life 
satisfaction as adults. Here we focus on the British 
cohort born in 1970, for whom we have detailed 
measurements of their development as children at 
ages 5, 10 and 16 along three dimensions: emotional, 
behavioral, and intellectual. We also have a wealth of 
information about their family background — 
economic, social and psychological. 
Holding constant these family background variables, 
Figure 3.1 shows the contribution of the child’s 
development to her resulting life satisfaction as an 
adult.6 It is the emotional development of the child 
that turns out to be much the most important 
factor. Next comes the child’s behavior — another 
dimension of the child’s mental health, and after 
that the child’s intellectual development. If you are 
interested in well-being, intellectual development 
needs to be balanced by much more interest in 
emotional and social development. Similarly when 
we turn to the effect of family background, the 
most powerful factor (in this and other studies) is 
the mother’s emotional health.7
All these facts underline the key importance of 
mental health services at every age, but particularly 
in the formative stages of life when the key 
attributes of emotional health are at their most 
crucial stage of development. It is vital to have 
good child (as well as adult) mental health services 
—both to improve the quality of life of children 
 Britain Germany Australia
Mental health        
problems
0.46* 0.26* 0.28*
Physical health 
problems
0.08* 0.16* 0.08*
Log Income per 
head
-0.05* -0.12* -0.04*
Unemployed 0.02* 0.04* 0.05*
Age -0.10* -0.07* -0.13*
Married -0.11* -0.06* -0.10*
Female -0.04* -0.04* -0.04*
Time, Region       
Dummies
9 9 9
N 71,769 76,409 73,812
Table 3.1: How mental health affects misery3    
(Standardized β-statistics)
* p<0.01
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and to stop mental illness that would otherwise 
continue into adult life. So how common are 
mental health problems?
The Prevalence of Mental Illness 
Worldwide
Mental disorders are a common occurrence in all 
regions and cultures of the world. For many years, a 
persistently held belief was that these disorders were 
the preserve of rich countries; epidemiological 
studies over the last generation have manifestly 
shown this not to be the case. In fact, by dint of 
population size, the large majority of persons with a 
mental disorder reside in low- and middle-income 
countries of the world. The prevalence of these 
conditions is dominated by the so-called “common 
mental disorders” of depression and anxiety, and 
they are indeed highly prevalent – between them 
they occur at any one time in nearly one in 10 
persons on the planet (676 million cases; see 
Table 3.2 for some overall global estimates).8 In 
childhood and adolescence, behavioral disorders 
constitute the most common problems, accounting 
for a further 85 million cases. 
Prevalence rates differ between countries but not 
greatly between groups of countries (when grouped 
by income level). For example, the World Health 
Survey found the following point estimates for 
depression among adults:9 high-income countries 
7.1%, upper middle-income 7.6%, lower middle-
income 6.4% and low-income 6.0%. Such 
estimates of course mask variations with respect 
to age and sex. The prevalence of depression 
among women, for example, is substantially 
higher than among men.11  
By weighting the time that individuals spend in 
these different health states by their estimated 
level of disability, one can get a better sense of the 
relative contribution that these disorders make 
to the overall burden of disease in a population. 
Figure 3.2 shows that, across different regions of 
the world, depression and anxiety disorders alone 
account for 10-18% of all years lived with disability in 
those populations. The disability burden is high-
est in adolescence and young adulthood (20% 
among 15-19 year olds), falling steadily to 10% by 
the age of 60-64 years (see Figure 3.3). 
Research is only now beginning on what factors 
explain the observed variation in mental illness 
among countries. It is sufficient here to record 
that there is some relation at the country level 
between the scale of mental illness and the level 
of national happiness.12
Figure 3.1: What are the main childhood influences on adult life satisfaction? (Britain)10
(Partial correlation coefficients)
Life satisfaction at 34
Emotional health Behavior Intellectual performance
.21 .10 .05
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Percent of  the 
world’s population 
Total number of cases 
in the world 
Depression (incl dysthymia) 6.8 404 million
Anxiety disorders 4.0 272 million
Childhood behavioral disorders 
(ADHD, conduct disorder)
1.2 85 million
Table 3.2: Global estimates of the prevalence of common mental disorders13
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Figure 3.2: Percent of total years lived with disability (YLD) due to depression and anxiety disorders, by world sub-region14
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The Under-Treatment of Mental Illness
A key contributing factor to the burden of mental 
disorders is the lack of appropriate care and 
treatment for those in need. This difference 
between identified need and actual service 
provision has been referred to as the “treatment 
gap.” Making use of community-based psychiatric 
epidemiology studies that included data on the 
percentage of individuals receiving care, the median 
treatment gap for schizophrenia has been estimated 
at 32%, but for all other conditions — including 
bipolar disorder, depression, dysthymia, anxiety 
disorders and alcohol dependence —  it well 
exceeded 50%.16 
Again, global estimates mask important variations 
between different geographical or income settings, 
as well as different conditions and severity levels. 
Figure 3.4 reinforces this point by revealing just 
how very low service uptake rates are for mental 
and substance use disorders in most low- and 
middle-income countries, even when the degree 
of disability or health loss is severe: only 10-30% 
of severe cases were in contact with services over 
the previous year in low- and middle-income 
countries, compared to (a still inadequate) 
25-60% in high-income countries.17
0 5 10 15 20 25 
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Figure 3.4: Percent of total years lived with disability (YLD) due to depression and anxiety disorders, by age group15
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Figure 3.4: Rate of service use for anxiety, mood and substance use disorders18
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The Cost of Mental Illness
The low rate of treatment of mental compared 
with physical illness is a case of extreme discrimi-
nation. It also makes no sense because:
tuntreated mental illness exerts huge costs on 
society, and
tgood treatments exist, which are not expensive.
We look first at the social costs of mental illness.
Loss of output and employment
The most obvious of these are the loss of output 
that results when people cannot work. In OECD 
countries employment would be 4% higher if 
people who are mentally ill worked as much as 
the rest of the population.19 And, even if they are 
in work, people who are mentally ill are more 
likely to go off sick. If they were no more absent 
than other workers, hours worked would rise by 
1%. On top of this, people experiencing mental 
health problems perform below par when they 
are at work. This “presenteeism” reduces output 
by at least another 1%. Thus if we add all these 
factors together OECD output is reduced by up to 
6% by mental illness. Estimates are not available 
for other countries.
From a public policy point of view, however, 
governments may be less worried about the cost 
to the economy than about the cost to the public 
finances. These can be very substantial. In high-
income countries, those who cannot work get dis-
ability benefits, and they also pay much less in tax 
than they otherwise would. In most high-income 
countries, mental illness accounts for at least a 
third of those on disability benefits — and more if 
psychosomatic conditions are included. Finance 
ministries in high-income countries are typically 
losing at least 1.5% of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) in disability benefits and lost taxes due 
to mental illness.
Physical healthcare
Mental illness also has a huge effect on physical 
health, and thus on the need for physical healthcare. 
Broadly speaking, compared with other people 
of the same age, people who are mentally ill are 
50% more likely to die.20 For people who have 
been admitted to the hospital for mental health 
reasons, the difference in life expectancy is some 
15-20 years.21
Moreover, if people with depression or anxiety 
disorders have a given physical condition, they are 
likely to receive 50% more healthcare than other 
patients who have similar physical conditions.22 In 
advanced countries these extra healthcare costs 
may amount to at least 1% of GDP.
Mental healthcare
So there are significant costs of mental illness, in 
terms of lost production and extra physical 
healthcare. If we also add in the cost of child 
mental illness, we have further major costs to 
include in terms of crime, social care and education-
al underachievement.
The main objective of mental healthcare is to 
raise the quality of life of patients and their 
families. But the case is stronger still when we 
take into account the costs to society and to the 
government.
So finally, how much do countries spend on mental 
healthcare? No government spends more than 15% 
of its health budget on mental healthcare,23 and 
even there (England and Wales) this amounts to 
only 1% of GDP. Other countries spend much 
less —see Figure 3.5. The underspend is particularly 
large in low-income countries.
When we consider the huge impact of mental 
health on life satisfaction, these figures are 
disproportionately low when compared with other 
items of government expenditure. But that judg-
ment depends of course on the fact that cost-
effective treatments exist that could be made much 
more widely available.
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Evidence-based Treatments 
Until the 1950s there was little that could be 
done for people with mental health problems 
other than to provide kind, compassionate care. 
But from the 1950s onwards new drugs were 
discovered that can help with depression and 
anxiety disorders, bipolar disorder and psychotic 
disorders. Then from the 1970s onwards new 
forms of evidence-based psychological therapy 
were developed, especially cognitive behavioral 
therapy (CBT), which have been subjected to the 
same rigorous testing as drugs. Let us begin with 
treatments for the most common mental health 
problems: depression and anxiety disorders.
Adult mental health 
For major depression, drugs lead to recovery 
within four months in over 50% of cases. But 
rates of relapse remain high unless drugs continue 
to be taken. Psychological therapy such as CBT 
for up to 16 sessions produces similar recovery 
rates, but these are followed by much lower 
relapse rates than with drugs, unless the drugs 
continue to be taken. For anxiety disorders, 
recovery rates with drugs and CBT are also over 
50%, but those who recover through CBT have 
low subsequent rates of relapse.
Both drugs and therapy are relatively inexpensive 
compared with treatments for most physical ill-
nesses. For example, a typical course of 10 sessions 
of CBT may cost $1,500 in a high-income country. 
Against this cost we have to set the humanitarian 
benefits of better mental health plus the economic 
benefits discussed earlier. Even if we consider only 
the public sector’s savings on disability benefits and 
lost taxes, these are likely to be at least as large 
as the gross cost – reducing the net cost of wider 
access to psychological therapy to zero.
This important and surprising situation is possible 
because the costs of treatment are not large (in 
Britain £750) and the economic costs of disability 
are very high (in Britain some £750 per month 
if someone is disabled rather than working). To 
illustrate, if 100 people are treated, and in con-
sequence four of them work for two years who 
would otherwise have remained disabled, this 
would be enough to reduce the net cost of the 
treatment to zero. Thus even quite small effects 
can reduce the net cost to zero.25
It was this argument that helped to persuade the 
British government to roll out from 2008 onwards 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Figure 3.5: Mental health spending in different types of countries24
As Percent of Health Spending As Percent of GDP
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an ambitious program for Improving Access to 
Psychological Therapies (IAPT). This program now 
treats half a million people a year and is still 
expanding. Recovery rates are close to levels obtained 
in clinical trials, and the employment record of those 
treated confirms the assumptions made in the 
previous paragraph.26 Similar programs are being 
considered in other countries. For example, 
population-based research on the costs and effects of 
depression treatment in primary healthcare in Chile 
has led to its inclusion and prioritization within the 
country’s national health program.27 
In poorer countries there will be much smaller 
flowbacks to the public finances, since disability 
benefits are much lower or non-existent. But the 
economic case remains strong. Two separate studies 
in India estimate the cost of episodic treatment of 
depression with antidepressants in primary care to 
be 150-300 rupees per month, equivalent to 
about $20-40 for a six-month treatment episode,28 
while an analysis for the South-East Asia region as 
a whole put the six-month cost of treatment at 
$30-60. Treatment produces a health improvement 
of at least 20 “disability-free days” or 0.06 disability-
adjusted life-years (DALYs), resulting in a cost per 
healthy life-year gained in the range of $500-1,000. 
That is the same as saying that $1,000,000 will 
buy 1,000-2,000 years of healthy life. One only 
has to place a very modest monetary value on a 
healthy year of life — such as the average annual 
income per person — to make the return on 
investment highly favorable.  
This of course does not consider the returns to 
productivity, the value of which also greatly 
surpasses the cost of treatment. Specifically, the 
cost of providing 10 sessions of CBT equates to 
about half the average monthly wage in high-
income countries, so were this (very conservatively) 
to apply to a low-income country with, say, an 
average monthly wage of $200, then treating 
100 patients will cost $10,000 but yield an 
expected 100 months or $20,000 of additional 
output if just four of them return to work for two 
years. The economic cost-benefit test is passed 
with flying colors. 
So there is a strong case for increased provision of 
both medication and psychological interventions 
in poorer countries. In richer countries medication 
is already widely available and the main need is 
for increased provision of psychological therapy: 
the majority of sufferers there want psychological 
therapy, and systematic reviews recommend at 
least one form of psychological therapy for every 
common mental health condition.29 At the same 
time as increasing the GDP, such an intervention 
will increase the health of the population.
What about the resources actually needed to 
implement an integrated package of cost-effective 
care and prevention? One financial analysis was 
carried out for 12 selected low- and middle-income 
countries to estimate the expenditures needed to 
scale up over a 10-year period the delivery of a 
specified mental healthcare package, comprising 
pharmacological and/or psychosocial treatment 
for schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, depression 
and hazardous alcohol use. The analysis estimated 
that in order to meet the specified target coverage 
levels (80% of cases for psychosis and bipolar 
disorder, 25-33% of cases with depression and 
risky drinking), annual spending for this package 
would need to be up to $2 per capita in low-income 
countries (compared to $0.10––0.20 now), and 
$3-4 in middle-income countries.30 So for a 
middle-income country of 50 million people, 
total annual spending on the package would 
amount to $150-200 million.
The Ethiopian Ministry of Health recently used 
an updated version of this costing tool to help 
them plan their national mental health strategy. It 
showed that modestly increasing coverage of 
basic psychosocial and pharmacological treat-
ment of psychosis, bipolar disorder, depression 
and epilepsy will require $25 million over the 
next four years, equivalent to just $0.07-0.08 per 
capita per year.31 
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Child mental health problems
Half of all mental illness manifests itself by the age 
of 15. Child mental illness can be divided between 
“internalizing” disorders (anxiety and depression) 
and “externalizing” disorders (conduct disorder and 
Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)). 
Anxiety disorders can be effectively treated by 
psychological therapy with 50-60% recovery rates. 
Depression can also be treated by CBT, interpersonal 
therapy or (in carefully selected cases) medication, 
with good success rates. Conduct disorder if mild 
to moderate can be treated by parent training such as 
the Webster-Stratton method, while a child with 
ADHD will recover in at least 70% of cases if treated 
with the psychostimulant drug Methylphenidate.32 
A recently completed trial undertaken in Jamaica 
demonstrated that a low-cost, school-based 
intervention substantially reduced child conduct 
problems and increased child social skills at 
home and at school.33
All these treatments are relatively cheap, and 
generate major savings to the public finances 
through reduced crime and social failure and 
improved economic performance. There is a strong 
humanitarian presumption in favor of early treat-
ment, and also a strong economic case.34
When it comes to severely disturbed children, 
those with severe conduct disorder (say 1% of 
a typical child population) have the capacity to 
impose enormous costs on a society. In Britain 
they are estimated to cost society some £150,000 
more in present value terms than other children. 
Suitable treatments include Multi-Systemic Therapy 
which can cost between £6,000 and £15,000 per 
child. Clearly this would pay for itself even if the 
success rate was only one in 10.
Evidence-based Strategies for      
Prevention
But we should also do all that we possibly can to 
prevent the emergence of mental illness in the 
first place. So what are the main risk factors 
causing mental illness, and the main protective 
factors against it? Table 3.3 provides an illustrative 
set of factors. 
Level of determinant Risk factors Protective factors
Low self-esteem Self-esteem, confidence
Individual attributes Emotional immaturity Ability to manage stress and adversity
Difficulties in communicating Communication skills
Medical illness, substance abuse Physical health, fitness
Loneliness, bereavement Social support of family and friends
Neglect, family conflict Good parenting/family interaction
Social circumstances Exposure to violence/abuse Physical security and safety
Low income and poverty Economic security
Difficulties or failure at school Scholastic achievement
Work stress, unemployment Satisfaction and success at work
Poor access to basic services Equality of access to basic services
Environmental factors Injustice and discrimination Social justice, tolerance, integration
Exposure to war or disaster Physical security and safety
Table 3.3: Risk factors and protective factors for mental health35
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So mental well-being can be put at risk by a wide 
range of factors that span not only the life course 
but also different spheres of life: cognition and 
behavior at the individual level; living and working 
conditions at the social level; and, opportunities 
and rights at the environmental level. Protection 
and promotion of mental health need to be built in 
at every level. Building the evidence base for men-
tal health promotion and the prevention of mental 
disorders is particularly important, given current 
gaps and weaknesses in knowledge.
At its core, mental health or psychological well-
being rests on the capacity of individuals to manage 
their thoughts, feelings and behavior, as well as 
their interactions with others. It is essential that 
these core attributes of self-control, resilience and 
confidence be allowed to develop and solidify in 
the formative stages of life, so that individuals are 
equipped to deal with the complex choices and 
potential adversities they will face as they grow 
older. Promoting a healthy start in life is therefore 
vital, and there is ample evidence to indicate that 
early intervention programs have an important 
protective or preventive effect.
Early child development holds considerable 
promise for protecting and promoting health.36 
The most successful programs addressing risk 
and protective factors early in life are targeted at 
child populations at risk, especially from families 
with low income and education levels, including: 
home-based interventions in pregnancy and 
infancy; efforts to reduce tobacco and alcohol use 
during pregnancy; and parent management 
training and pre-school programs.37 Recent reviews 
of evidence from low- and middle-income countries 
likewise found significant positive effects for 
interventions delivered by community members 
on children’s development and the psychosocial 
functioning of both mothers and children.38 For 
example, research from Jamaica has shown how 
adding psychosocial stimulation to a nutrition 
intervention can help reduce the development of 
long-term disabilities in undernourished infants 
and other young children.39
Mental health promotion and protection strategies 
may be targeted at specific groups or be more 
universal in nature. Evidence-based interventions 
for supporting families and community-level 
interventions include: home-based interventions, 
for socioeconomically disadvantaged families (as 
above); school-based interventions supporting 
social and emotional learning; work-based 
interventions for adults looking for employment 
or struggling to cope at work; and community-
based interventions aimed at enhanced social 
participation of older adults or providing psycho-
social support for persons affected by conflict 
or disaster.40
Concluding Remarks
So we need a completely different attitude to 
mental health worldwide. This should affect the 
availability of treatment, as well as major steps 
to prevent mental illness and to promote mental 
health. We offer a few thoughts.41
Treatment
It is reasonable to expect that treatment is as avail-
able for mental illness as it is for physical illness. 
This is a basic matter of equity and human rights. 
It is enshrined in law in many countries including 
the US, the U.K. and South Africa, but is currently 
some distance from being achieved. The effects of 
treatment are now highly predictable and relatively 
inexpensive. More treatment of mental illness is 
therefore probably the single most reliably cost-effec-
tive action available for reducing misery.
Treatments are now well-developed and their 
impact on recovery is well known. This is however a 
relatively new situation and it is time now for the 
world to provide these treatments more widely. 
To provide even basic mental health services for 
all in need, countries will need to spend a larger 
proportion of their GDP on mental healthcare. 
In advanced countries the largest neglected 
groups are those with depression and anxiety 
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disorders and children with behavioral disorders. 
They urgently need a better deal. In poorer countries, 
even those with the most severe conditions are 
mostly not in treatment. Remedying that is the 
first priority in these countries. 
It is vital that primary healthcare providers (e.g. 
general practice doctors, nurses and community 
health workers) are much better trained in rec-
ognizing and treating mental illness. The World 
Health Organization has developed clear and 
feasible guidelines for this.42 At the same time a 
new cadre of psychological therapists may need to 
be developed, whose services are available on the 
same basis as other medical services. In poorer 
countries there is also a major role for key counsel-
ors and community health workers.
Prevention and promotion
We also need a more mental health-conscious 
society. Every school teacher needs to be aware of 
mental health problems and be able to identify them 
in the children they teach. Similarly all managers 
should be aware of these problems and know what 
action to take when employees go off sick or are 
experiencing mental health problems. Govern-
ments also need to plan for mental health conse-
quences of macroeconomic and social changes.
The social environment also has to change. Exces-
sively macho environments generate stress which 
can easily turn into mental illness.43 Both schools 
and employees should treat the mental well-being of 
those in their care as a major priority.
Stigma and discrimination
Those who suffer from mental illness are doubly 
unfortunate. They have the condition in the first 
place, but in addition they are frequently discrim-
inated against44 and written off as hopeless cases. 
But, with the help of modern science, everyone 
can now be helped. It is time for every society to 
become much more open about mental illness, 
just as with other illnesses. This will also open 
the doors for people with mental illness playing 
a role in contributing to policy service development 
for mental health.
The adoption of the Comprehensive Mental Health 
Action Plan by the World Health Assembly clearly 
marks the political commitment of countries to 
mental health. A systematic implementation of 
the Action Plan has the potential to decrease the 
burden of mental illness as well as to decrease 
unhappiness in the world.45
Conclusion
Mental illness is a huge problem in every society 
and a major cause of misery in the world. The 
economic cost is also huge. But cost-effective 
treatments exist. Unfortunately however, most 
people who need treatment never get it. This can 
be reversed, and to do it will require countries to 
spend a higher proportion of their health budgets 
on mental health and to use these resources 
more efficiently. It ties in closely with the global 
happiness agenda in two ways. Better treatment 
for mental health would improve happiness 
directly; and improving happiness in other ways 
would reduce the frequency of mental illness.
If we want a happier world, we need a completely 
new deal on mental health.
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Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to survey the “hard” 
evidence on the effects of subjective well-being. 
In doing so, we complement the evidence on the 
determinants of well-being by showing that 
human well-being also affects outcomes of interest 
such as health, income, and social behavior. 
Generally, we observe a dynamic relationship 
between happiness and other important aspects of 
our lives, with influence running in both directions. 
Although happiness is considered here as a means 
— rather than an end in itself — we do not imply 
that normative arguments for raising well-being 
are insufficient to make the case for well-being. 
However, a better understanding of the objective 
benefits of raising happiness may also help to put 
happiness more center-stage in policy making 
and to refine policy evaluation. 
In the following sections we review the growing 
literature on the objective benefits of happiness 
across the major life domains categorized into 
(i) health & longevity; (ii) income, productivity, 
& organizational behavior; and (iii) individual & 
social behavior. Scientific research increasingly 
points to specific ways in which happiness generates 
tangible benefits. The experience of well-being 
encourages individuals to pursue goals that are 
capacity-building to meet future challenges. At 
the physiological level, positive emotions have 
been found to improve immune, cardiovascular, 
and endocrine functioning. In contrast, negative 
emotions are detrimental to these processes. 
Table 4.1 summarizes and categorizes the litera-
ture on the effects of subjective well-being.
Although high subjective well-being tends to help 
people function better, it is of course not a cure-all. 
Happy people do get sick and do lose friends. Not all 
happy people are productive workers. Happiness is 
like any other factor that aids health and functioning; 
with all other things being equal, it is likely (but not 
guaranteed) to help. It is important to emphasize 
that research does not prescribe extreme bliss but,   
rather, tentative evidence suggests that a moderate 
degree of happiness tends to be “optimal” for the 
effects surveyed in this chapter.
Before concluding this chapter we also discuss 
how happiness may lead to better life outcomes 
and what its role may be in human evolution. 
There is initial evidence about the processes that 
mediate between happiness and its beneficial 
outcomes. For instance, positive feelings bolster 
the immune system and lead to fewer cardiovas-
cular problems, whereas anxiety and depression 
are linked to poorer health behaviors and prob-
lematical physiological indicators such as inflam-
mation. Thus, a causal impact of happiness on 
health and longevity can be understood with the 
mediating mechanisms that are now being 
uncovered. Research in the field of neuroscience 
provides further prospects for new scientific 
insights on mediating pathways between happiness 
and traits or outcomes of interest.
It naturally follows from this survey that it is 
important to balance economic measures of 
societal progress with measures of subjective 
well-being and to ensure that economic progress 
leads to broad improvements across life domains, 
not just greater economic capacity. Given the 
tangible benefits to individuals and societies of 
moderately high well-being, it is ever more 
urgent that we act to effectively put well-being at 
the heart of policy and generate the conditions 
that allow everyone to flourish. 
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Benefits Evidence
Health & Longevity
t Reduced inflammation
t Improved cardiovascular health, 
immune & endocrine systems
t Lowered risk of heart disease, 
stroke & susceptibility to infection
t Practicing good health behaviors  
t Speed of recovery
t Survival & longevity
t Adversity and stress in childhood is associ-
ated with higher inflammation later in life.1 
t Positive emotions help cardiovascular, im-
mune and endocrine systems,2 including 
heart rate variability.3 Evidence suggests a 
causal link between positive feelings and 
reduced inflammatory, cardiovascular and 
neuroendocrine problems.4
t Positive affect is associated with lower 
rates of stroke and heart disease and sus-
ceptibility to viral infection.5
t High subjective well-being is linked to 
healthier eating, likelihood of smoking, 
exercise, and weight.6
t Positive emotions can undo harmful 
physiological effects by speeding up 
recovery.7 
t Happier individuals tend to live longer 
and have a lower risk of mortality, even 
after controlling for relevant factors.8
Income, Productivity 
& Organizational 
Behavior
t Increased productivity
t Peer-rated & financial performance
t Reduced absenteeism
t Creativity & cognitive flexibility
t Cooperation & collaboration
t Higher income
t Organizational performance
t Individuals with induced positive emo-
tions were more productive in an experi-
mental setting.9
t Happy workers were more likely to be 
rated highly by supervisors and in terms 
of financial performance.10
t Happiness can increase curiosity, creativity, 
and motivation among employees.11
t Happy individuals are more likely to 
engage collaboratively and cooperatively 
during negotiations.12
t Well-being is positively associated with 
individual earnings.13 Longitudinal evidence 
suggests that happiness at one point in time 
predicts future earnings, even after control-
ling for confounding factors.14
t Greater satisfaction among employees tends 
to predict organization-level productivity and 
performance, e.g. revenue, sales and profits.15
Table 4.1: Summary of the objective benefits of subjective well-being
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Note: Further detail on each study cited in the table is included in the relevant sections of this chapter.
Individual & Social 
Behavior
tLonger-term time preferences 
and delayed gratification
tReduced consumption & in-
creased savings
tEmployment
tReduced risk-taking
tPro-social behavior (e.g., donat-
ing money and volunteering)
tSociability, social relationships & 
networks
tIn experiments, individuals with higher 
well-being and positive affect are more 
willing to forego a smaller benefit in the 
moment in order to obtain a larger benefit 
in the future.16 Happier individuals may 
be better able to purse long-term goals 
despite short-term costs due to a greater 
ability to delay gratification.17
tLongitudinal studies find evidence that 
happier individuals tend to spend less and 
save more, take more time when making 
decisions and have higher perceived life 
expectancies.18
tSurvey evidence shows the probability of 
re-employment within one year is higher 
among individuals who are happier.19
tThe prevalence of seat-belt usage and the 
likelihood of being involved in an auto-
mobile accident were both linked to life 
satisfaction in a survey of over 300,000 
US households.20
tIndividuals who report higher subjective 
well-being donate more time, money, and 
blood to others.21
tWell-being increases interest in social 
activities leading to more and higher 
quality interactions.22 Positive moods also 
lead to more engagement in social activi-
ties.23 The happiness-social interaction 
link is found across different cultures and 
can lead to the transmission of happiness 
across social networks.24
Benefits Evidence
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Benefits of Happiness
Happiness on health and longevity
There are many factors that influence health, such 
as having strong social support, and practicing 
good health behaviors, such as exercising and not 
smoking. Although being happy is only one of 
those factors, it is an important one. This is because 
higher levels of subjective well-being can both 
directly and indirectly influence health. Below we 
review the up-to-date research on whether happy 
people experience better health.25 
Happiness and unhappiness have been directly 
associated with physiological processes underlying 
health and disease. For example, Kubzansky and 
colleagues find that adversity and stress in child-
hood predict elevated markers of inflammation a 
few years later.26 And chronic inflammation that 
occurs over years can harm the cardiovascular 
system. Cohen et al. (2003) found that positive 
emotions were associated with stronger immune 
system responses to infection. Bhattacharyya et al. 
(2008) found that positive feelings were associated 
with healthier levels of heart rate variability. Negative 
emotions harm cardiovascular, immune, and 
endocrine systems in humans, whereas positive 
emotions appear to help them.27 Levels of subjective 
well-being influence health, with positive levels 
helping health and negative levels harming it. 
Through an accumulation of studies, we are begin-
ning to understand not just that subjective well-
being influences health, but how this occurs. 
Because subjective well-being influences physi-
ological processes underlying health and disease, it 
is predictive of lower rates of cardiovascular disease 
and quicker recovery. For example, positive affect 
is associated with lower rates of strokes in senior 
citizens.28 Davidson et al. (2010) found in a 
prospective longitudinal study that those without 
positive feelings were at a higher risk for heart 
disease than those with some positive feelings, 
who in turn had higher levels of heart disease than 
those with moderate positive feelings. Stress can 
even hinder wound healing after an injury.29
One indirect route from happiness to health is 
that individuals who are high in subjective 
well-being are more likely to practice good health 
behaviors and practices. Blanchflower et al. 
(2012) found that happier individuals have a 
healthier diet, eating more fruits and vegetables. 
Ashton and Stepney (1982) reported that neurotic 
individuals, people who are prone to more stress, 
are more likely to smoke. Pettay (2008) found 
that college students high in life satisfaction were 
more likely to be a healthy weight, exercise, and 
eat healthy foods. Schneider et al. (2009) found 
that happier adolescents, as assessed by brain 
scans of the left prefrontal area, showed a more 
positive response to moderate exercise. Garg et 
al. (2007) found that people put in a sad mood as 
part of an experiment were more likely to eat 
tasty but fattening foods, such as buttered popcorn, 
rather than a healthy fruit. 
Using a large sample representative of the USA, 
Strine and her colleagues (2008a & b) found that 
depressed individuals are more likely to be obese 
and twice as likely to smoke, and parallel results 
were found for those with very high anxiety. Lack 
of exercise was associated with depression, and 
excessive drinking of alcohol was associated with 
anxiety. Grant et al. (2009) found, in a large sample 
across 21 nations, that higher life satisfaction was 
associated across regions with a greater likelihood of 
exercising and a lower likelihood of smoking. 
Kubzansky et al. (2012) found that distressed 
adolescents are more likely to be overweight. Thus, 
not only is there a direct biological path from 
happiness to healthier bodily systems, but unhappi-
ness is also associated with destructive behaviors 
that can exacerbate health problems.
Another indirect effect of happiness, as will be de-
scribed more fully in a next section, is that higher 
happiness can lead to more positive and fulfilling 
social relationships. And having these relation-
ships promotes health.30 For instance, the experi-
ence of prolonged stress can lead to poor health, 
but the presence of supportive friends and family 
can help individuals during this time. In contrast, 
lonely individuals experience worse health.31
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An important concern with these research findings 
is that healthier people may be happier because of 
their good health, and not the other way around. 
While this may be true for some reported findings, 
scientific studies also show support for a link going 
from happiness to health. Research findings have 
established a link from happiness to better physi-
ological functioning. Ong (2010) and Steptoe et al. 
(2009) review various possible explanations for the 
effects of positive feelings on health. Steptoe et al. 
(2005) found among middle-aged men and women 
that those high in positive feelings had reduced 
inflammatory, cardiovascular, and neuroendocrine 
problems. For instance, happiness was associated 
with a lower ambulatory heart rate and with lower 
cortisol output across the day. Similarly, Rasmussen 
et al. (2009) found that optimism predicted future 
health outcomes such as mortality, immune 
function, and cancer outcomes, controlling for 
factors such as demographics, health, and negative 
feelings. Boehm and her colleagues found that 
optimism and positive emotions protect against 
cardiovascular disease and also predict slower 
disease progression.32 They discovered that those 
with positive moods were more often engaged in 
positive health behaviors, such as exercising and 
eating a nutritious diet. Furthermore, positive 
feelings were associated with beneficial biological 
markers, such as lower blood fat and blood 
pressure, and a healthier body mass index. 
These associations held even controlling for level 
of negative moods.
Another piece of evidence supporting happiness 
causing good health is that positive emotions 
can undo the ill-effects of negative emotions on 
health. Negative emotions generate increased 
cardiovascular activity and redistribute blood 
flow to specific skeletal muscles. It has been 
shown that positive emotions can undo harmful 
physiological effects by speeding physiological 
recovery to desirable levels.33 
Diener and Chan (2011) reviewed eight types of 
evidence that point to a causal connection going 
from subjective well-being to health and longevity. 
They reviewed longitudinal studies with adults, 
animal experiments, experiments in which 
participants’ moods are manipulated and biomark-
ers are assessed, natural quasi-experiments, and 
studies in which moods and biomarkers are 
tracked together over time in natural settings. 
Diener and Chan (2011) concluded that the 
evidence overwhelmingly points to positive 
feelings being causally related to health. 
Happiness on average leads not only to better 
health, but also to a longer life. Danner et al. (2001) 
found that happier nuns lived about 10 years longer 
than their less happy colleagues. Because the nuns 
all had similar diets, housing, and living conditions, 
and the happiness measure was collected at a very 
early age many decades before death (at age 22 on 
average), the study suggests a causal relation 
between positive moods and longevity. In another 
study, Pressman and Cohen (2012) found that 
psychologists who used aroused positive words 
(e.g., lively, vigorous) in their autobiographies 
lived longer. In a longitudinal study of individuals 
40 years old and older, Wiest et al. (2011) found 
that both life satisfaction and positive feelings 
predicted mortality, controlling for socio-economic 
status variables. Conversely, Russ et al. (2012) 
reviewed 10 cohort studies and found that psycho-
logical distress predicted all-cause mortality, as well 
as cardiovascular and cancer deaths. Russ et al. 
(2012) found that even mild levels of psychological 
distress led to increased risk of mortality, con-
trolling for a number of possible confounding 
factors. Whereas risk of death from cardiovascular 
diseases or external causes, such as accidents, was 
significant even at lower levels of distress, cancer 
death was only related to high levels of distress. 
Bush et al. (2001) found that even mild depression 
increased the risk of mortality after people had 
experienced a heart attack. 
A systematic review by Chida and Steptoe (2008) 
on happiness and future mortality in longitudinal 
studies showed that happiness lowered the risk of 
mortality in both healthy and diseased populations, 
even when initial health and other factors were con-
trolled. Moreover, the experience of positive emo-
tions predicted mortality over and above negative 
emotions, showing that the effects of subjective 
well-being go beyond the absence of negativity. 
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Therefore, not only do negative emotions predict 
mortality, but positive emotions predict longevity. 
One reason this may be so, besides the toll that 
cardiovascular and immune diseases take on 
unhappy people, is that stress might lead to more 
rapid ageing. Epel et al. (2004) found shorter 
telomeres (the endcaps protecting DNA) in 
women who had significant stress in their lives. 
Because DNA must replicate with fidelity for an 
individual to remain healthy over the decades of 
life, and because the telomeres protect our DNA 
during replication, the reduction of telomeres due 
to stress leads to more rapid aging when a person 
chronically experiences unhappiness. 
In a large representative sample of elderly people 
in the UK, Steptoe and Wardle (2011) found that 
higher levels of positive affect were significantly 
associated with a higher probability of survival in 
the five years following the survey. The study 
divided respondents into three groups based on 
the positive affect they reported over a 24-hour 
period and then compared their mortality rates 
over a five-year period following the survey. 
Mortality rates among respondents in the highest 
positive affect group were reduced by 35% on 
average relative to those in the lowest positive 
affect group. This rate was robust even when 
controlling for demographic factors as well as 
health behaviors, self-reported health, and other 
conditions. Those in the high and medium 
positive affect groups had death rates of 3.6% 
and 4.6%, respectively, compared to 7.3% for the 
low positive affect group. Figure 4.1 below shows 
the differences in survival rates among the three 
groups in the follow-up period.
Figure 4.1: Proportion of individuals surviving by level of positive affect in an analysis of the English 
Longitudinal Study of Ageing
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Notes: Figure from Steptoe and Wardle (2011). “Survival from affect assessment” is measured in months from initial interview where 
positive affect levels where reported. The English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing is a representative sample of older men and women 
living in England. Positive affect reported on a single day by individuals between 52 and 79 years old were used. Values are adjusted for 
age and sex. Respondents with the highest third of reported positive affect were 34% less likely to die over the period studied than those 
in the lowest positive affect group after controlling for demographic and health factors. Those in the high and medium positive affect 
groups had death rates of 3.6% and 4.6%, respectively, compared to 7.3% for the low positive affect group.
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Primate studies also point to happiness affecting 
longevity. Weiss et al. (2011) found that orangutans 
who were rated as happier by their caretakers 
lived longer. Indeed, the difference between the 
apes that were one standard-deviation above 
versus below the mean in happiness was 11 
years. Because these apes often live about 50 
years in captivity, happiness accounted for a very 
large increase in longevity.
Research on the role of happiness in human evo-
lution (a topic explored in more depth below) finds 
a relationship between well-being and successful 
reproduction. A recent review by Diener et al. 
(2012) highlighted the evidence linking positive 
mood to the frequency of sexual intercourse and 
fertility. For example, Rasmussen et al. (2009) 
found that pregnant women who were more 
optimistic tended to miscarry less frequently and 
have babies of a healthy weight.
The positive benefits of subjective well-being on 
health at the individual level generalize to more 
aggregate levels. Lawless and Lucas (2011) found 
that places with higher life satisfaction had greater 
life expectancies, with lower levels of mortality 
from heart disease, homicide, liver disease, diabetes, 
and cancer. Similarly, Blanchflower and Oswald 
(2008) found that higher levels of national 
well-being were related to lower levels of national 
hypertension in a sample of 16 nations. Blanch-
flower and Oswald (2008) also found that regions 
in the United Kingdom reporting more stress 
also had higher rates of blood pressure. Moum 
(1996) found that low subjective well-being is 
both a short- and long-term predictor of suicide, 
and uncovered similar findings in a 20-year study. 
Across 32 nations, it was found that experiencing 
higher life satisfaction and happiness was related 
to lower suicide rates.34 These findings suggest 
that links between happiness and health outcomes 
are not simply relative in nature as they persist in 
aggregate and cross-national studies. Happiness 
can therefore influence health outcomes for both 
individual citizens and entire societies.
There is also evidence that negative affect can 
worsen health, even making illness more likely. 
For example, depressed people are substantially 
more likely to have cardiovascular problems, such 
as heart disease and strokes. Rugulies (2000) 
found in a review of 11 studies that depressed 
feelings predict coronary heart disease and that 
clinical levels of depression predict even more 
strongly. Similarly, when a person is angry and 
hostile they are more likely to suffer from coronary 
heart disease.35 Depression is associated with 
unhealthy physiological processes, such as inflam-
mation,36 which is believed to be connected to the 
development of heart diseases. Antidepressant 
medications can lower inflammation. A review by 
Zorrilla et al. (2001) found that stress is related to 
a weaker immune system. Studies on fertility 
provide yet more evidence on how negative 
emotions can be detrimental to healthy functioning. 
Fertility is lower among depressed women.37 An 
unhappy pregnancy is more likely to lead to a 
premature and low birth weight child.38 However, 
as discussed above, the effect of negative affect is 
not a mirror image of that observed for positive 
affect. In a study of susceptibility to developing a 
cold, Cohen et al. (2003) found that individuals 
with positive emotional styles had greater resistance 
to the virus when controlling for other factors, 
whereas negative emotions were not associated 
with resistance. This suggests that positive and 
negative affect may impact on health through 
different pathways but further study is needed to 
understand this interaction. 
Happiness on income, productivity, and             
organizational behavior
The experience of happiness is beneficial to 
workplace success because it promotes workplace 
productivity, creativity, and cooperation. There 
are several reasons why this is the case. The 
experience of positive feelings motivates people 
to succeed at work and to persist with efforts to 
attain their goals. As discussed above, individuals 
who are happier are more likely to be healthy and 
will, in turn, tend to be more productive (in part, 
simply because happier and healthier individuals 
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will take fewer sick days). In addition, individuals 
who are happier better integrate information 
leading to new ideas, which leads to creativity 
and innovation. Finally, individuals who are hap-
pier tend to have better social relations. In the 
context of work this leads to greater cooperation 
among coworkers and with customers.
Oswald et al. (2012) investigated how positive 
feelings influence productivity in an experimental 
setting. In an experiment involving piece-rate pay 
for research participants across a number of days, 
the economists found that those who were put in a 
positive mood had a greater quantity of work 
output (about 10-12%), but no less quality of 
output. Those performing the task at low and 
medium levels of productivity were helped most 
by being put in a good mood. As part of that same 
research, Oswald et al. (2012) also found that a bad 
mood induced by family illness or bereavement 
had a detrimental impact on productivity. 
Employees who are high in subjective well-being 
are more likely to achieve more while at work. 
Peterson et al. (2011) found that happy workers 
– optimistic and hopeful, resilient and high in 
self-efficacy – were more likely to be high in 
supervisor-rated performance and in financial 
performance. Conversely, whereas positive feelings 
reduce absenteeism from work, negative feelings 
increase absenteeism as well as turnover.39 
Happiness has also been shown to enhance 
curiosity and creativity. Foremost, positive feelings 
are associated with curiosity and creativity.40 
Leitzel (2001) found that happy people are more 
likely to feel energetic and interested in doing 
things, as well as scoring higher on measures of 
curiosity. Further, there is a large experimental 
research literature showing that people put in a 
good mood tend to be more original, creative, 
and show greater cognitive flexibility.41 Both 
Amabile et al. (2005) and George and Zhou 
(2007) found that workers are more creative 
when they experience positive moods. Indeed, 
two recent meta-analyses of experimental and 
non-experimental studies showed that although 
the strength of effects depend on the context and 
motivational focus, happiness is related to and 
generates creativity.42
A major reason for the success of happy individuals 
and organizations is that they experience on 
average more positive social relationships. 
Research clearly shows that happy workers are more 
cooperative and collaborative in negotiations than 
unhappy ones. In general, positive emotions 
boost cooperative and collaborative behavior in 
negotiations rather than withdrawal or competi-
tion.43 Individuals who are in a positive mood are 
more willing to make concessions during nego-
tiations.44 Through cooperation, they reach a 
better joint solution in negotiations.45 Individuals 
in a positive mood are more likely to make coop-
erative choices in a prisoner’s dilemma game as 
well.46 People in a positive mood are also more 
likely to show cohesion with their group. Recent 
experimental studies have shown that positive 
emotions lead to trust and cooperation when 
specific conditions are met.47 Overall, happiness 
leads to cooperation and collaboration in the 
workplace, particularly so in situations involving 
negotiation. 
On the other hand, negative emotions in the work-
place, especially chronic or intense ones, can be very 
detrimental to the organization. For example, Felps 
et al. (2006) found that a single negative individual 
in a work unit often brings down the morale and 
functioning of the entire group. 
One indicator of the subjective well-being of 
employees is job satisfaction.48 A quantitative review 
found that job satisfaction is a key predictor of job 
performance, showing that happy employees are 
better performers in their workplace.49 To establish a 
causal relation, a meta-analysis of panel data demon-
strated that job satisfaction predicted future perfor-
mance, but performance did not predict future job 
satisfaction.50 Erdogan et al. (2012) reviewed the 
research showing that individuals with higher life 
satisfaction are more likely to have higher levels of 
career satisfaction, lower turnover intentions, and 
higher organizational commitment. 
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In line with the notion that happier workers are 
better workers, higher well-being is also shown 
to be associated with higher income51 and future 
income.52 De Neve and Oswald (2012) used a 
large US representative panel study to show that 
adolescents and young adults who report higher 
life satisfaction or positive affect grew up to earn 
significantly higher levels of income later in life. 
They used siblings as comparison controls, and 
also accounted for factors such as intelligence and 
health, as well as the human capacity to imagine 
later socioeconomic outcomes and anticipate the 
resulting feelings in current well-being (see 
Figure 4.2). Thus, to date, four longitudinal studies 
have systematically found that happiness at one 
point in time predicts higher future income, 
controlling for relevant factors such as intelligence, 
parental income, and even a sizable part of any 
genetic predispositions.53 
Subjective well-being brings about greater success 
at the organizational level as well. Bockerman 
and Ilmakunnas (2012) found that job satisfaction 
predicts the productivity of manufacturing plants. 
Harter et al. (2010) found in a longitudinal study 
of 10 large organizations that worker engagement 
makes a difference to productivity. Work units in 
which employees were satisfied and otherwise 
felt highly engaged with their work led to im-
provements in the bottom line, measured in 
terms of revenue, sales, and profit.54 On the 
other hand, reverse causality going from com-
pany success to employee satisfaction was 
weaker. An analysis of the “100 Best Companies 
to Work For in America” revealed that they 
increased more in equity value compared to the 
industry benchmarks. The resulting higher 
returns were about 3% per year. 
Figure 4.2: Longitudinal relationship between subjective well-being during adolescence and young 
adulthood (ages 16, 18 and 22) and later earnings (at age 29)
Notes: Figure from De Neve and Oswald (2012). The bars represent the response categories for positive affect (at ages 16 and 18) and 
life satisfaction (at age 22), from lowest to highest levels, and relate this to the mean income for the respondents in each category at 
age 29. Across the sample, the mean income at age 29 was $34,632. Large samples were observed for each category (N=14,867 for 
positive affect at age 16, N=11,253 for positive affect at age 18 and N=12,415 for life satisfaction at age 22). A margin of error (i.e. 2 
Standard Errors) is included around each estimate. 
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The study by Harter and his colleagues (2010), 
based on 2,178 work units in 10 large companies, 
found that engaged and satisfied workers led to 
greater revenue, sales, and profits. The two factors 
that mediated the relation between employee 
engagement and the performance outcomes were 
customer loyalty and employee retention. It makes 
intuitive sense that customers would prefer to 
interact with positive employees and thus frequent 
the business. Employee retention is a large 
challenge for modern companies both because it 
is expensive to replace employees, especially 
highly skilled ones, and because more senior 
employees have more experience on the job. Thus, 
it is not surprising that employee engagement, 
resulting in customer loyalty and employee 
retention, accounted for 10% of the variability in 
the productivity of the corporations studied.
Happiness on individual and social behavior
Subjective well-being has an impact on individual 
behavior and decision-making. Happiness and 
positive affect have been identified as determinants 
of economic behavior ranging from consumption 
and savings to time preferences and risk-taking. 
Research in psychology and economics suggests 
this may occur through improved integration of 
information and broadened focus of attention in 
happier individuals.55 Thus, happier individuals 
may be better able to evaluate the implications of 
decisions with short and long term trade-offs, 
resulting in decisions that reflect greater self-
control and appropriate risk-taking. 
Well-being can influence how individuals evaluate 
outcomes that may occur in the present or future 
— a concept known in economics as time preference, 
or discounting. In survey and experimental 
evidence, Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011a) found 
that subjective well-being and positive affect were 
associated with less preference for consumption 
in the present relative to the future. Using a 
randomized assignment experiment, they observed 
that among the group where greater positive 
affect was induced, participants were less 
likely to discount future payments, i.e. they were 
more likely to give up a smaller payment in the 
current period to receive a larger payment at a 
later point in time. This implies that individuals 
with greater positive affect may be more able to 
exercise self-control or delay gratification (i.e. 
foregoing smaller short term benefits in order to 
receive greater benefits in the future or to avoid 
longer term costs). Happy individuals are motivated 
to pursue long-term goals despite short-term costs.56 
Fry (1975) found that children placed in a happy 
mood better resisted temptation. Additionally, 
Lerner and Weber (2012) found in lab experiments 
that inducing sadness among participants led to 
a greater discounting of future rewards than 
those in a neutral state. Moreover, lack of self-
control is also related to over-consumption, 
obesity, and financial decisions, suggesting that 
changes in well-being may influence their 
prevalence.57 
Greater self-control and longer-term time prefer-
ences among happier people have been linked to 
consumption and saving behaviors. Guven 
(2012) analyzed two representative longitudinal 
household surveys in the Netherlands and 
Germany to estimate the causal relationship (if 
any) between happiness and consumption and 
saving behaviors. The regression results found 
that happier people were more likely to save 
more and consume less than others. Further, 
happier people had different expectations about 
the future than those less happy. These individu-
als were more optimistic about the future, took 
more time when making decisions, and had 
higher perceived life expectancies (i.e. moving 
from “neither happy or unhappy” to “happy” was 
associated with 1.1 year increase in perceived life 
expectancy).58 Thus, happier individuals may be 
more forward-thinking and willing to consider 
the long-term implications of decisions taken in 
the present, leading to “better” decisions for 
themselves and society.
The probability of being re-employed has also been 
linked to individual happiness. Among individuals 
recently entering unemployment in Germany, 
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Krause (2012) found a statistically significant 
positive relationship between job seekers with 
higher than average well-being and the probability 
of re-employment within a year. Additionally, these 
individuals were more likely to enter into self-
employment, suggesting a link between happiness 
and entrepreneurship. Interestingly, the effect of 
happiness on re-employment decreased at the 
extremes, indicating that an “optimal” level of 
happiness may exist. 
Research on individual risk-taking provides 
evidence of a relationship between happiness and 
risk-related behavior. According to economic 
theory, happier individuals have more to lose 
from engaging in risky behavior that may carry 
the risk of injury or death. Happier individuals 
should therefore be more willing to engage in 
activities that reduce risk. Goudie et al. (forth-
coming) found that seatbelt use and not being 
involved in a motor vehicle accident were both 
more likely among those with higher subjective 
well-being (see Figure 4.3 with respect to seatbelt 
use). In a representative sample of 313,354 US 
households, the authors estimated that individuals 
who reported being “very satisfied” with life were 
5.3% more likely to always wear a seatbelt in the 
survey, even after controlling for potentially 
confounding factors. When Goudie et al. (forth-
coming) looked at the probability of motor 
vehicle accidents, they found that individuals 
with higher levels of life satisfaction were less 
likely to be involved in an accident several years 
later.59 While these statistical analyses cannot 
fully rule out the possibility of reverse causality, 
the results are robust to including a number of 
confounding variables and provide strong evidence 
for a positive relationship between happiness 
and risk-avoiding behavior. 
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Figure 4.3: Frequency of seatbelt use by subjective well-being in a US representative sample
Notes: Figure from Goudie et al. (forthcoming). Data is from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, a random-digit 
telephone survey in the US, N=313,354. Pearson’s chi-squared statistic = 3,242, p-value < 2.2 x 10-16. Cross-tabulation figures 
indicate that subjective well-being and seatbelt use are strongly correlated but this does not account for other factors that may 
explain this relationship. Goudie et al. (forthcoming) use regression analysis to control for other potentially confounding factors 
and find the association is robust to these controls. Individuals who report they are “very satisfied” with life are 5.3% more likely 
to state they always wear a seatbelt. The authors also find that subjective well-being at the time of the survey is statistically 
significantly associated with a lower probability of having a motor vehicle accident several years later (even after controlling for 
confounding factors). 
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Research studies also indicate a powerful link 
between high subjective well-being and social 
behavior, such as being a better friend, colleague, 
neighbor, and citizen. People who are in a positive 
mood see others more inclusively and sympatheti-
cally. For example, they are less biased against 
other ethnic groups.60 Nelson (2009) found that 
people in a positive mood induction condition, 
as compared to neutral and negative mood condi-
tions, showed greater compassion, perspective 
taking, and sympathy for a person experiencing 
distress. 
Individuals who report high subjective well-being 
give more to their communities — in both time 
and money. Morrison et al. (2012) found that both 
life satisfaction and positive feelings predicted 
reports of donating money to charity, helping 
a stranger, and volunteering activities. Oishi et 
al. (2007) found that happier people volunteer 
more. Aknin et al. (2013) found in a study of 136 
countries that prosocial uses of money by happy 
people generalized across regions of the world. 
However, further research is underway to clarify 
the causal relationship between prosocial spending 
and happiness. Priller and Shupp (2011) found 
slightly higher rates of blood donation, as well 
as monetary giving to charity, among happier 
individuals. They also found that those who were 
satisfied with their incomes were more likely to 
donate money to worthy causes. 
Do happy moods cause the helping behavior and 
good citizenship? It is a consistent finding in 
social psychology experiments that when people 
are induced into a good mood, by various means, 
they are more likely to help others.61 These exper-
imental studies in which people who are put into 
a good mood and compared to those in a neutral 
mood leave little doubt that happier feelings 
generally tend to increase helping. The fact that 
people give both more time and money when 
they are put into a positive mood in an experi-
ment indicates that being happy raises prosocial 
behavior.62 Aknin et al. (2012) suggest that the 
relation between mood and helping is circular as 
shown in Figure 4.4. When people are in a good 
mood they tend to help others; helping others in 
turn fosters a good mood. Thus, friends, family, 
neighbors, and the society as a whole tend to 
profit from happy people because these individuals 
are more likely to be helpful to others.
Having supportive relationships boosts subjective 
well-being, but having high subjective well-being 
in turn leads to better social relationships.63 Thus, 
good relationships both cause happiness and are 
caused by it. Two major reasons why happiness 
benefits social relationships are because happi-
ness increases a person’s level of sociability and 
also improves the quality of social interactions. 
Happier people have a larger quantity and better 
quality of friendships and family relationships.64
Frequent positive emotions create a tendency in 
people to be more sociable. In a laboratory experi-
ment people placed in a positive mood expressed 
greater interest in social and prosocial activities 
compared to those in a neutral condition, whereas 
those placed in a negative mood indicated lower 
interest in social activities.65 This pattern was 
replicated in a second study that found an interest 
in social and prosocial activities among those in 
Figure 4.4: Model of positive feedback loop 
between prosocial spending and happiness
Notes: Figure from Aknin, Dunn and Norton (2012). The 
model posits that prosocial spending promotes happiness 
and, in turn, happiness improves the probability of future 
prosocial spending.
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a good mood. People who were placed in a good 
mood expected social activities to be more rewarding 
than those not placed in a good mood. Similarly, 
other experimental studies have demonstrated that 
inducing happiness, in contrast to sadness, makes 
people more likely to express liking for others they 
meet for the first time.66 On the other hand, the 
absence of positive feelings is accompanied by 
feeling bored, unsociable, uninterested in things, 
slowed down, and unenergetic, reflecting a lack of 
active involvement with the environment and oth-
er people.67 It has also been shown that depressed 
individuals cause others to react in a negative man-
ner.68 This can lead to unwillingness to have future 
interactions with those who have low happiness.
The links between positive moods and sociability 
are not just in terms of feeling sociable, but translate 
into actual behavior. Cunningham (1988a) 
discovered that people in an induced positive 
mood condition compared to a negative mood 
condition were more talkative. Mehl et al. (2010) 
monitored people’s everyday conversations for 
four days and assessed happiness through both 
self-reports and informant reports. They found 
that happy participants spent about 25% less time 
alone and about 70% more time talking when 
they were with others. Furthermore, the happy 
participants engaged in less small talk and more 
substantive conversations compared to their 
unhappy peers. 
Recent evidence shows the happiness-relationship 
link occurs across cultures. Lucas et al. (2000) 
found that across the world positive feelings 
were associated with tendencies for affiliation, 
dominance, venturesomeness, and social interaction. 
Similarly, a world survey of 123 nations found 
that the experience of positive feelings was 
strongly related to good social relationships 
across different socio-cultural regions.69 
Happy people are not just more sociable; they 
also experience higher-quality social relationships. 
Kazdin et al. (1982) found that children put in a 
positive mood showed greater social skills and 
confidence in social behavior than those not put 
in a good mood. Boehm and Lyubomirsky (2008) 
reviewed evidence showing that happy people 
tend to be more popular and likable. One study 
showed that reports of better interaction quality 
were not merely a function of the happy person’s 
perceptions, but that observers similarly rated 
happier individuals as having better interactions 
with strangers.70
Happiness has the potential to generate positive 
snowball effects in society. Research has shown 
that people who are happier are likely to bring 
happiness to those around them, resulting in 
networks of happier individuals. It was found that 
happiness extends up to three degrees of separa-
tion, and longitudinal models show that individu-
als who are surrounded by happy people are likely 
to become happier in the future.71
Happiness can also have effects on the long-term 
quality of relationships. Luhmann et al. (2013) 
found that unmarried people high in life satisfaction 
are more likely to get married in the following years 
and less likely to get separated or divorced if they 
get married. Conversely, Stutzer and Frey (2006) 
found low life satisfaction prior to courtship 
predicted later dissolution of the marriage. 
Depression, which is characterized by low or 
absent positive feelings, creates problems in 
social relationships such as divorce, limited social 
support, and distancing from one’s neighbors.72 
Even minor depression results in problems in 
social relations, such as higher rates of divorce.73 
Even those recovering from depression show 
impairments in the social and occupational 
domains.74 In addition, clinical depression inter-
feres with executive functioning, which is a 
hallmark of humans’ special adaptive abilities. 
For example, Fossati et al. (2002) review evidence 
indicating that depressed individuals suffer 
deficits in problem solving and planning. Snyder 
(2012) reviewed extensive evidence showing that 
depressed people suffer substantially from broad 
impairments in executive functions, such as 
planning, with strong effect sizes varying from 
0.32 to 0.97.
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In sum, there is substantial evidence connecting 
positive moods to higher sociability and better 
quality of social relationships, and the opposite 
is the case for negative moods and depression. 
Happier people enjoy the company of others, 
and find that interacting with people is more 
rewarding compared to less happy individuals. 
Others in turn enjoy interacting with happy 
individuals. Those high in subjective well-being 
thus have more rewarding and stable social 
relationships.
Moderation, mediation, and the 
evolutionary role of happiness
Although happy people and societies have a num-
ber of advantages, this does not imply that 
high subjective well-being is a panacea for 
everything. To illustrate, happiness can facilitate 
good health but is not a guarantee of it. Happy 
individuals may die at a young age. However, on 
average they will live longer. We can make 
statements about the effects of average happi-
ness using the notion of ceteris paribus (i.e. 
assuming “all other things being equal”) be-
cause in particular cases there will be other 
factors that override the influence of high subjec-
tive well-being.
Not every study has found positive benefits for 
long-term happiness. A few studies find no 
differences between happier and less happy 
individuals, and the rare study has shown opposite 
effects. This is common in research because of 
sampling, methodology, and other differences 
between studies. Nonetheless, reviews that 
summarize results across studies have virtually 
always shown benefits for high subjective well-
being. One reason for the few null findings is 
that happiness will not show its value in all 
samples and contexts. For instance, for young 
adults there might be no differences in health or 
longevity due to happiness because young adults 
very rarely die and mostly have healthy bodies. 
The results of happiness and unhappiness 
become more manifest as adults age. Similarly, 
one would not be surprised if happiness did not 
reduce divorce in a nation where divorce is 
virtually nonexistent. 
Another caution about the conclusion that 
happiness is desirable is that people do not need 
to be constantly euphoric or ecstatic. Happy 
people most of the time feel merely pleasant — a 
mild positive state. Only occasionally do happy 
people feel intensely positive. Oishi et al. (2007) 
found that although the happiest individuals did 
very well in social relationships, the moderately 
happy — not 100% satisfied — often did the best 
in achievement domains. There is evidence 
that frequent high-arousal emotions could be 
harmful to health.75 Krause (2012) shows that 
re-employment prospects actually decreased for 
those with extreme levels of happiness. Further-
more, in a randomized lab experiment, Ifcher and 
Zarghamee (2011b) found that positive affect 
increased overconfidence among participants in 
the treatment group. Thus, extremely high 
happiness is not a recipe for extremely effective 
functioning, and in fact, moderate happiness can 
be more helpful.
It is important to note that happy people also 
occasionally feel unhappy, and this is not necessar-
ily undesirable. Gruber et al. (2011) and Forgas 
(2007), as well as others, have shown that in 
some situations negative emotions can help 
people to respond more effectively. Thus, happiness 
does not mean a complete absence of negative 
feelings. The happy person, however, does not 
feel chronic negative feelings; he or she experi-
ences negative feelings only occasionally, not 
frequently, and in appropriate situations.
An important question that is receiving increasing 
attention is how well-being and positive emo-
tions may influence life outcomes. This is an 
emerging area of research with important 
contributions from psychology and neuroscience. 
The pathways leading from happiness to the 
life outcomes discussed in this chapter can 
either be direct or be subject to moderation and/or 
mediation by other variables that influence the 
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effect that subjective well-being may have on a 
trait or outcome of interest. Our discussion here is 
mostly on mediating pathways that may carry 
some part of the influence of happiness onto the 
outcome of interest and thus help explain the 
relationship. One branch of thinking in psychol-
ogy posits that positive emotions broaden cogni-
tive capacity and attention, allowing individuals to 
engage in the behaviors and build the skills associ-
ated with better health, productivity, and social 
interaction.76 Evidence from lab experiments pro-
vides initial backing for this theory. For example, 
Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) found that 
participants where positive emotions were in-
duced showed greater scope of cognition and 
attention in psychological tests. 
Studies focusing on neurological processes also 
support this approach and provide evidence for a 
connection between well-being and brain structure. 
Experiments using brain imaging to monitor 
participants’ neurological processes have reported 
that positive affect is associated with activity in a 
part of the brain that is associated with “exploratory 
modes of thought and behavior.”77 Further, Schmitz 
et al. (2009) found that affect can also alter neuro-
logical processing of visual stimuli — specifically, 
positive affect led to a widening of individuals’ 
field of vision. Small-scale trials of the effect of 
mindfulness training, a type of meditation that has 
been linked to improved well-being in psychological 
studies, have also been shown to increase grey 
matter in parts of the brain that are believed to 
regulate cognition and emotion.78 Happiness may 
therefore be linked to neurological and cognitive 
processes that influence human behavior and 
particularly to behaviors that require broader and 
more integrative thinking (e.g. considering benefits 
over a longer time period or helping others).
In a promising new development in the study of 
mediating pathways between subjective well-being 
and health outcomes, Fredrickson and colleagues 
(2013) provide preliminary evidence for different 
epigenetic dynamics as a result of varying levels and 
types of happiness. The authors find that varied 
states of well-being influence gene expression 
with particular relevance to genotypes underlying 
the immune system. Although the study is small-
scale and is mostly interested in the epigenetic 
effects of different types of well-being (hedonic 
and eudaimonic well-being) it opens a promising 
new direction in the study of how happiness may 
influence health outcomes.
In their study of happiness in young adulthood 
and earnings later in life, De Neve and Oswald 
(2012) shed light on the potential pathways 
between happiness and income in a longitudinal 
survey. Their mediation tests reveal a direct effect 
as well as indirect effects that carry the influence 
from happiness to income. Significant mediating 
pathways include obtaining a college degree and 
a job, higher degrees of optimism and extraversion, 
and less neuroticism.79 
Given the increasing evidence for a strong 
connection between happiness and behavior, a 
handful of studies have started to investigate the 
role of well-being in human evolution. Happiness 
is argued to play a role in promoting evolutionary 
success in two possible ways: (1) the experience 
of happiness acts as a reward for behaviors that 
increase the likelihood of evolutionary success 
(e.g. survival, reproduction, resource accumulation, 
etc.); or, alternatively, (2) given that happiness 
is beneficial to survival and other important life 
outcomes (such as those discussed throughout 
this chapter), it has persisted as an evolutionary 
characteristic.
Happiness as a reward mechanism for evolution-
arily-advantageous behaviors has been explored 
in psychological and neurological research. A 
review of laboratory experiments by Wise (2004) 
highlighted the critical role dopamine plays in the 
neurological learning processes that embed how 
the brain anticipates reward and prompts action 
to obtain this reward. For example, Wise (2004) 
discusses a study where mice whose dopamine 
production is impaired are less able to undertake 
previously learned tasks to receive a reward (e.g. 
pressing a certain lever to receive food). Psycholo-
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gists have argued elsewhere that positive affect 
and dopamine levels are connected.80 They hy-
pothesize that the positive affect feedback from 
goal-directed behavior and the associated dopa-
mine production are crucial to understanding how 
humans “learn” what behaviors and habits 
promote evolutionary success. This fits with 
other evolutionary theories that suggest the 
pursuit and experience of happiness incentivizes 
and increases the probability of successfully engag-
ing in behaviors that improve health, productivity, 
and reproduction.81 
Diener et al. (forthcoming) find that in a globally 
representative sample, 70% of respondents report-
ed enjoying much of the previous day.82 The fact 
that happiness is a relatively common human trait 
can be considered indicative of its important role in 
evolutionary fitness. The authors also review the evi-
dence that “positive mood offset,” or the presence of 
positive mood in a neutral state, is associated with 
characteristics, such as longevity, material and social 
resource accumulation, and fertility, that have 
allowed humans to propagate successfully.
Conclusion
Existing scientific evidence indicates that subjective 
well-being has an objective impact across a broad 
range of behavioral traits and life outcomes, and 
does not simply follow from them. In fact, we 
observe the existence of a dynamic relationship 
between happiness and other important aspects of 
our lives with effects running in both directions. 
Experimental research in which moods and emo-
tions are induced in some participants and their 
actions are compared to a control group show 
that positive moods lead to creativity, sociability, 
altruism, and beneficial physiological patterns. 
Levels of subjective well-being are found to 
predict future health, mortality, productivity, and 
income, controlling statistically for other possible 
determinants. For example, young people who 
are less happy many years before they meet their 
future spouse later show higher rates of divorce 
compared to their happier peers. Furthermore, 
predictions in the other direction, from condi-
tions to subjective well-being (that is, conditions 
influencing happiness) are also positive, helping to 
create feedback loops that may raise the longer-
term happiness effects. 
Although high subjective well-being tends to help 
people function better, it is of course not magic or a 
cure-all. Happy people do get sick and do lose 
friends. Not all happy people are productive work-
ers. Happiness is like any other factor that aids 
health and functioning —all other things being 
equal it is likely (but not guaranteed) to help. 
Needless to say that many other factors such as 
personality, intelligence, and social capital are also 
important for good functioning. 
It is important to emphasize that research does 
not prescribe extreme bliss but, rather, tentative 
evidence suggests that a moderate degree of 
happiness tends to be “optimal” for the effects 
surveyed in this chapter. Thus, a desirable level 
of happiness would imply feeling mildly to 
moderately positive most of the time, with 
occasional negative emotions in appropriate 
situations.
There is initial evidence about the processes that 
mediate between happiness and beneficial 
outcomes. For instance, happiness is associated 
with greater cooperation, motivation, and creativity, 
which in turn are instrumental to success in 
business, and in life as a whole. Conversely, 
depression creates problems, such as illness and 
quitting one’s job more frequently, that all lead 
to less success in the workplace. Similarly, 
positive feelings harness the immune system 
and lead to fewer cardiovascular problems, 
whereas anxiety and depression are linked to 
poorer health behaviors and problematical 
physiological indicators, such as inflammation. 
Thus, a causal mechanism of happiness on 
health and longevity can be understood with the 
mediating mechanisms that are now being 
uncovered. Research in the field of neuroscience 
provides further prospects for new scientific 
insights on mediating pathways between happi-
ness to behavioral traits and socio-economic 
outcomes of interest.
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It naturally follows from this survey that it is impor-
tant to balance economic measures of societal 
progress with measures of subjective well-being, 
to ensure that economic progress leads to broad 
improvements across life domains, not just greater 
economic capacity. By assessing subjective well-
being as well as economic variables, a society can 
gauge whether overall net progress is positive in 
terms of raising human well-being. Diener et al. 
(2009) detail the case for national accounts of 
well-being. Most arguments for putting happiness 
more center-stage in policy making have been 
normative in nature; happiness is what would 
appear to matter most to most people. The aim of 
this chapter is to complement and inform the 
normative reasoning with a survey of the “hard” 
evidence on the benefits of subjective well-being 
across outcomes of importance, such as health, 
income, and social behavior. A better understanding 
of the objective benefits of raising happiness may 
help in estimating the potential impact of making 
happiness more central in policy making and in 
enhancing policy evaluation by informing cost-
benefit analyses. Indeed, an argument could be 
constructed that raising subjective well-being leads 
to positive externalities or spillover effects across a 
number of policy domains, ranging from health to 
traffic safety. Given the tangible benefits to 
individuals and societies of moderately high well-
being, it is imperative that we act to effectively put 
well-being at the heart of policy and generate the 
conditions that allow everyone to flourish. 
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Chapter 5.
RESTORING VIRTUE ETHICS IN THE 
QUEST FOR HAPPINESS
JEFFREY D. SACHS
Jeffrey D. Sachs: Director, The Earth Institute, Columbia University 
I would like to thank Claus Dierksmeier, John Helliwell, Richard Layard, and Adam Sachs for many corrections andsuggestions. 
Remaining errors and interpretations are of course my own. 
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What makes people happy? Economists typically 
claim that the answer is higher income and 
consumption. Sociologists emphasize the quality 
of social support such as one’s network of family 
and friends (“social capital”). Psychologists stress 
the importance of personality, mental health, and 
an individual’s state of mind (e.g. “positive psychol-
ogy” or “mindfulness”). Many moral philosophers 
and religious leaders have suggested that virtue is 
the key to happiness, an approach sometimes 
called virtue ethics.1 Of these factors, it is the 
ethical dimension that is most often overlooked 
in current discussions of well-being, and one that 
I explore in this highly speculative essay.  
As shown compelling by Helliwell and Wang 
(2013) in this volume, all four types of factors — 
economic, social, psychological, and ethical — help 
to account for the differences across individuals 
and nations in measured happiness, used in the 
“evaluative” sense of life satisfaction. Helliwell 
and Wang identify six basic covariates that fall 
within the four dimensions. These six covariates 
include: log of GDP per capita (economic),  years 
of healthy life expectancy (economic and psycho-
logical), perceptions of corruption (social and 
ethical), prevalence of generosity (ethical), and 
freedom to make life choices (all four categories). 
The variables behave as expected. Higher incomes 
and longevity raise happiness, corruption percep-
tions lower happiness, and generosity and freedom 
raise happiness. 
Even though social, psychological, and ethical 
factors are crucially important in individual 
happiness, public discourse and public policies 
tend to focus the lion’s share of attention on 
economics. The public is told, and generally 
believes, that the key to greater happiness is 
through more economic growth. This emphasis 
on economic growth as the principal path to 
happiness is relatively new, emerging gradually 
after 1700. Before then, psychologists and moralists 
dominated the thinking. Happiness was to be 
achieved by living a “good life,” one imbued with 
the proper virtues. This was true both for secular 
philosophies in the spirit of Aristotle and the 
stoics, as well as for the religious teachings of the 
medieval Roman Church. 
With economic growth and the rise of the modern 
market economy, a new philosophy of consumerism 
gradually emerged. Economists, as champions of 
rising incomes and consumption, increasingly 
held sway. Individual economic success rose in the 
hierarchy of social and ethical values as offering the 
key to happiness. There was certainly something to 
this, since the new era of economic growth 
opened unprecedented opportunities for large 
parts of humanity to achieve improved nutrition, 
healthy lives, education, and material comforts, 
all of which do indeed influence happiness and 
well-being.   
Yet the pendulum swung way too far away from 
the non-economic factors. More recently, the 
non-economists have begun successfully pushing 
back. Man never did live by bread alone, and we 
have learned — painfully — that too focused a 
pursuit of bread leads not only to obesity but also 
to a starvation of other human needs, including 
social connections, psychological balance, and 
virtue. When the CEO of Goldman Sachs declared 
that his bank— an orchestrator of brazen financial 
malfeasance that helped to cause global financial 
crisis in 2008 — was simply doing “God’s work,” 
the world had a breathtaking example of the 
collapse of ethics. 
The fact is that even before the 2008 financial 
crisis, income in the rich countries had already 
evinced a sharply declining marginal utility — that 
is, sharply diminished gains in happiness that 
could be achieved by an incremental dollar of 
national income. The aggressive pursuit of higher 
income in the United States came at the cost of 
declining social capital, mental well-being, and 
ethical behavior, a point that I develop at some 
length in my book The Price of Civilization.2 As 
Richard Easterlin and his followers have long and 
famously demonstrated, the US has substantially 
raised incomes over the course of several decades 
without raising subjective measures of happiness, 
a phenomenon known as the Easterlin Paradox.3 
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Bartolini et al. (2013) present a statistical model in 
which the gains to US happiness from rising 
income have been offset by declines due to 
falling social capital.4 (They don’t explore whether 
adverse trends in psychological and ethical factors 
have also contributed to the paradox, but the 
decline in social trust in their data might well 
represent an average decline in ethical behavior 
in the US population.)     
We are now returning, step by step, to a broader 
conception of happiness. Yet I would argue that 
the ethicists are still mostly overlooked. Sociologists 
have powerfully shown how social ties are fraying 
in many countries, to the detriment of well-being. 
Psychologists have successfully championed a 
surge of interest in ancient and modern practices 
of psychological well-being, including self-help 
groups, meditation, and various approaches of 
positive psychology. Yet modern ethicists, who 
are generally overshadowed in the public discourse, 
have not yet been successful in placing their 
subject back on the public agenda.     
A renewed focus on the role of ethics, and in 
particular of virtuous behavior, in happiness 
could lead us to new and effective strategies for 
raising individual, national, and global well-being. 
To try to make this case, albeit in a highly pre-
liminary and impressionistic way, I will briefly 
trace how virtue ethics were largely abandoned in 
modern thinking about happiness, and how 
virtue ethics might be restored to a proper place 
alongside economic, social, and psychological 
approaches.   
Ancient Traditions of Virtue Ethics 
and Happiness
Until the modern era, virtue and happiness were 
seen as intrinsically intertwined. One achieved 
happiness by living the right kind of life. The sages 
instructed us not to follow our base instincts for 
sensual pleasures and material possessions, but 
rather our higher potential for compassion and 
moderation. The better path was acknowledged 
to be hard work, to be won through study, training, 
self-discipline and the emulation of great people. 
This philosophy is found in both East and West, 
and in both secular and religious traditions. 
Let’s briefly consider three leading examples: 
Buddhism, Aristotelian ethics, and the Roman 
Catholic Church. 
Buddhism teaches the path to escape from 
suffering. When Prince Siddhartha, the future 
Buddha, ventures beyond the palace walls, he finds 
a world filled with death, poverty, and suffering. 
He is overcome with a longing to find the solution 
to end this suffering. Siddhartha experiments 
with a variety of approaches, including hedonism 
(the unbridled pursuit of sensual pleasures) on 
one extreme, and asceticism (the self-denial of 
sensual pleasures) on the other. He finds both to 
be wanting. Neither frees him from suffering; 
neither is the key to happiness. 
Siddhartha’s great insight was that suffering and 
happiness are mainly determined by psychology, 
by one’s state of mind, rather than by the relative 
presence or absence of material goods. To escape 
from suffering, an individual must have the right 
state of mind towards material good and also 
towards other people. Since possessions, sensual 
pleasures, and physical life itself are all transient, 
suffering can be overcome only by acknowledging 
the transience of all things and all relations, and 
living in mindfulness of that transience. Moreover, 
since all things and all people are naturally inter-
dependent, with the untrained “ego” leading to a 
false sense of separation, we gain happiness by 
our compassion towards others. 
The Buddha’s basic teachings on achieving happi-
ness (more properly, the escape from suffering) 
are summarized in the Four Noble Truths and the 
Noble Eightfold Path. The Four Noble truths 
convey the response to impermanence and inter-
dependence. Human beings tend to grasp for 
sensual pleasures, personal possessions, and 
attachments that are in fact impermanent, and these 
then become a source of inevitable suffering through 
the disappointment of loss and envy of others. 
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By understanding the impermanence and inter-
dependence of all things, according to the Buddha, 
the individual can achieve a healthier approach 
to life. The Buddha called for a Middle Way that 
steers between hedonism and asceticism, and a 
spirit of compassion in place of untrammeled ego.    
The Eightfold Noble Path prescribes eight “right” 
responses to transience and interdependence. 
These are grouped into three dimensions: a 
cognitive dimension (right view, right intention); 
an ethical dimension (right speech, right action, 
right livelihood); and a mental-concentration 
dimension (right effort, right mindfulness, and 
right concentration). The cognitive dimension is 
to understand the nature of reality itself: always 
in flux, impermanent, and interconnected. The 
ethical dimension is to avoid causing harm to 
others through the wrong kind of behavior, such 
as lies or livelihoods that bring harm to others. 
The concentration dimension is to train the mind 
to avoid false attachments to transient pleasures. 
This mental training is to be achieved through 
exercises of meditation and mindfulness.
Buddhist teaching therefore follows a naturalistic 
logic. It starts with the impermanence and 
interdependence of all things, and then prescribes a 
psychological attitude and ethical framework 
consistent with this reality. Since goods and 
sensory pleasures are impermanent, it is important 
to maintain a psychological detachment from 
them, a philosophical attitude sometimes called 
imperturbability. Since humans are mortal, their 
social status impermanent, and their fates inter-
dependent, humans are all worthy of compassion. 
In this sense, then, Buddhism is both a psycho-
logical and an ethical approach to happiness, 
calling for the right state of mind as well as the 
right actions (ethics) vis-à-vis others. 
It is also an approach that must be achieved 
through life-long diligence. An individual must 
conquer one’s passions and desires in order to 
achieve the necessary imperturbability and 
compassion towards others. Success is not easy, 
requiring acts of compassion and mental training 
through meditation. Like nearly every traditional 
philosophy, Buddhism holds that happiness must 
be achieved through striving, using tools of 
learning from masters, habitual practice, and the 
exercise of the mind and will. 
Matthieu Ricard, a renowned Buddhist monk and 
humanitarian who is deeply engaged in the 
neuroscience of happiness, emphasizes that 
“achieving durable happiness as a way of being is 
a skill. It requires sustained effort in training the 
mind and developing a set of human qualities, 
such as inner peace, mindfulness, and altruistic 
love.”5 Happiness, noted Ricard, is “a way of 
interpreting the world, since while it may be 
difficult to change the world, it is always possible 
to change the way we look at it.”6
Inner fulfillment, moreover, contributes to social 
peace. “One who is at peace with herself will 
contribute spontaneously to establishing peace 
within her family, her neighborhood, and, 
circumstances permitting, society at large.”7 The 
five “mental poisons”— desire, hatred, delusion, 
pride, and envy — undermine one’s happiness 
while sowing social discord.8
In the Western tradition, Aristotle’s approach to 
happiness, notably in the Nichomachean Ethics, 
has had as great an influence as Buddha’s in the 
Eastern tradition, in part because Aristotle’s 
approach was later incorporated into the doctrines 
of the medieval Roman Church through the 
writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Aristotle and 
Buddha shared some fundamental precepts in 
their respective paths to happiness. Both followed 
an ethical and psychological naturalism, in which 
happiness is achieved by living consistently with 
human nature and physical reality. Both saw 
one’s life task as living in the right manner 
through education, training, practice, and self-
discipline. 
For Aristotle, the key human reality is that man 
is a social animal, with individual happiness 
secured only within a political community, or 
polis. The polis should organize in its institutions 
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to promote virtuous behavior. As in Buddhist 
teaching, virtue is conducive not only to individual 
well-being but also to social harmony. As with the 
Buddha, Aristotle believed that humans are easily 
lured to behavioral extremes of one kind or 
another. Some individuals pursue hedonism, 
others asceticism. Some individuals are physi-
cally reckless in the pursuit of glory, while others 
are excessively cowardly. 
Virtue, according to Aristotle, is the path of 
moderation between these excesses, similar to 
the Buddha’s Middle Way. Emotions and actions, 
wrote Aristotle, “admit of excess and deficiency 
and the mean”:
Thus it is possible to go too far, or not to go far 
enough, in respect of fear, courage, desire, anger, 
pity, and pleasure and pain generally, and the 
excess and the deficiency are alike wrong; 
but to experience these emotions at the right 
times and on the right occasions and towards 
the right persons and for the right causes and 
in the right manner is the mean or the supreme 
good, which is characteristic of virtue.9
This kind of virtue leads to a deep well-being, 
termed eudaimonia, which promotes both the 
psychological strength of the individual and 
social harmony. Consider for example the virtuous 
approach to material possessions. Aristotle 
regarded both asceticism and greed (pleonexia) 
to be failures of virtue. Greed, noted Aristotle, 
threatens both psychological well-being as well as 
social cohesion (see Dierksmeier and Pirson 
(2009) for an insightful account, also related to 
business practices).
Eudaimonia is sometimes translated as happiness, 
and often as “flourishing,” to convey the sense of 
deep and persistent well-being. This kind of virtue 
not only attends to the individual’s thriving, but 
also to the community’s harmony. Eudaimonia is 
the telos, the end goal of human beings; it is the 
summum bonum, the highest good. 
Aristotle emphasized that virtue must be cultivated, 
above all, through the exercise of reason over 
emotions. And that in turn requires instruction, 
especially of the young. “[F]or a life of temperance 
and steadfastness is not pleasant to most people, 
least of all to the young. It follows that the pursuits 
of the young should be regulated by law, as they 
will not be painful, if he becomes used to them.”10 
Moreover, “we must practice what is right and get 
the habit of doing it…”11 This then becomes a 
matter of public policy:
It is best then that the state should undertake 
control of these matters and should exercise it 
rightly and have the power of giving effect to 
its control. But if the state altogether neglects 
it, it would seem to be the duty of every citi-
zen to further the cause of virtue in his own 
children and friends, or at least to set before 
himself the purpose of furthering it.”12
Philosopher Alisdair MacIntyre described 
Aristotle’s ethics in the following way. There is, 
wrote MacIntyre, “a fundamental contrast between 
man-as-he-happens-to-be and man-as he-could-be-
if-he-realized-his-essential-nature.”13 Accordingly, 
ethics, in Aristotelian terms, “is the science which 
is to enable men to understand how they make the 
transition from the former state to the latter.” 
The Buddha and Aristotle obviously shared many 
keen psychological and social insights. Both 
emphasized the tendency of human beings to 
pursue material possessions and sensual pleasures 
to excess, undermining their psychological well-
being in pursuing of fleeting sensations. Both 
emphasized that more material possessions do 
not lead to happier lives. Both regarded hedonism 
and greed as threats to social stability. Both believed 
that the tensions between the individual and the 
community could be moderated through an ethic 
of virtue, in which individuals live their lives in 
accordance with the dictates of human nature 
and social realities. And both believed that the 
“right path” (for Buddha) and “virtue” (for Aristotle) 
require training, education, practice, and cultiva-
tion of the mind. The main difference between 
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them is the attitude towards the passions: Buddhism 
favors imperturbability, a subduing of the passions, 
while Aristotle believes that emotions should be 
controlled by reason, but not subdued.14
The Christian doctrine of happiness differs from 
Buddhism and Aristotelian ethics mainly by 
placing happiness in the context of servicing 
God’s will. In the Roman Church teachings, the 
central human goal is eternal happiness rather 
than transitory happiness on Earth. Yet by living 
properly on Earth, in line with God’s will, an 
individual can promote earthly well-being while 
gaining merit for eternal life. 
Through the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, the 
Aristotelian virtues were incorporated into the 
path to salvation. The Church identified four 
cardinal (or human) virtues — prudence, justice, 
fortitude, and temperance — that together with 
three theological virtues — faith, hope, and charity — 
define the disposition “to do the good,” that is, “to 
become like God.” In the Roman Catholic cat-
echism, the cardinal virtues are “habitual and 
stable perfections of the intellect and will that 
govern our actions, order our passions, and guide 
our conduct,” and that “are acquired and 
strengthened by the repetition of morally good 
acts,” all in line with Aristotle’s thinking. 
The Church added two theological dimensions 
to Aristotle’s ethics. First, the human virtues 
“are purified and elevated by divine grace,” and 
second, through goodness inspired by the Holy 
Spirit, individuals “can merit for our selves and 
for others the graces needed for our sanctification 
and attainment of eternal life.”15 The goal of the 
medieval Christian community, explained historian 
Brad Gregory, was “to live as part of the body of 
Christ extended in space and time … through the 
shared practice of the virtues constitutive of that 
community as the via to salvation.”16
To summarize, the essence of traditional virtue 
ethics — whether in Buddhism, Aristotelianism, 
or Roman Catholicism — is that happiness is 
achieved by harnessing the will and the passions 
to live the right kind of life. Individuals become 
virtuous through rational thought, instruction, 
mind training, and habits of virtuous behavior. 
All three traditional philosophies taught that the 
unrestrained passions can mislead individuals 
onto false paths that result in worldly suffering, 
and in the case of Christian doctrine, eternal 
damnation. While we have reviewed just three 
traditional virtue ethics, we would find strong 
echoes in many other revered traditions, such as 
Confucianism and Greek and Roman Stoicism. 
From Virtue Ethics to Consumerism  
Over the course of several centuries, virtue ethics 
largely disappeared and was replaced by the 
economist’s doctrine of utility. The traditional view 
of material goods as the source of suffering was 
turned on its head. The new “worldly philoso-
phers” of economics came to regard material 
goods as the very key to happiness. They developed 
a “utility theory” in which each individual’s utility 
(or well-being) is determined by the possession 
and consumption of material goods, mainly 
through market purchases. By the 20th century, 
utility theory is marked by an unrestrained 
consumerism, where advertising and PR fill the 
public space, even the pulpits in many churches. 
How did this nearly complete turnaround occur? 
Perhaps it was inevitable that in a world of pervasive 
and persistent poverty, a world subject to the 
vagaries of famines and epidemics, moralists 
would view material goods with profound caution 
or even hostility. The Buddha emphasized the 
constant threat of suffering through transience 
and loss, certainly an apt worry in a world that 
lived on the very edge of survival. While it is 
certainly true that the Buddha and Aristotle also 
warned against hedonism because of the psycho-
logical risks of addiction, habituation, and other 
excesses of materialism, it was probably only 
with the onset of modern economic growth that 
a moral system could relax its warnings against 
material consumption and accumulation. Only 
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with modern economic growth would a rise in 
individual income signify more than zero-sum 
redistribution between wealth and poverty. 
Still, we have to marvel, and with considerable 
dismay, that consumerism not only jostled its 
place alongside social, psychological, and ethical 
approaches to happiness, but in the profession 
of economics and in much public discourse and 
practice, totally displaced them. The story has not 
yet properly been told, so I can at best sketch the 
progression. I am also grateful to the writings 
of Claus Dierksmeier in vividly tracing some of 
these steps.17 Since I will put considerable em-
phasis on modern “utility theory,” I will start by 
explaining this term.
To a present-day economist, a utility function 
expresses an individual’s preferences over market 
commodities. Individuals buy “baskets” of goods 
(as if we think of individuals with their daily or 
weekly shopping carts). Utility function measures 
the happiness they achieve from the basket of 
goods. In the modern economic theory, elaborated 
by economists from the mid-19th century onward, 
the utility function gives a relative ranking of alter-
native baskets of goods, not an absolute measure 
of happiness. Thus, the individual buys the basket 
of commodities offering the highest relative hap-
piness consistent with the individual’s budget. 
There are several features to emphasize. The utility 
function is egoistic, meaning that it focuses on the 
individual’s relationship to commodities, rather 
than to other individuals and their well-being. 
It is materialistic, in that it focuses on goods and 
services purchased in the market, rather than on 
ideas, values, or behavior. It is hedonistic, in that it 
assumes that the market commodities give pain 
or pleasure to the consumer, varying according to 
the basket of commodities consumed. And it is 
stable, either unchanging over time or changing 
in a wholly predictable way anticipated by the in-
dividual. The mainstream of economics since the 
mid-19th century has not been much interested in 
the formation of preferences through education, 
training, addictions, or other social and psycho-
logical processes. 
The puzzling question is how economists came 
to adopt the egoistic, materialistic, hedonistic, 
and static utility function as their profession’s 
theory of happiness, and how such a theory 
gained such prominence and social repute. The 
process did not happen quickly or linearly. We 
can watch it build over the course of several 
centuries, alongside the rise of the modern 
market economy. As a shorthand, I will call this 
the “utility theory” of happiness, though we must 
constantly remember that economists and philoso-
phers who have used the term “utility” (such as 
Bentham, Mill, or Sidgwick) have meant different 
things by it since utility theory evolved over time, 
with the various aspects of the modern utility 
function (egoism, materialism, hedonism, and 
stability) being adopted in stages. 
Many philosophers plausibly attribute to Thomas 
Hobbes the first clear enunciation of philosophical 
egoism. Hobbes’ view in The Leviathan is, of 
course, a bleak one. Man’s tendency is “a perpetual 
and restless desire for power after power, a desire 
that ceases only in death.”18 In a state of nature, 
as a result, “the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short.” For this reason, men agree to 
the Leviathan of state power to create the conditions 
of peace. Power and contract, not virtue, is the 
key to happiness. 
A next step was taken a half-century later, also in 
England. Bernard Mandeville, like Hobbes, starts 
from the philosophical attitude of egoism, and 
adds a materialist angle befitting the stirrings of 
commercialism in early 18th century England. His 
famous and notorious poem, The Fable of the Bees, 
published in 1705, announced a new approach to 
well-being in its subtitle: Private Vices, Public 
Benefits. Mandeville’s was the first telling, albeit 
obliquely, of the Invisible Hand that would be 
described in analytical detail by Adam Smith 
seven decades later. 
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Mandeville shrewdly notes that in England’s new 
commercial economy just then breaking free of 
poverty, the vice of greed is becoming the motor 
of new material success, and material success, in 
turn, is becoming the pride and power of England. 
Wrote Mandeville of the beehive, standing in for 
commercial England:
 
Thus every Part was full of Vice,
Yet the whole Mass a Paradise;
Flatter’d in Peace, and fear’d in Wars
They were th’ Esteem of Foreigners,
And lavish of their Wealth and Lives,
The Balance of all other Hives.
Such were the Blessings of that State;
Their Crimes conspired to make ‘em Great;
And Vertue, who from Politicks
Had learn’d a Thousand cunning Tricks,
Was, by their happy Influence,
Made Friends with Vice: And ever since
The Worst of all the Multitude
Did Something for the common Good.19 
Mandeville assumed that humanity is bound to 
be immoral rather than truly virtuous, but was 
arguing that immorality, and especially mate-
rial greed, will ultimately serve human purpose 
through the market forces that build wealth and 
power. Mandeville’s conceptual breakthrough is 
as startling as Hobbes. How far we are, already, 
from the medieval church’s vision of virtue as the 
expression of man’s goodness acting in God’s 
image, the source of humanity’s eternal salvation!  
Mandeville’s notion that private vice would be 
conducive to public good reflected something 
more than early economic growth. It was also a 
reflection of the collapse of the Roman Church’s 
moral monopoly in Europe. The medieval con-
sensus on the cardinal virtues was broken irrepa-
rably first by the Reformation, which permanent-
ly divided Christianity, and then by the 
Enlightenment. By 1705, when Mandeville wrote 
the Fable of the Bees, Church teachings were 
increasingly viewed by many leading thinkers 
as artificial and arbitrary constraints on the 
society rather than as reflections of natural law 
and God’s will. 
MacIntyre brilliantly described the role of the 
Reformation and the Enlightenment in the collapse 
of virtue ethics.20 He argued that two things were 
lost in the process of modernization. The first was 
Aristotle’s telos, the idea that ethics is the way to 
help men go from what they are to what human 
nature, guided by reason, can allow them to 
become. That is, ethics as a science of human 
improvement was largely abandoned. The second 
victim of modernity was the hierarchical authority of 
the Church, which had backed Aristotelian 
notions with the promise of eternal happiness. In 
an odd way, abandoning Aristotelian ideas about 
virtue were equated with a new freedom from 
Church dogma. If the Church had appropriated 
Aristotle, then freethinkers must drop him.21 
Gregory deepens our understanding of the 
monumental upheaval caused to virtue ethics 
by the Reformation.22 Not only did the Roman 
Church lose its monopoly over doctrine, but the 
new Protestant faiths like Calvinism and Luther-
anism decisively rejected the fundamental theo-
logical pillar of virtue ethics: the idea that virtues 
were the key to salvation. The Protestant view of 
human sin was much darker than the Roman 
Church’s. Individuals could not save themselves 
through virtue; only God could grant salvation 
through grace. The case for virtue-as-salvation 
was overturned, yet as Max Weber23 famously 
argued, the case for worldly business success was 
ironically strengthened as Calvinists came to view 
business success as a sign of (predestined) salva-
tion through God’s grace. 
In this new world of rapid change, where science, 
religious upheaval, technological advance, and 
global trade were rapidly overturning long-
standing practices and beliefs, Mandeville’s idea 
of making a virtue of vice was compelling, even 
if his initial telling of this story was viewed with 
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scandal and horror. By the time of Adam Smith, 
the notion of a self-organizing market economy 
was gaining force, as was the idea that untram-
meled commercial ambitions brought prosperity 
rather than damnation. Smith did not glorify 
greed, but like Mandeville he believed that it 
could be harnessed for the public good. 
Smith enshrined materialism at the very core of 
economics in his declaration of the basic human 
“propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one 
thing for another.”24 Smith brilliantly described 
how that propensity gives rise to specialization 
and thereby to wealth. Cooperation comes not 
from virtue, noted Smith, but from self-interest:
But man has almost constant occasion for the 
help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him 
to expect it from their benevolence only. He 
will be more likely to prevail if he can interest 
their self-love in his favour, and show them 
that it is for their own advantage to do for him 
what he requires of them.
Then Smith famously noted that, “It is not from 
the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the 
baker that we expect our dinner, but from their 
regard to their own interest.” 
A few years after Smith, in 1789, Jeremy Bentham 
took the new license for material consumption 
a step further, by adding a frank hedonism to 
the doctrines of egoism and materialism already 
expounded by Mandeville and Smith. Bentham 
aimed for a new science of happiness based on 
pain and pleasure. Bentham opened his master-
work, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation, with his hedonist account of utility: 
Nature has placed mankind under the gover-
nance of two sovereign masters, pain and plea-
sure … The principle of utility recognizes this 
subjection, and assumes it for the foundation 
of that system, the object of which is to rear 
the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason 
and of law…
By utility is meant that property in any object, 
whereby it tends to produce benefit, advan-
tage, pleasure, good, or happiness (all this 
in the present case comes to the same thing) 
or (what comes again to the same thing) to 
prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, 
or unhappiness to the party whose interest is 
considered.25 
Something remarkable has occurred with Ben-
tham’s viewpoint. As with Aristotle, the goal of 
the polity is to promote happiness, but now 
happiness is the sum of individual (egoistic) pain 
and pleasure, rather than virtue. Bentham’s new 
utilitarianism had considerable merit as a revolu-
tionary social doctrine for the emerging British 
parliamentary democracy. It drew attention to 
human happiness as the principle goal of public 
policy. In calling for the greatest good for the 
greatest number, it drew unprecedented attention 
to the distribution of well-being across the society, 
and thereby helped to promote many social 
reforms, with an emphasis on the poor. 
Yet its outright egoism and hedonism also had a 
deleterious effect, albeit one unintended by its 
lead author. Though Bentham and his great 
utilitarian successor, John Stuart Mill, empha-
sized that hedonism could readily justify the 
cultivation of the virtues, on the grounds that the 
virtues raise the capacity for happiness, later 19th 
century economists adopted hedonism as justify-
ing a utility function based solely on market 
commodities, with no attention to the virtues. 
And Bentham was not blameless. He himself 
asserted (and Mill chastised him for it),26 that 
“In every human breast … self-regarding interest 
is predominant over social interest; each person’s 
own individual interest over the interests of all 
other persons taken together.”27
A pivotal figure in this transition to the modern 
utility function is Stanley Jevons, whose Theory 
of Political Economy was profoundly influential 
in the emergence of modern economics. Jevons 
positioned himself squarely in the hedonist camp, 
endorsing Bentham’s theory of pain and pleasure. 
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Moreover, while he recognized that the doctrine of 
utility could entertain “higher motives” in indi-
viduals, such as concern for the well-being of the 
nation, he placed his practical interest and analysis 
“in the lowest ranks of feelings”:
The calculus of utility aims at supplying the 
ordinary wants of man at the least cost of 
labour. Each labourer, in the absence of other 
motives, is supposed to devote his energy to 
the accumulation of wealth. A higher calculus 
of moral right and wrong would be needed 
to show how he may best employ that wealth 
for the good of others as well as himself. But 
when that higher calculus gives no prohibition, 
we need the lower calculus to gain us the utmost 
good in matters of moral indifference.28
Another pivotal figure is F. Y. Edgeworth, whose 
Mathematical Psychics is proclaimed to be an 
“application of mathematics to the moral sciences.” 
This brilliant and influential work in economic 
exchange adopted a mathematical utility function 
of the modern form, in which each individual’s 
utility is now simply a function of the goods and 
services consumed by the individual. The “distrib-
utable proximate means of pleasure,” assumed 
Edgeworth, are “chiefly wealth as destined for 
consumption and (what is conceivable if not 
usual in civilisation) the unpurchased command 
of unproductive labor.”29 Economists like Jevons 
and Edgeworth knew better — that true happi-
ness requires a deeper view than egoistic, mate-
rialistic hedonism — but by the end of the 1800s 
economists had advanced far down the slippery 
slope to a doctrine of unfettered consumerism.   
Social ethics thereby took a radically new course, 
especially as economics rose to be the dominant 
social science of the new market society. Well-being 
is now defined as individual utility. An individual 
derives pain or pleasure, and hence utility, from 
the market goods that he or she consumes and 
accumulates. Individuals are no longer seen to 
derive their happiness from altruism, compassion, 
social connections, or virtue. Their happiness 
comes from their relations to objects of pain and 
pleasure, rather than their relations to people. 
The “utility function,” which economists would 
continue to elaborate mathematically into the late 
20th century, neatly summarizes all of these 
assumptions in a “rigorous manner,” easily 
conveyed to each new generation of students. 
Of course there have been countless philosophical 
exceptions and refinements to the stark descrip-
tion of utility theory even within economics. 
Many economists have long-recognized the reality 
of interdependent utility functions (where one’s 
well-being depends on the well-being of others), 
and of impulses of sympathy and altruism. These 
refinements, while real, have not fundamentally 
shaken the Benthamite edifice of individualism 
and object-based utility. Perhaps the newer field 
of behavioral economics, honing more closely to 
the findings of psychology and neuroscience, will 
have a deeper effect.   
The economist’s analytical machinery diverged 
further and further from virtue ethics as the 19th 
century unfolded. For Bentham, utility was truly a 
measure of happiness (or “felicity”), which he 
believed could be measured across individuals 
and thereby summed across the society to measure 
and to maximize the greatest good for the greatest 
number. Later on, though, economists dropped 
almost entirely Bentham’s faith in measuring 
happiness. In the jargon of economics, utility 
became an “ordinal” measure, incommensurate 
across individuals, rather than a “cardinal” 
measure that could be compared and added 
across individuals. Utility theory came to be used 
as an explanation for consumer behavior rather 
than for individual or social well-being.   
Several core assumptions thereby became 
codified in mainstream utility theory during the 
19th and 20th centuries, which came to underpin 
both the high theory of market equilibrium and 
the work-a-day practice of neoclassical economics. 
These included:
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(1) The egoistic and materialist assumptions 
that utility is a function of the individual’s 
consumption of market commodities rather 
than of social relations, virtues, state of mind, 
well-being of others, and other non-market 
conditions;
(2) The stability assumption that the utility func-
tion is unaffected by experience, education, 
social norms, or moral instruction;
(3) The moral presumption that individual tastes 
should be taken as given, in both a moral 
and descriptive sense. As Stigler and Becker 
famously put it, quoting a Latin saying, “De 
Gustibus Est Non Disputandem,” tastes are not 
subject to dispute, and certainly not subject to 
improvement through ethical training;30
(4) The loss of interest in happiness per se, as 
utility theory is reinterpreted not as a theory 
of well-being (as with Bentham, for example), 
but as a theory of consumer behavior. 
Mainstream economics in effect lost interest in 
the state of mind of individuals, and in closely 
related questions of character, virtue, and hap-
piness. Instead of asking about the economic, 
social, psychological, and ethical determinants 
of happiness, economists increasingly focused 
their attention on the study and explanation of 
observed consumer behavior. They lost interest 
in the question of whether an increase of market 
consumption truly raises the well-being of indi-
viduals, and they began to doubt that happiness 
could, in any event, be measured with reliability. 
Such was the growing influence of the econom-
ics profession that no other profession, such as 
moral philosophy or psychology, succeeded until 
the past quarter century in counteracting the 
economists’ retreat from the study of happiness. 
Bentham’s utilitarianism lived on in the special-
ized sub-field of welfare economics.  But even 
there, welfare economists paid most attention 
to policies that could raise social well-being 
without requiring interpersonal comparisons of 
happiness, the so-called Pareto improvements 
that leave everybody at least as well off as before 
the change. A few hardy economists continued 
to follow Bentham in believing that utility func-
tions could and should be aggregated through 
a “social welfare function” in order to maximize 
social well-being along utilitarian lines, but this 
remained the minority practice. 
Even as 19th century economists retreated from an 
interest in happiness and virtue, there were still a 
few residual glimmers of virtue ethics. The Catholic 
Church, of course, maintained its own teachings 
on virtue ethics, for example in the influential 
Papal Encyclical Rerum Novarum (Of New Things) 
in 1891.31 This encyclical insisted on a moral 
framework for the market economy, one in which 
private property must conform with moral laws: 
“It is lawful,” says St. Thomas Aquinas, “for 
a man to hold private property; and it is also 
necessary for the carrying on of human ex-
istence.” “But if the question be asked: How 
must one’s possessions be used? - the Church 
replies without hesitation in the words of the 
same holy Doctor: “Man should not consider 
his material possessions as his own, but as 
common to all, so as to share them without 
hesitation when others are in need. (Para-
graph 22)
Beyond the Catholic Church, traditional virtues 
of prudence and temperance were still looked to 
for social harmony. John Maynard Keynes, in The 
Economic Consequences of the Peace, emphasized 
that the vast new wealth of the late 19th century 
industrial era was socially tolerated in part be-
cause the rich did not in fact consume their vast 
wealth, but rather invested it:
Herein lay, in fact, the main justification of 
the capitalist system. If the rich had spent 
their new wealth on their own enjoyments, the 
world would long ago have found such a ré-
gime intolerable. But like bees they saved and 
accumulated, not less to the advantage of the 
whole community because they themselves 
held narrower ends in prospect.32
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Consistent with Keynes’ point, a few great titans 
of industry, notably Andrew Carnegie and John 
D. Rockefeller, turned much of their wealth over 
to the public by establishing philanthropic 
activities of unprecedented scale. Carnegie and 
Rockefeller professed their belief in the tradi-
tional values of temperance and charity. Here is 
how Carnegie put it in his manifesto, the Gospel 
of Wealth: 
This, then, is held to be the duty of the man of 
Wealth: First, to set an example of modest, un-
ostentatious living, shunning display or extrava-
gance; to provide moderately for the legitimate 
wants of those dependent upon him, and after 
doing so to consider all surplus revenues which 
come to him simply as trust funds, which he is 
called upon to administer, and strictly bound as 
a matter of duty to administer in the manner 
which, in his judgment, is best calculated to 
produce the most beneficial results for the com-
munity—the man of wealth thus becoming the 
mere agent and trustee for his poorer brethren, 
bringing to their service his superior wisdom, 
experience and ability to administer, doing for 
them better than they would or could do for 
themselves.33
Carnegie summed up his philosophy in this way: 
“The man who dies thus rich dies disgraced.” 
Unfettered Hyper-Commercialism
In the first decades of the 20th century, the social 
ethos in the US, the world’s richest and most 
commercialized society, evolved into a full-throat-
ed consumerism and hedonism, exemplified by 
the “Roaring Twenties.” Happiness, according 
to the prevailing elite ethos, was more and more 
to be found in personal wealth, pure and simple. 
Mandeville had written of “private vice, public 
benefit.” Increasingly, as modern consumerism 
was born, the notion of private vice was dropped. 
In modern America, it became every man’s God-
given birthright to pursue and enjoy wealth, and 
as much of it as possible.
The mass media of the 20th century — especially 
radio, TV, and most recently Internet — transformed 
the market society, as I have recently described in 
The Price of Civilization.34 Advertising soared, and 
the field of public relations emerged in the 1920s, 
with Sigmund Freud’s nephew Edward Bernays 
credited as the inventor. PR specialists became the 
leading applied psychologists of the day, building 
on the new psychological insights of unconscious 
motivation to create powerful stimuli for con-
sumption. America slid into hyper-commercial-
ism, untethered by ethical, religious, or philosophi-
cal constraints. 
The German free-market thinker Wilhelm Ropke 
launched a trenchant mid-20th century critique of 
the power of advertising and mass consumerism 
in his 1958 book The Humane Society.35 (Vance 
Packard did the same in The Hidden Persuaders 
(1957) and John Kenneth Galbraith also under-
scored these themes around the same period, in 
The Affluent Society in 1958 and The New Industrial 
State in 1967.) Ropke observed that advertising 
“separates our era from all earlier ones as little 
else does, so much so that we might well call our 
century the age of advertising.” Ropke pointed out 
the ubiquity of advertising and the other dark arts 
of persuasion, and believed that they would under-
mine social values and ethics and end up destroy-
ing the market economy itself:
To assert oneself all the time by ubiquitous 
advertising, day and night, in town and coun-
try, on the air and on every free square foot 
of wall space, in prose and in verse, in word 
and picture, by open assault or by the subtler 
means of ‘public relations,’ until every gesture 
of courtesy, kindness, and neighborliness is 
degraded into a move behind which we sus-
pect ulterior motives; to fashion all imaginable 
relations and performances on the principle of 
supply and demand and so to commercialize 
them, not excluding art and science and reli-
gion; forever to compare one’s own position 
with that of others; always to tryout something 
new, to shift from one profession and from one 
place to the next ; to look with constant jealousy 
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and envy upon others -— such extreme com-
mercialization, restlessness, and rivalry are an 
infallible way of destroying the free economy 
by morally blind exaggeration of its principle. 
This is bound to end up in an unhealthy state 
of which the worst must be feared.36
Ropke was concerned that an unfettered market 
economy is inherently biased towards commercial-
ization because it pays to advertise for private goods 
but not for public goods. He also presciently wor-
ried that financial innovations would undermine 
personal thrift. Installment buying was, for Ropke, 
an insidious trap, in the way that sub-prime lending 
in recent years became a trap. Ropke rightly worried 
that such financial engineering would tempt house-
holds to go into excessive debt to buy consumer 
goods, undermining the fragile restraints that 
induce households to save for their future.
The Failures of the Hyper-commer-
cialism 
The ethos of hyper-commercialism has prevailed 
the United States for around one century. It 
remains the dominant US ethos today. Yet there 
are growing counter-currents, both religious and 
secular, that insist on social justice, redistribu-
tion, ecological sustainability, social capital, and 
psychological detachment from consumerism. 
Hyper-commercialism has failed to lift average US 
happiness for more than half a century, even as 
per capita income has tripled. In Figure 2.3 of this 
report, the US ranks just 17th in happiness, though 
it has a higher income per capita than the 16 coun-
tries ahead of it, with the exception of Norway.  
Hyper-commercialism has failed as an ethic of 
happiness on four fundamental grounds. First, de-
spite Mandeville’s hopes, an economy cannot run 
effectively on greed alone. A prosperous market 
economy depends on moral ballast for several fun-
damental reasons. There must be enough social 
cooperation to provide public goods. There must 
be enough honesty to underpin a stable financial 
system. There must be enough attention paid to 
future generations to attend responsibly to the 
natural resource base. There must be enough re-
gard for the poor to meet basic needs and protect 
social and political stability. The US is falling short 
on all of these fronts, in part because the moral 
consensus needed for public cooperation, a viable 
social safety net, and private ethical responsibility 
has seriously atrophied.37 
Second, modern neuroscience, evolutionary biol-
ogy, and psychology, all contributing to a newly 
emergent science of happiness, concur in refut-
ing the model of individualistic, object-oriented 
utility. Economists are beginning to take heed, as 
well, of the young field of behavioral economics. 
Utility does not inhere only in objects after all. 
Pain, pleasure, and life satisfaction inhere at least 
as much in the mind as in the market, as Bud-
dha and Aristotle rightly taught. Acts of altruism, 
such as gift giving and volunteer work, raise one’s 
individual well-being.38 Moreover, even market 
preferences, attitudes towards wealth, and moral 
behavior such as honesty and compassion, depend 
on moral instruction, social norms, individual 
habits of behavior, and mind training.
Third, hyper-commercialism undermines social 
capital, a key factor in well-being. Unfettered labor 
markets undermine families and communities, 
for example, by driving fathers in poor households 
to leave their families in search of jobs. Techno-
logical change, such as the rise of television and 
the Internet, reduce face-to-face time and interac-
tion, undermining the ingredients of social trust. 
As shown by Putnam and others, US social capital 
has declined markedly over the course of several 
decades.39
Fourth, the psychological burdens of hedonism 
have been grimly exposed, especially in the United 
States, the most hyper-commercial society. Study 
after study confirms the ancient wisdom that 
an exaggerated desire for wealth and consump-
tion leads to personal unhappiness, addictions, 
ill health, and other psychological, social, and 
physical burdens.40 Relentless advertising and 
media imagery greatly amplify these problems. 
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Consumer addictions of all sorts (compulsive 
shopping, compulsive gambling, heavy TV watch-
ing, fast-food addictions, eating disorders, tobacco 
addiction, excessive borrowing, and more) seem to 
be soaring. 
The Return toVirtue Ethics?
By now we recognize that economic, social, and 
psychological factors are all at play in determin-
ing happiness. There has been considerable 
recent attention given to the challenges of falling 
social capital and psychological instability, even if 
solutions have not yet been achieved. But what of 
the fourth factor: ethics? Can we foresee a revival 
of virtue ethics?
We continue to shy away from virtue ethics in our 
diverse and pluralistic society in part because we 
believe implicitly that no ethical consensus is pos-
sible. Could there be a meaningful new consen-
sus on ethics that could help to guide behavior 
and encourage individuals towards the pursuit of 
virtue? 
I am cautiously optimistic. Professor Hans Küng 
and his colleagues at Tubingen University and 
the Global Ethic Foundation have convincingly 
argued that certain basic ethical principles are 
shared by all major religions, and therefore can 
become the basis for a shared ethical framework 
in a diverse and pluralistic society. Two notable 
attempts in this direction are the Declaration 
Toward a Global Ethic (1993)41 adopted by the 
Parliament of the World’s Religions, and more 
recently the Global Economic Ethic (2009) that 
focuses on economic issues.42 This, I believe, is 
a course urgently in need of further exploration, 
especially as the world searches for a new, shared 
sustainable development agenda.   
In the Global Economic Ethic, the overarching 
ethical framework is “the principle of humanity,” 
meaning that, “The fundamental principle of a 
desirable global ethic is humanity.” This includes 
ensuring the basic needs of all people and honor-
ing the Golden Rule of reciprocity (“What you do 
not wish done to yourself, do not do to others.”). 
Within the principle of humanity, the Global Eco-
nomic Ethic identifies four basic values:
(1) Non-violence and respect for life, including 
respect for human life and respect for the 
natural environment;  
(2) Justice and solidarity, including rule of law, 
fair competition, distributive justice, and soli-
darity;
(3) Honesty and tolerance, including truthfulness, 
honesty, reliability, toleration of diversity, and 
rejection of discrimination because of sex, 
race, nationality, or beliefs;
(4) Mutual esteem and partnership, including 
fairness and sincerity vis-à-vis stakeholders 
and the rights to pursue personal and group 
interests through collective action.
Many other movements worldwide aim at a revival 
of virtue ethics. One, Action for Happiness, asks its 
members to live so as to produce as much happiness 
and as little misery as they can in the world.43
There would of course be much work to do to in-
troduce a new virtue ethics into public policy. The 
US and much of the world are out of practice, to 
say the least. And there would be a grave danger 
in trying to force an ethical consensus where one 
does not exist. Yet we can still imagine a new 
ethics agenda with at least five components. The 
first, following the work of Küng and colleagues, 
would be to engage in deliberative processes to 
try to identify ethical values shared (or potentially 
shared) across society. The second would be more 
public education in ethical concepts, to help in-
dividuals, companies, and governments develop 
better tools to debate and adopt ethical positions. 
Two exemplary initiatives are the Good Project44 
and Action for Happiness.45  The third would be 
public policies to promote voluntary, pro-social 
actions such as national or international service. 
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The fourth would be to encourage civil society 
organizations to create new tools to monitor busi-
ness and government for their ethical behavior. 
Finally, we need new thinking to understand 
and elaborate the modern linkages of virtue eth-
ics and happiness. The OECD proposes in this 
report, for example, that governments collective 
data not only on subjective well-being but also on 
the covariates of well-being. The OECD mentions 
demographics, material conditions, quality of 
life, and psychological measures.  
I would encourage one more category: individual 
values and social norms regarding honesty, trust, 
compassion, consumerism, and other aspects of 
virtue ethics. I am confident that more scientific 
understanding of the evolving values and norms 
around the world will offer new pathways to 
global consensus and happiness. 
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34 Sachs (2011). 
35 Ropke (1960).
36 Ropke (1960, p. 128).
37 Sachs (2011). 
38 See, for example, Aknin et al. (2012), Aknin et al. (2013), 
and the discussion in Lyubomirsky (2013, pp. 174-6).
39 Putnam (2000).
40 See the discussion in Lyubomirsky (2013, pp. 170-2), and 
references therein.
41 Parliament of the World’s Religions (1993).
42 Global Ethic Foundation (2009).
43 Action for happiness. Retrieved from http://www.action-
forhappiness.org/ 
44 See The Good Project (http://www.thegoodproject.org/
about-us/): “The Good Project is a large scale, multi-site 
effort to identify individuals and institutions that exem-
plify good work—work that is excellent in quality, socially 
responsible, and meaningful to its practitioners—and to 
determine how best to increase the incidence of good work 
in our society.”
45 See Action for Happiness (http://www.actionforhappiness.
org/): "Action for Happiness is a movement of people 
committed to building a happier society by making positive 
changes in their personal lives, homes, workplaces and 
communities."
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We are now measuring happiness and well-being 
across countries and across time. We are learning 
about what does and does not raise well-being. 
How can this new knowledge and information 
be used to develop better policies in terms of 
improved outcomes, and also create better ways 
of making policy?
This chapter explains how countries are using 
well-being data to improve policy making, with 
examples from around the world. It also explains 
the practical and political difficulties faced by 
policy makers when trying to use a well-being 
approach. The main conclusion is that this approach 
leads to better policies and a better policy process. 
The remaining technical problems are surmount-
able. There are some difficult philosophical 
issues about what constitutes success that are 
less easy to resolve and, as ever, there is an urgent 
need for more data, research and experiments.
Introduction
More and more countries are starting to measure 
their progress with reference to the happiness of 
their citizens. The wealth of data and analysis in 
Chapter 2 shows how far this subject has come. 
Bhutan has gone the furthest but others, like 
the UK, are now systematically collecting data 
on happiness and life satisfaction. The OECD is 
leading the way in developing clear standards so 
that cross-country comparisons can be made.1 
There are also many private organizations like 
Gallup that collect well-being data across the 
world and have been doing so for many years.
This is not to say that the philosophical and 
political debates about how a country’s success 
should be measured are over. Indeed it is doubtful 
whether there will ever be complete unanimity on 
what constitutes success. But there is a growing 
consensus among governments and international 
institutions on two points: first, that GDP is a 
very partial and imperfect measure, and second, 
that measures of subjective well-being have an 
important role to play in defining success. This 
is not to say that happiness should be the only 
measure, although some do believe that, but that 
a successful society would at the very least not 
have widespread misery.2
Last year’s World Happiness Report contained a 
Chapter (4) on policy implications.3 This Chapter 
updates that one and summarizes the widespread 
use now being made of happiness and well-being 
data in the formulation of policy.
At the macroeconomic level, politicians have 
found it difficult to move the focus of commentary 
away from GDP towards well-being measures. 
This is in part due to cynicism that the politicians 
are merely trying to draw attention away from 
the economic realities of the world, particularly 
in those countries struggling to recover from the 
consequences of the financial crash in 2007-08. As 
the global recovery picks up pace, this problem 
should solve itself, but it is clear that in some 
countries like France, the impetus provided by 
the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report has not been 
maintained.4 In contrast, British Prime Minister 
David Cameron has set up a system requiring 
the Office for National Statistics (ONS) to measure 
well-being regularly. The publication of various 
league tables by the OECD, the UN and various 
independent organizations, has stimulated intense 
debate about how progress should be measured, 
why certain countries are lagging behind, and 
what they should do about it. 
These measurements take a number of forms. 
Some use survey evidence to measure how happy 
people feel at the moment (so-called “affective” 
measures) while others ask about overall satisfac-
tion with life (an “evaluative” measure). Many 
organizations use these measures in conjunc-
tion with other less subjective data on topics like 
life expectancy, and individuals’ capabilities and 
freedoms. There is no consensus about how or 
whether these different factors should be com-
bined to produce a single measure. Indeed, dif-
ferent governments will place different weights 
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on the various indicators. The important new 
development is that countries and researchers 
increasingly are using measures of subjective 
well-being to help formulate better policies and to 
measure the success of those policies.
There is also intense interest in the spatial distri-
bution of well-being within countries.5 This has 
been driven by evidence showing that there are 
large spatial divergences in well-being that are not 
explained simply by differences in income. Just as 
we have many policies, such as progressive tax 
systems, designed to reduce economic inequalities, 
so policy makers are now developing ideas on 
how to reduce spatial inequalities. Certainly in 
the UK, the micro data suggest that “rurality” and 
“green space” are key drivers of well-being, even 
after controlling for many other factors. Yet our 
world is characterized by the growth of ever larger 
cities. China is an interesting case study. It has 
delivered an enormous reduction in economic 
poverty as a result of people moving from rural 
areas to large cities. However, these “migrants” 
are not as happy as you might expect given the 
increase in their incomes. They clearly miss 
many aspects of rural living that raised their 
well-being.6 
At a micro level, governments are working out how 
to incorporate well-being into standard policy 
making. This is hardly surprising given that the 
need for government intervention often arises 
because of risks to individuals’ well-being. We 
know, for example, the misery caused by unem-
ployment, especially long term unemployment. This 
misery is in addition to the strains that high 
unemployment puts on private income and 
public sector budgets. Getting people back to 
work means they start paying taxes, not collecting 
benefits, and it raises their self-esteem and ability 
to look after themselves and their families with 
less reliance on the State. A greater emphasis on 
well-being would lead to more resources being 
devoted to overcoming the obstacles to returning 
people to work. A second obvious example is the 
need to reorient health budgets to take account of 
well-being effects. Mental illness is a great cause 
of misery, and of unemployment and low produc-
tivity. Social networks are also tremendously 
important – lack of human contact and loneliness 
can have clear physiological effects and negative 
consequences for our health. A focus on well-
being would shift resources from physical to 
mental health and would make more use of 
“social” prescriptions.
A third key policy implication is the need to 
switch public spending towards “prevention” 
rather than “care.” Becoming ill, physically or 
mentally, can reduce happiness significantly and 
in some cases, recoveries can be very lengthy and 
far from complete. Money spent upfront, for 
example on improved education, resilience and 
emotional intelligence, and preventative measures 
like malaria nets, can allow people to live healthier, 
more fulfilled and more productive lives. Well-
being clearly leads you to focus on asset-based 
approaches to policy rather than deficits. This 
applies to many areas of policy other than health, 
e.g. asset-based community development vs. 
multiple deprivation approaches.
It is not surprising that in these examples, the 
case for the policy interventions is both to raise 
well-being and to raise incomes. It is a mistake to 
believe that the two always have to be traded off. 
Of course, there are times when trade-offs must 
be made. For example, a more sustainable energy 
policy might raise the current cost of living as a 
result of higher energy prices. These kinds of 
policies involve trade-offs between current and 
future well-being. The future “you” and future 
generations may well be much happier if we 
move now to more sustainable energy policies. 
The problem for politicians is that it is the current 
cohort of electors who decide their fate. If the 
public does not put much weight on the welfare 
of future generations, possibly because they 
believe they will be much better off anyway, or 
because people are short-sighted, then politicians 
may respond accordingly.
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Politicians have found it easier to get agreement 
to policies that enhance well-being by referring to 
the growing literature on behavioral insights.7 
Where it is shown that people are not operating 
always in their own best interests, are being 
manipulated in ways that might lower their well-
being, or are acting in ways that might damage 
the collective interest of the country or even the 
planet, politicians across the political spectrum 
are starting to be more confident about intervening 
to improve well-being. Those on the right are 
attracted to policies that involve small changes 
and do not require governments to be heavy 
handed, for example by banning certain products 
or very restrictive regulations. Those on the left 
emphasize the need to protect individuals from 
exploitation by companies or even corrupt govern-
ments. This relatively new area has allowed policies 
to be implemented that previously might have 
been ruled out as being part of a “nannying” state. 
Another growth area for well-being policies comes 
from the various findings that policies that raise 
well-being may actually enhance other factors like 
health and incomes, and hence GDP, where politi-
cians may get more credit for any successes.8
Practical problems and political obstacles
Governments are increasingly realizing that using 
well-being as a success measure will lead to better 
policies. However, they are worried about whether 
all the practical problems can be overcome and 
whether such policies can be implemented 
successfully. In many cases, there will be genuine 
disagreements about what changes will most 
enhance well-being. To assess well-being you 
need to engage with the affected groups. As Hall 
and Rickard9 have pointed out, engaging the 
public has its own advantages. They feel more 
ownership of the eventual policy decision, 
making it easier for policy makers to implement 
any changes, and such engagement helps build 
capacity and resilience. Many policies have 
upfront costs and yield benefits later. The more 
the public have been engaged in the policy 
decision, the more patience they usually display.
Quite often this kind of policy process will expose 
deficiencies in our understanding of what impact 
policies might have on certain groups. A focus on 
well-being often means experimenting, whether 
by step-by-step testing of options or using 
randomized control trials, to fill in the gaps. It 
is highly doubtful that a well-being analysis will 
immediately lead to the perfect policy. It is much 
more likely that it will be necessary to test various 
options, to learn from these tests, and then adapt 
the policies appropriately. But this process of 
testing options at the outset has its own politi-
cal problems – it can take a long time, which 
those with vested interests can use to encourage 
resistance and marshal support for the status 
quo. Experimenting can involve treating identical 
groups differently, which is a political challenge. 
Overcoming these drawbacks requires a com-
munication strategy that explains the eventual 
benefits from getting a better policy. 
There is also a methodological problem. A great 
deal of research is now being published showing 
how policies and different policy processes lead 
to better outcomes. However, despite the oppor-
tunities for learning and informing policy, it is 
very difficult to publish negative findings, thus 
increasing the risk that policy makers will repeat 
errors that have been made before.
There is also a technical problem about inferring 
that the policy change causes the improvement in 
well-being. The statistical techniques that are 
used can show that certain changes are associated, 
or correlated, with changes in well-being. Outside 
of an experimental context, it is hard to establish 
that the improved well-being is caused by the 
specific policy in question. This is why more 
research is needed and a degree of humility is 
always appropriate.
The next sections look at real examples from 
around the world where well-being analysis has 
informed policy decisions. It then looks at three 
key policy areas, namely health, education and 
transport, to give a feel for some of the difficulties 
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that will be encountered and how they can be 
overcome. The final section covers some of the 
remaining technical barriers that need to be 
resolved to help policy analysts apply well-being 
techniques routinely.
Global Examples
Bhutan is the best known example where the 
government has adopted the objective of maximiz-
ing its Gross National Happiness (GNH) Index. 
This is a very broad measure with 124 different 
components. It is very much an indicator of the 
“colors and texture”10 of people’s lives. The GNH 
Index acts as a measure of progress and by 
looking at those components that drag down 
overall GNH, it shows where policy changes are 
most needed. These changes can be implemented 
at the individual, community or country level. 
Many countries are following Bhutan’s lead. Under 
Bhutan’s leadership, there is now a connected 
international network, supported by a series of 
international GNH conferences,11 to measure and 
build happiness in local organizations and com-
munities in countries at all stages of economic 
development. These activities have been important 
in several countries, but are perhaps most 
widespread in Brazil, where GNH, or Felicidade 
Interna Bruta (FIB) in Portuguese, has inspired a 
variety of surveys and activities designed to improve 
lives. These typically involve community-level 
investigations using FIB surveys, combined with 
actions as diverse as cleaning up polluted water-
ways, building biodigesters for waste management,12 
and training fencers drawn from favelas.  The 
actions are locally inspired and directed, but 
connected by the FIB movement to parallel 
activities throughout the country. Thus in Brazil, 
GNH starts with indicators, but the questionnaire 
is simply the launching pad to generate a high 
level of citizen participation in collective discussions 
and concerted action, by means of both “top-
down” official government policy, and “bottom-
up” social mobilization. 
At the national level in New Zealand, the Govern-
ment is engaged in a Quality of Life Project to 
look at well-being in urban environments and 
investigate how to use well-being measures more 
systematically in policy analysis. The UN has for 
some time measured a much broader set of 
development indicators, and it and the EU are 
now going further in measuring the sustainability of 
that progress. South Africa has published devel-
opment indicators since 2007 covering 10 broad 
areas measuring progress in overcoming some of 
the legacy problems from apartheid. But the most 
systematic work is being carried out by the OECD 
and is explained in detail in Chapter 7 of this 
report. That Chapter describes the OECD  Guidelines 
on Measuring Subjective Well-being and also docu-
ments progress already underway within a 
number of national statistical offices.
In the UK, the Office for National Statistics 
(ONS) is now regularly collecting data on well-
being in terms of happiness, life satisfaction and 
anxiety. The results have created interest, for 
example, in the question of how happiness and 
life satisfaction vary with age. The spatial variations 
in the answers have also spurred intense debates 
about why some areas are so much better places 
to live than others.
There are also plenty of examples at the sub-
country level. In the US, the Jacksonville Com-
munity indicators have been collected for the last 
28 years. Inspired by the GNH examples, city-level 
groups in the United States and Canada have run 
GNH-type happiness questionnaires to inform 
and motivate local collaborative actions to im-
prove communities. In Australia, the Tasmania 
Together project is a good example, and in the 
UK, there are numerous examples at the Local 
Authority level.13 The community level studies 
emphasize the building of social capital, covering 
issues like trust, relationships and cohesion, 
which have a profound effect on well-being.14 
They are having a significant impact on local 
policy makers as they seek to understand what 
makes for great places to live and how they can 
improve the quality of lives of their constituents.
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There are also numerous examples at the indi-
vidual policy level. Since 1998, the Singapore 
Prison Service has implemented policies to 
improve the well-being of prisoners, staff and 
society as a whole, mainly by focusing on education 
and reducing reoffending.15 Elsewhere in Asia the 
focus on well-being comes through in their 
approach to handling disasters. In Aceh in 
Indonesia, for example, measures of well-being 
showed that despite the dreadful loss of life and 
property caused by the tsunami in 2004, people 
were more satisfied with their lives after the 
disaster. This is generally attributed to the ending of 
the civil war as communities worked together to 
rebuild their homes and lives.16
More generally, a focus on well-being has affected the 
macro policies implemented in some countries in 
response to the global financial crisis. It is well 
known that unemployment often leads to misery 
and low levels of life satisfaction. Following this 
large negative shock to growth, governments like 
South Korea realized they needed to stimulate 
growth to stop unemployment rising. President Lee 
highlighted that these policies followed from a 
desire to improve the quality of life in Korea.17 It will 
be very interesting to look back at the very different 
macro policy responses to the shock in different 
parts of the world to see which set of policies worked 
best from a well-being point of view.
From my personal experience, the use of well-being 
as the measure of success is particularly powerful 
in cross cutting areas, which are always the hardest. 
For example, to tackle climate change requires 
cooperation from many government departments, 
from Education to Energy, Business, and Treasury. 
Focusing on well-being allows a common language 
and a common metric to compare different 
policies and outcomes.
Key Policy Areas
Health
On health, policy makers long ago realized that it 
made little sense to appraise health treatments in 
terms of their impact on GDP, not least because 
in many countries prices are set at zero or well 
below cost. The health profession hit upon the 
idea of using QALYS, so called Quality Adjusted 
Life Years. These are obtained by asking people 
various questions designed to reveal how much 
they would be affected by certain illnesses. A 
treatment that would extend someone’s life by 
one year in perfect health adds 1 QALY. If it adds 
two years but the quality is only valued at half way 
between death (0) and perfect health (1) then it 
also provides 1 QALY (2 x ½). This system allows 
analysts to allocate scarce resources with the aim 
of maximizing QALYS. However, a well-being 
approach to the same issue gives rather different 
results.18
One of the main findings is that reductions in 
physical functioning matter less than people had 
thought, while reductions in mental health 
matter more than had been expected. Basing 
resource allocation on patients’ well-being is by no 
means straightforward. We know that people adapt 
to different conditions, thus mitigating the impact 
of, say, losing a limb, on a person’s well-being. But 
should we reduce the resources spent on some-
one because they have successfully adapted to a 
disability? A strict well-being approach would say we 
should. Those who favor a “capabilities” approach 
(Amartya Sen, for example)19 would be worried by 
such a conclusion. Nevertheless it is clear that the 
well-being approach can supplement QALYS and 
may point the way to measuring QALYS more 
accurately. Its most powerful conclusion – that 
mental health needs to be taken much more 
seriously – has widespread support and in some 
countries, like the UK, it has already resulted in 
important policy changes. Who knows, in a few 
years, we may all be assessing health measures in 
WELBYS (Well-being Years) not QALYS.
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Transport
The standard method of analyzing transport 
investments, such as new roads, airports or railways 
is to compare the cost with the benefits (so called 
cost benefit analysis (CBA)). The costs are usually 
measured in money as they reflect wages, materials 
and profits. The benefits are more difficult to 
calculate as transport services are often not 
charged directly, e.g. via road tolls. The most com-
mon solution is to calculate the benefits in terms 
of time saved, injuries and deaths prevented, and 
the impact on the environment, for example in 
terms of changes in noise levels and air quality. All 
the latter factors are hard to value accurately and 
objectively. 
How much is a reduction in noise worth? Are 
small time savings of much value when you are 
travelling on a comfortable train with internet 
access that allows you to work, or play, as you 
choose? Indeed, are we better off “working” or 
playing on the internet, or talking to companions 
on the train?20 Quite often time savings are valued 
in terms of average earnings, or some fraction of 
the average hourly pay rate. Standard approaches 
have been drawn up for the values of lives saved, 
and injuries, again based around average earnings. 
Even more difficult issues like valuing the loss of 
a particularly scenic view have been resolved by 
asking people how much they would pay to preserve 
the view. All the different effects are converted 
into monetary equivalents which allows the CBA 
to come up with a Net Present Value (NPV) of 
Benefits minus Costs. This allows projects to be 
ranked, and assuming there is a fixed budget, the 
“best” policy is to select that set of projects which 
maximizes the NPV.
A well-being approach would be more focused on 
assessing the effect of the  environmental impact 
and time savings on people’s subjective well-
being. Factors like preventing deaths and injuries 
could be evaluated using WELBYs. A focus on 
maximizing WELBYs in transport policy would 
surely also tilt resources towards policies such as 
active travel or collaborative consumption with 
well-being as an additional intended outcome, 
valued alongside traditional objectives such as 
reduced congestion and local growth.
Researchers have been trying to explain the 
determinants of well-being using regression 
techniques. These equations provide estimates 
of the individual effects of, for example, aircraft 
noise on people’s subjective well-being. They are 
not subject to the obvious problems associated with 
asking people how much they would be prepared 
to spend to forego the noise, where the respondents 
have every incentive to overstate the impact. 
“Objective” measures like differences in the prices 
of similar houses with different noise levels can 
be useful as checks on the plausibility of the well-
being estimates. This can be done as long as there 
is a way to equate well-being changes to income 
changes. Again, this effect can be estimated using 
a regression, but the results can vary considerably. 
This is definitely an area where more research is 
needed. A reliable way of converting money into 
well-being and vice versa would be extremely useful 
for policy analysts and decision makers. 
Education
The traditional policy approach to education is to 
look for objective “success” measures such as test 
results. These are available using a country’s own 
exams and there are some internationally compa-
rable measures, like the PISA (Program for 
International Student Assessment) results. A 
standard economic approach to measuring the 
value of education is to consider the increase in 
lifetime earnings resulting from an educational 
intervention. This is a classic way for MBA 
courses to market their programs. Schools are 
held up as a success if they “add value” to their 
pupils as measured by the increase in their test 
results between joining and leaving the school. In 
reality there is more to education than just formal 
teaching, and there is more to life than just 
earning more money. A well-being approach to 
education policy would first of all look at the 
impact of measured levels of formal educational 
attainment on subjective well-being. Surprisingly, 
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the estimated effects are very small. Indirect 
effects of education on other factors included in 
such equations, such as income and even social 
trust,21 are often significant. More generally 
researchers like Michalos22 argue that you need a 
broad definition of education to include informal 
sources, like learning from the media and friends. 
In addition, you need a broader definition of 
well-being than simply individuals’ subjective 
measures, more along the lines of Aristotle’s 
eudaimonia, to pick up the ability of education to 
enhance capabilities and open new doors. Eudai-
monic well-being measures appear particularly 
sensitive to the type of work you end up doing and 
the profession you enter. If students selected their 
course based on their future earnings and the 
well-being of people currently in their chosen 
career, the data suggests that perhaps more would 
choose courses leading to health, social care and 
teaching, which are associated with a greater 
sense of personal worth. Ultimately, you need to 
understand how education influences well-being 
by looking at more than just the size of a coeffi-
cient in a regression equation. This is another 
way of saying that there are lots of indirect chan-
nels through which education ultimately raises 
well-being. And it is a restatement of the view 
that there is more to a successful life than just 
high levels of well-being and happiness. This 
suggests a multi-equation approach would be 
more appropriate.
Education has a special place in well-being analysis 
because there are growing demands for schools to 
teach children how to enhance their own and others’ 
well-being. This is an end in itself but also it helps 
to contribute to a better society where people are 
more sympathetic, compassionate and willing to 
help each other. From a public policy point of view, 
this has enormous attractions. A world where 
each individual “stands alone” is a world where 
there will be very strong pressures for the State to 
shoulder more responsibilities. For example, the 
combination of an ageing population with children 
feeling less obligation to look after their parents 
is potentially an expensive call upon the public 
finances. And as individuals, those who have been 
taught about well-being may go on to be more in-
dependent and productive, better members of soci-
ety, with less individual need to call on the State. In 
a world where tax competition is holding down tax 
revenues and the list of issues the State is expected 
to resolve keeps growing, Finance Ministries are 
likely to embrace ideas that reduce pressure on the 
public finances. This is another reason why even 
the most mechanistic, GDP-loving Treasury econo-
mists should embrace well-being analysis.
Remaining Problems for Applying 
Well-being to Policy Questions
Methodological
The debate between those who believe that the goal 
of policy should be subjective well-being (SWB) 
and those who argue for a broader definition, such 
as Aristotle’s eudaimonia, is still unresolved. 
However there is a growing consensus that SWB 
provides useful additional information to the 
standard GDP-style indicators, and resources are 
being allocated to ensure it is measured. The de-
bate is philosophical and fundamental. It entails 
answers to questions like “Why are we here?,” 
“What is the State for?,” “What type of society 
do we want to shape for future generations?.” 
These issues are not likely to be resolved soon to 
everybody’s satisfaction, but they are important 
questions. Interest in well-being is keeping them 
at the forefront of debate and providing a tangible 
framework to explore them. Furthermore, as long 
as it can be shown that well-being analysis leads 
to better informed policy decisions it is likely to 
be a growth area.
There are three further issues holding back the 
more widespread use of well-being in policy work:
(1) the need for interpersonal comparisons,
(2) the choice of discount rate,
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(3) the translation of well-being effects into     
monetary amounts and vice versa.
These issues are much more tractable, and 
answers that command broad support are emerging. 
Each issue is discussed in turn.
Interpersonal Comparability
As Sen (2008) has cogently argued, without inter-
personal comparisons it is difficult to make any 
progress in comparing policies involving both 
winners and losers. The reality is that public policy 
decisions are based on a set of often implicit values 
that incorporate interpersonal comparisons. 
Usually the “values” are exemplified by using 
market prices and assuming away any distribu-
tional issues. This is generally not a sensible way 
to do policy work because if market prices were 
right and there were no distributional problems 
there would not be much need for governments 
to do anything, apart from providing public goods 
like defense. The key requirement is to make 
explicit the assumptions that are being used in the 
analysis. In the well-being area, this means you 
need to confront the issue of whether an increment 
to the well-being of a very happy person is worth as 
much as a similar increment to someone in a mis-
erable state. One solution is to argue that govern-
ments should concentrate on creating what could 
be called a “not bad” society. This means concen-
trating on getting people out of misery, for ex-
ample by spending more on mental health issues. 
Kahneman and Krueger,23 for example, suggested 
reducing the proportion of time people spend 
in an unpleasant state as a policy goal.24 This is 
similar to giving high weight to those with low 
levels of well-being and no weight at all to those 
with, say, above average well-being. The important 
point is to be transparent about the values used. As 
Sen argues: “it gives the public a clear opportunity 
to discuss, scrutinize and question the values that 
are being invoked, and also to debate the decisions 
that are being taken.”25 
It is also important to have a system that can 
be used in practice. For example, a government 
might decide to give twice as much weight to 
SWB gains to those with below the average or 
median SWB levels, compared to those with SWB 
above the average or median level. The specific 
choice of weighting system would be determined 
by the government and might well change if 
there were a change of political control.
The choice of discount rate
Standard Cost Benefit Analysis values costs and 
benefits in monetary terms and applies a discount 
rate to future values. This is common practice by 
governments, although the Stern report presented 
some interesting questions about how governments 
should handle discounting when dealing with 
very long-term changes in our climate that might 
be irreversible.26 Most of us prefer $1 today rather 
than an equivalent amount of spending power in a 
year’s time. Is the same true for SWB? Again, most 
of us appear to prefer pleasure now to pleasure 
later, but there is no reason to believe that the 
discount rates for money and SWB should be the 
same. It is tempting merely to say we need more 
research, but this is no use to the policy analyst 
trying to present the decision maker with a choice 
of options. Some analysts might be tempted to use 
the same discount rate in the absence of strong 
arguments about what the SWB discount rate 
should be. But this cannot be right in a world with 
positive economic growth and declining marginal 
utility of income. Others have argued that we 
should not discount at all, as we should in principle 
treat all generations equally. One practical solution 
is to present a sensitivity analysis that would show 
the level of discount rate for SWB that would be 
the tipping point for choosing between options. 
This would leave the elected decision maker to 
decide on whether he or she felt that the rate 
should be above or below that point, a somewhat 
simpler problem than picking a particular rate. Of 
course this creates a problem that different decision 
makers might use different discount rates so create 
inconsistencies. This is inevitable unless a govern-
ment makes a clear decision on what rate to use.
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The translation of SWB effects into monetary 
values and vice versa
One of the most difficult problems for policy 
makers is how to value so called “intangibles,” 
like noise and air pollution. Economists have 
attacked the problem by asking people what they 
are prepared to pay, for example, to have fewer 
planes flying over their house. This is known as 
“Stated Preference” or Willingness to Pay (or 
Accept) method.27 An alternative method, known 
as “Revealed Preference,” infers people’s valuations 
by looking at the choices people make. For 
example, the market value of a house with one 
plane flying overhead every waking hour is 
$100,000 but if that increased to $120,000 when 
the nearby airport closed, you might infer that 
people are prepared to pay $20,000 to avoid the 
noise. Both approaches have their advantages and 
disadvantages.28
The well-being approach has the advantage of 
being based on direct estimation of the impact of 
the “intangibles” on SWB. To use the above 
example again, we would need to have measured 
the SWB of those living under the flight path 
before the (unexpected) closure of the airport. 
Then we would measure their SWB after it had 
closed. The change would give an estimate of the 
SWB impact of the noise. But how do we compare 
this with the monetary costs that might result 
from the closure? One solution is to build a 
model that attempts to explain the variations in 
well-being among individuals. This would allow 
us to get an estimate of the impact of any changes, 
for example in their income, on their SWB. This 
would provide a measure of how much a change 
in SWB was “worth.” In practice, this technique is 
generally applied by using panel data –information 
on a large group of people measured at different 
points in time – to run a regression where SWB 
is “explained” by factors like income, individual 
characteristics, and whatever environmental and 
other factors are believed to be important. The 
coefficient on the income term tells us how much 
extra income is needed to deliver a one unit 
increase in SWB. For example, we might find that 
a $1,000 increase in income is associated with a 
one unit rise in SWB, holding all other factors 
constant. If we also find that a 10% reduction in 
noise increases SWB by one unit then we can 
infer that the 10% reduction is “worth” $1,000. 
These approaches also need to take account of the 
evidence suggesting that the marginal utility of 
income depends heavily on the level of income.29 
There are many problems associated with this 
approach as well, but this demonstrates that it 
can be implemented. A key advantage is that it is 
based on people’s actual experiences revealed 
through their life satisfaction ratings rather than 
relying on them to provide direct estimates; we 
know from behavioral science literature that 
people can find it difficult to estimate and predict 
such values. Of course, the big new requirement 
is to have measures of SWB. That is why cam-
paigners for spreading this kind of analysis are so 
keen on getting more data collected as soon and as 
broadly as possible. 
More sophisticated approaches are being devel-
oped.30 It remains to be seen if these approaches 
will come up with robust and stable measures of 
the relationship between income and well-being. 
This relationship is unlikely to be straightforward, 
and may well depend on context and be very 
different for different groups in society.
Conclusions
The desire to enhance well-being is being used more 
and more to drive policy decisions. Each new ex-
ample helps push forward the boundaries of what is 
possible. But these are early days and the techniques 
are being refined all the time. These analyses may 
give roughly the right solutions where many other 
techniques provide answers that, while more pre-
cise, are not measuring what really matters.
The international institutions can help this process 
by agreeing on ways of measuring well-being and 
by publicizing the results. Those institutions that 
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assess developments around the world, like the 
UN, the World Bank and the IMF, would do well 
to consider shifting some of the attention currently 
devoted to GDP to better, broader measures of 
sustainable progress.
The analytical community needs to help us 
understand which policies would raise well-being 
in a sustainable way. Then we need to convince 
the public of the link between their well-being 
and the policies that Governments are pursuing. 
In this way we can help politicians to reap the 
reward for good, sustainable policies that enhance 
individual and global well-being. Policy revolutions 
take time. The evolution from the GDP era to the 
well-being era has started. This is only the second 
World Happiness Report, but already the importance 
of well-being as the goal of policy is spreading 
both within and between societies.
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1 OECD (2013). 
2 Recent work by Benjamin et al. (2012) shows that surveys 
of subjective well-being (SWB) are a good, but imperfect, 
predictor of revealed preferences abut other outcomes or 
behavior. This suggests that people are taking into account 
more issues than just the impact on their well-being when 
making choices. Nevertheless, SWB surveys may still be 
our best available guide to what it is people are really trying 
to maximize.
3 Helliwell et al. (2012).
4 Stiglitz et al. (2009).
5 See, for example, Making Space for Well-being (2012). 
6 Knight & Gunatilaka (2007), Knight & Gunatilaka (2008). 
7 See for example Kahneman (2011), and Thaler & Sunstein 
(2008).
8 De Neve & Oswald (2012).
9 Hall & Rickard (2013).
10 For more detail, see the case study on Bhutan in Helliwell 
et al. (2012).
11 For the proceedings of the fifth international GNH confer-
ence, see www.felicidadeinternabruta.org.br 
12 This project, in the Rajadinha community of Brasília, using 
a methodology developed by the Instituto Visão Futuro 
(www.visaofuturo.org.br), started by building community 
cooperation, followed by a GNH questionnaire. After 
processing the data, a large festive meeting was convened 
- with entertainment by the local schoolchildren as clowns 
and with cultural programs by the youth - in which the 
results of the questionnaire were presented to the mem-
bers of the community. After extensive, community-wide 
discussion and voting, the treatment of water effluents was 
selected as the priority to increase collective well-being. A 
GNH committee was then constituted including adults and 
youth, which met regularly twice a month to plan and ex-
ecute collective actions: the cleaning of the waste clogging 
the local stream; the involvement of the local university 
hospital to educate the neighborhoods about “Water and 
Health;” the partnership with the students and faculty of 
the local university in Brasília to help map the water prob-
lems of the area; and the mobilization of a citizen’s group 
to negotiate with the local government to provide clean 
water to the community. In addition, the national Bank of 
Brazil (Banco do Brasil), a GNH project partner, is in the 
process of constructing 50 ecological “biodigestor septic 
tanks” to resolve the waste water problem.
13 See Aylott et al. (2012) and Hall & Rickard (2013) for more 
detail on these examples.
14  Halpern (2000).
15  Leong (2010) and Helliwell (2011).
16  Deshmukh (2009). 
17  Lee (2009).
18 See Dolan et al. (2012). 
19 Sen (1985).
20 See Helliwell & Huang (2013) for a comparison of the value 
of real and online friends.
21 Helliwell & Putnam (2007). 
22 Michalos (2007)
23 Kahneman & Krueger (2006).
24 Of course, much of what the State does is designed to en-
hance efficiency e.g. building roads, resolving commercial 
disputes; and has no specific focus on misery prevention.
25  Sen (1985).
26  Stern (2007).
27  See Kahneman et al. (1999) for a powerful critique of this 
approach.
28  See Fujiawara & Campbell (2011) and the references cited 
therein to get a feel for the debate.
29  Layard et al. (2008).
30  See for example the work of Benjamin et al. (2012 and 
forthcoming).
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Introduction
Notions of subjective well-being or happiness 
have a long tradition as central elements of quality of 
life. However, until recently, these concepts were 
often deemed beyond the scope of official statis-
tics. In recent years this view has changed, 
particularly following the report of the Commission 
on the Measurement of Economic Performance and 
Social Progress, which recommended that national 
statistical agencies collect and publish measures 
of subjective well-being.1 
Following the release of the Commission’s recom-
mendations, an increasing number of statistical 
agencies have launched initiatives aimed at measur-
ing subjective well-being. However, these measures 
are not necessarily collected in a consistent manner 
nor do they follow the same methodology. While 
subjective well-being has been examined extensively 
in the academic literature, including from the 
perspective of which subjective well-being measures 
to collect, and how to collect them, no consistent 
set of guidelines for national statistical agencies 
drawing on this research currently exist. Providing 
a single, self-contained reference document 
tailored to the needs of producers of statistical 
information in this field was the main motivation 
for developing the OECD Guidelines on Measuring 
Subjective Well-being.2
The Guidelines published on March 20, 2013 
represent an important step forward in moving 
the measurement of subjective well-being from a 
primarily academic activity to the sphere of official 
statistics. They constitute the first international 
Handbook on the measurement of subjective well-
being. They are part of a broader OECD agenda 
aimed at improving the measurement of outcomes 
relevant to well-being and quality of life.
Measuring subjective well-being: the 
OECD approach
The OECD approach to measuring subjective 
well-being covers both the range of concepts to be 
measured and the best approaches for measuring 
them. This includes considering issues of sample 
design, survey design, data processing, coding, 
and questionnaire design. In particular, the 
OECD approach emphasizes a single primary 
measure intended to be collected consistently 
across countries, as well as a small group of core 
measures that data producers should collect 
where possible. Beyond this, the Guidelines 
provide advice on how to collect a wide range of 
different measures of subjective well-being that 
national statistical offices and other data producers 
may want to tailor to their specific needs.
Defining subjective well-being
The OECD approach to measuring subjective well-
being covers a wider range of concepts than just 
happiness. In particular, the focus is on subjective 
well-being, which is taken to be:3
good mental states, including all of the various 
evaluations, positive and negative, that people 
make of their lives and the affective reactions of 
people to their experiences
This definition is intended to be inclusive, en-
compassing the full range of different aspects 
of subjective well-being commonly identified by 
research in this field. It includes first and foremost 
measures of how people experience and evaluate 
their life as a whole. However, the scope of the 
definition also covers measures of “meaningful-
ness” or “purpose” in life (often described as 
“eudaimonic” aspects of subjective well-being). 
This definition of subjective well-being hence 
encompasses three elements:
tLife evaluation – a reflective assessment on a 
person’s life or some specific aspect of it
tAffect – a person’s feelings or emotional states, 
typically measured with reference to a particular 
point in time
tEudaimonia – a sense of meaning and purpose 
in life, or good psychological functioning
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The measures of life satisfaction or happiness with 
“life as a whole” that form the main focus of the 
World Happiness Report are measures of life evalu-
ation and, as will be outlined below, are also at the 
core of the OECD approach. However, the other 
aspects of subjective well-being  — ffect and eudai-
monia — are also important and play a complemen-
tary role in the OECD measurement framework.
A modular approach
For national statistical offices, collecting information 
on subjective well-being means using survey data. 
The choice of which questions to use is therefore of 
critical importance for measuring subjective well-
being. Different questions capture different dimen-
sions of subjective well-being and the precise 
question wording can have a non-trivial impact 
on results. In selecting questions to incorporate 
into existing or new survey vehicles, statistical 
agencies face trade-offs between the time taken to 
ask any new questions, the potential impact of new 
questions on responses to existing questions, and 
the added information gained from the new 
questions. These trade-offs will come under 
particularly severe scrutiny if the survey in 
question refers to an important and well-estab-
lished concept (e.g. household income or unem-
ployment).
In recognition of the different user needs and 
resources available to statistics producers, the 
OECD does not present a single approach to 
gathering information on subjective well-being. 
Instead, six question modules are presented in 
the Guidelines. Module A (see Box 1) measures all 
three aspects of subjective well-being (life evalu-
ation, affect, and eudaimonia), with national 
statistical agencies encouraged to implement it in 
its entirety. When this is not possible, a primary 
measure — outlined in the module — should be 
used at the minimum. Additional modules (B 
to F — see Box 2) are focused on specific aspects 
of subjective well-being. These modules are not 
intended to be used in their entirety or unaltered, 
but provide a reference for statistical agencies 
that are developing their own questionnaires.
For statistical agencies already using subjective 
well-being measures in their surveys, a crucial 
question will be whether the potential benefit 
of using improved and/or more internationally 
comparable measures outweighs the potential 
cost of disrupting an established time series. 
This is a choice for individual statistical agencies, 
and will depend on a number of factors, including 
the current and future intended uses of the data, 
how drastic the change may be, and how long 
the time series series has been established. In 
any case, it is recommended that any changes to 
existing questions are phased in using parallel 
samples, so that the impact of the change can be 
fully documented and examined. This will enable 
insights into the systematic impact of changes in 
methodology and provide agencies with a potential 
method for adjusting previous data sets.4 
Core measures of subjective well-being
Core measures of subjective well-being are those for 
which there is the most evidence of validity and 
relevance, for which the results are best understood, 
and for which policy uses are most developed. These 
are measures for which international comparability 
is the highest priority. Although the Guidelines are 
intended to support producers of measures of 
subjective well-being rather than being overly 
prescriptive, the core measures are quite specific in 
content and collection method.
The core measures are intended to be used by 
data producers as the common reference point 
for the measurement of subjective well-being. 
Although limited to a few questions, the core 
measures provide the foundation for comparisons 
of the level and distribution of life evaluations, 
eudaimonia, and affect between countries, over 
time and between population groups. 
Data producers are encouraged to use the core 
measures in their entirety (Box 1). The whole 
module should take less than 2 minutes to 
complete in most instances. It includes a basic 
measure of overall life evaluation and three affect 
questions. A single experimental eudaimonic 
measure is also included.
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There are two elements to the core measures 
module. The first is the primary measure of life 
evaluation (question A1). This represents, in 
the OECD assessment, the absolute minimum 
required to measure subjective well-being, and 
it is recommended that all national statistical 
agencies include this measure in one of their an-
nual household surveys. The primary measure is 
intended to be collected consistently across coun-
tries and should be the first question included 
in surveys where the measurement of subjective 
well-being is considered.
The second element consists of a short series of 
affect questions and the experimental eudaimon-
ic question. These measures complement the 
primary evaluative measure both because they 
capture different aspects of subjective well-being 
(with a different set of drivers) and because the 
different nature of the measures means that they 
are affected in different ways by cultural and 
other sources of measurement error. While it is 
highly desirable that these questions are collected 
along with the primary measure as part of the core, 
these questions should be considered a lower 
priority than the primary measure. In particular, 
the inclusion of the eudaimonic measure in the 
core should be considered experimental.
Choosing the core measures
The choice of questions to be included in the core 
measures is, perhaps, the most significant decision 
that was involved in developing the OECD Guide-
lines. It is therefore useful to summarize the decision 
process and the rationale for the measures finally 
included.
There were essentially two candidate questions 
for the primary measure. These were the Self-
Anchoring Striving Scale5 (the Cantril Ladder) 
and a version of the commonly-used question 
on satisfaction with life.6 Both have been widely 
Primary Measure
The following question asks how satisfied you feel, on a scale from 0 to 10. Zero means you feel “not at all 
satisfied” and 10 means you feel “completely satisfied”.
 A1. Overall, how satisfied are you with life as a whole these days?   [0-10]
Additional core measures
The following question asks how worthwhile you feel the things you do in your life are, on a scale 
from 0 to 10. Zero means you feel the things you do in your life are “not at all worthwhile,” and 10 
means “completely worthwhile.”
A2. Overall, to what extent do you feel the things you do in your life are worthwhile? [0-10]
The following questions ask about how you felt yesterday on a scale from 0 to 10. Zero means you did not 
experience the feeling “at all” yesterday while 10 means you experienced the feeling “all of the time” yesterday. 
I will now read out a list of ways you might have felt yesterday.
 A3. How about happy? [0-10]
 A4. How about worried? [0-10]
 A5. How about depressed?        [0-10] 
          Source: OECD, 2013
 Box 1. OECD core measures of subjective well-being
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used and have an extensive literature attesting to 
their validity and reliability. Both questions focus 
on the evaluative aspect of subjective well-being and 
have been used in large-scale surveys across many 
different nations and cultures. The choice between 
the two measures comes down to a balancing of the 
strengths and weaknesses of each measure.
The Cantril Ladder is designed to be “self-anchor-
ing” (“self-anchoring” means that the scale is 
explicitly framed relative to the respondent’s 
aspirations). It has therefore been thought to be 
less vulnerable to interpersonal differences in 
how people use the measurement scale. This, 
however, has been questioned by some authors 
who have suggested that the Cantril Ladder may 
actually be more rather than less vulnerable to 
issues of cross-country comparability.7 However, 
more recent evidence suggests that, apart from 
the fact that the Cantril Ladder tends to produce a 
marginally wider distribution of responses than 
does satisfaction with life, the two measures are 
essentially equivalent. However, the Cantril 
Ladder is a relatively lengthy question, requiring 
some explanation of the “ladder” concept involved to 
the person participating in the survey.
By way of contrast, the satisfaction with life question 
is simple and relatively intuitive. Although both 
measures have been extensively used, compared to 
the Cantril Ladder, the satisfaction with life question 
has been the subject of more analysis, reflecting its 
inclusion not just in the World Values Survey, but 
also in crucial panel datasets such as the German 
Socio-Economic Panel and the British Household 
Panel Survey.
The Cantril Ladder and the satisfaction with life 
question are relatively similar in terms of their tech-
nical suitability for use as an over-arching evaluative 
measure, particularly if both use the same 11-point 
(0 to 10) scale.8 Given the above, the primary mea-
sure included in the core module has been chosen 
as a variant of the satisfaction with life question 
using a 0 to 10 scale. The decisive factor in favor of 
this choice is the relative simplicity of the question, 
which will make it easier to incorporate in large-scale 
household surveys where respondent burden is a 
significant issue.
Three affect questions are also included in the 
core module. This is because affect is inherently 
multi-dimensional and no single question can 
capture overall affect. The various dimensions of 
affect can be classified in two ways. One of these 
relates to positive versus negative emotions, while 
the other relates to level of “arousal.” This classifi-
cation gives four affect quadrants and is known 
as the Circumplex model.9 Figure 7.1 below 
illustrates the Circumplex model. The quadrants 
Figure 7.1. The Circumplex model of affect 10 
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are: positive low arousal (e.g. contentment); positive 
high arousal (e.g. joy); negative low arousal (e.g. 
sadness); and negative high arousal (e.g. anger, 
stress). A good set of affect measures might 
attempt to cover all four quadrants. 
Unlike overall life satisfaction, there is not an 
obvious choice of a simple affect measure that is 
suitable for inclusion in general household surveys. 
Most affect scales have been developed in the 
context of either the measurement of mental 
health or of more general psychological research. 
In the former case, many of the existing scales 
focus excessively on negative affect, while in the 
latter the questionnaire may be too long for 
practical use in a household survey. One model 
for collecting affect measures in a household survey 
is provided by the Gallup World Poll, which 
contains a range of questions on affect covering 
enjoyment, worry, anger, stress and depression, 
as well as some physical indicators such as 
smiling or experiencing pain, experienced by 
the respondent over the previous day. These 
questions now have a significant history of use 
and analysis behind them.11 A very similar set of 
questions (on positive affect only) was proposed 
by Davern, Cummins & Stokes.12
The affect questions contained in the core 
questions module are based on those in the 
Gallup World Poll and proposed by Davern et al., 
but reduced two questions covering the negative 
quadrants of the Circumplex model of affect and 
a single positive affect question. Only a single 
positive question is used because the different 
aspects of positive affect are, in practice, relatively 
closely correlated. The moods proposed for 
measurement in the OECD core set are being 
happy, worried and depressed. In each case, a 0 
to 10 frequency scale is used for responses (rang-
ing from “not at all,” to “all of the time,” which is 
similar to the scale anchors used in the European 
Social Survey).13
The eudaimonic question is based on a question 
trialed by the UK Office of National Statistics 
(ONS) in the Annual Population Survey: “to what 
extent do you feel the things you do in your life 
are worthwhile?” There is good evidence from the 
ONS data that this question captures information 
not provided by either life evaluation or affect 
measures.14 In addition, a similar question has 
been included in the ad hoc well-being module of 
the European Union Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) to be fielded in 2013. The 
question proposed here is similar to that used 
by the ONS and in EU-SILC. However, because 
there is as yet no overarching theory linking 
individual questions such as the one proposed 
to “eudaimonia” as a broad concept, the question 
should be regarded as experimental. In particular, 
although notions of meaning or purpose in life 
are a crucial part of eudaimonia, it is unclear as to 
whether a single question of this sort adequately 
captures all of the relevant aspects of eudai-
monia.
Best practice in data collection
Measuring subjective well-being in a consistent 
fashion requires not just using a common set of 
questions, but also taking into account a range of 
issues in survey design and implementation. It 
is important to consider the survey in which the 
subjective well-being questions are to be included 
as this affects both the type of information that 
can be collected and the range of covariates that 
can be analyzed. Beyond this, the specific details 
of survey and sample design, questionnaire design, 
and how the survey is implemented are also of 
crucial importance.
Survey vehicles
Subjective well-being measures are relevant in a 
wide range of contexts. Of particular importance 
for monitoring progress is the inclusion of such 
measures in integrated household surveys and 
in general social surveys. Time use surveys are 
the key vehicle for collecting detailed information 
on affect and its antecedents but it is possible to 
collect useful information on affect from other 
household surveys as well.
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Box 2. OECD question modules: beyond the core
Much of the OECD Guidelines focus on the 
minimal set of questions for which international 
comparability is the highest priority. These are 
outlined in the core module (module A) contain-
ing the primary measure of life evaluation and a 
short set of questions addressing affect and eudai-
monia. However, because the core questions are 
intended to be widely used, they are also brief. The 
entire core module is expected to take less than two 
minutes of survey time. This brevity prevents the 
core module from dealing with any of the aspects 
of subjective well-being in great depth.
The remaining five modules in the OECD Guide-
lines address the issue of depth. The first three of 
these modules (modules B, C, and D) address the 
concepts of life evaluation, affect, and eudaimonic 
well-being in more detail. Each module includes a 
range of measures related to the concept including 
multi-item scales consisting of several separate 
questions and measures of the different sub-
dimensions related to each concept.
Multi-item scales are important because some of 
these —such as the Satisfaction With Life Scale — 
are well tested and known to have higher statistical 
reliability than the single item questions contained 
in the core module. Although too long to include 
in the core, they may be valuable for national statis-
tical offices to include in surveys where subjective 
well-being is an important focus and more time is 
available. Alternatively, they may be useful in more 
experimental contexts to help validate the single 
item measures used in the core.
Measures of sub-dimensions are particularly 
important for affect and eudaimonia. While 
the measures of affect included in the core will 
provide a useful summary, for some purposes 
more detailed information may be wanted. There 
is good evidence that the negative emotions in 
particular are only weakly correlated with each 
other and with positive affect.15 This means that 
measuring additional negative emotions adds 
unique value to measurement.
Module E is different to the previous modules in 
that it focuses on people’s evaluations of particular 
aspects of their life such as satisfaction with their 
health status or satisfaction with their personal 
relationships. These “domain evaluations” are more 
specific than overall life evaluation, but can play an 
important role in measuring overall well-being and 
in explaining variation in overall life evaluation.
Finally, module F focuses on the measurement of 
experienced well-being through time-use diaries. 
Experienced well-being measures involve collecting 
information on the moods and emotions people 
experience during different activities through the 
use of a time-use diary or via experience sampling, 
where people record their activity and affective 
state whenever prompted to by a pager. Obviously 
such data cannot be collected through a normal 
household survey, and are thus not suitable for the 
core measures. However, such data are extremely 
valuable and provide a different set of insights to 
the more standard survey questions. Module F 
provides two standard approaches for collecting 
experienced well-being data that can be imple-
mented in official time use surveys.
All of the OECD question modules focus on 
information for surveys of the general population. 
However, there is also an important policy 
interest in the subjective well-being of children. 
The available evidence suggests that children are 
capable of responding effectively to subjective 
well-being questions from as young as age 11 
with respect to measures of life evaluation and 
affective state.16 As the focus of the OECD 
Guidelines is on general population surveys, 
questions focused specifically at young children 
are therefore not provided in the question modules. 
However, this remains a significant gap that 
future work should address.
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Measures of subjective well-being are also 
relevant to victimization surveys, health surveys, 
household income surveys, and special topic 
surveys. In particular, one-off special topic surveys 
are excellent vehicles for exploring aspects of 
subjective well-being in more depth, although 
they cannot be used to monitor changes in well-
being over time due to their “one-off” nature.
Including measures of subjective well-being in 
panel surveys is important for research to explore 
causality and the drivers of subjective well-being.
What other information should be collected: covariates 
and analytical and variablezs.
The range of covariates to collect alongside 
measures of subjective well-being will vary with 
the specific aspect of subjective well-being that is 
of interest and with the research question being 
examined. Despite this, it is possible to present 
some general guidelines on the most important 
information that should be collected in household 
or general social surveys alongside measures of 
subjective well-being.
tDemographics: age, gender, place of birth, marital 
status (legal and social marital status), family 
type, number of children, household size, and 
geographic information
tMaterial conditions: household income, consump-
tion, wealth, housing conditions, and measures 
of material deprivation
tQuality of life: employment status, health status, 
work/life balance, education and skills, social 
connections, civic engagement and governance, 
environmental quality, and personal security 
tPsychological measures: aspirations and expecta 
tions about the future, which form part of the 
frame of reference17 that individuals use when 
evaluating their lives or reporting their feelings
Although all of the measures of subjective well-
being identified as suitable for inclusion in 
household surveys are equally relevant to time 
use surveys, the use of time diaries allows the 
collection of information on additional covariates 
in a way that is not possible in standard household 
surveys (e.g. activity classification, with whom an 
activity was performed, location where the activity 
took place). This is particularly useful where 
information on aspects of subjective well-being, 
such as affect, is collected for specific activities in 
the time-use diary itself rather than as an overall 
judgment as part of an individual questionnaire.
Survey and sample design
One important distinction between measures of 
subjective well-being and many of the measures 
typically included in official statistics is that sub-
jective well-being measures will almost invariably 
need to be collected through sample surveys. In 
contrast to many economic or population statistics, 
there is generally no administrative database that 
would produce subjective information without, 
in effect, incorporating survey questions in an 
administrative process.18 Thus, issues relating 
to survey and sample design are fundamental to 
producing trustworthy and reliable measures of 
subjective well-being.
It is not the role of this chapter to provide detailed 
guidelines on sample frames and sample design. 
These are specialist areas in their own right, and 
excellent guides exist for data producers who 
are seeking advice on these technical aspects of 
data collection.19 However, in survey design, as 
in other aspects of design, form should follow 
function. The fact that subjective well-being is the 
goal of measurement has implications for survey 
design. This section hence discusses some of the 
most significant considerations for the measure-
ment of subjective well-being with respect to the 
target population, to when and how frequently 
the data should be collected, to what collection 
mode should be used, and to identifying the most 
appropriate survey vehicle.
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Target population
The target population for a survey describes the 
complete set of units to be studied. A sample survey 
will generally attempt to achieve a representative 
sample of the target population. While surveys 
may differ in terms of the population covered in 
terms of both concept (e.g. whether the institutional 
population is covered or not) and practice (e.g. in 
terms of including people living in collective living 
quarters, the specific resources to be shared in 
order to qualify people as members of the same 
households), most household surveys are restricted 
to people who are members of private households 
and are residents in the country to which the 
statistics relate. The same concept of usual 
residence should be applied when the focus is on 
measuring subjective well-being. However, the 
target population may be more detailed than the 
total population from which the sample is drawn. 
For example, the total population might be all 
persons aged 15 and over living in private dwellings 
in a specified area. However, the target population 
might specify males and females as sub-populations 
of interest, requiring the sampling frame to 
accommodate distinct analysis of these two 
groups. More generally, sub-groups are often 
defined by such characteristics as age, gender, 
ethnicity, employment status or migrant status.
The target age group for measures of subjective 
well-being will vary with respect to the goals of 
the research program. For example, in the context 
of research on retirement income policies, it may 
be appropriate to limit the target population to 
persons aged 65 or older. In general, however, for 
measures of subjective well-being, and particularly 
for the OECD core measures, the target popula-
tion should normally be the resident population 
aged 15 and older, dwelling in private residences. 
It is important here to emphasize that the resident 
population should be captured rather than citizens 
of a country for two reasons. First, because most 
of the policy-relevant drivers of well-being relate to 
where a person lives, not their country of origin, 
and second, in order to ensure that international 
comparisons are comparing like with like.
Some surveys with the household as the unit of 
measurement rely on a single respondent (such 
as the head of household) to provide responses 
for the household as a whole. This approach cannot 
be used for measures of subjective well-being, 
since the cognitive process of evaluating and 
responding with respect to one’s own subjective 
well-being is very different to that of providing an 
estimate of another householder’s state of mind. As 
responses to questions on subjective well-being are 
inherently personal, the unit of measurement  for 
subjective well-being must be the individual. This 
implies that the sampling frame must produce a 
representative sample of individuals. While this will 
typically not be an issue for surveys where the 
individual is the primary unit of analysis, some 
household surveys may require an additional set of 
individual weights to derive individual estimates. 
Surveys where the response is on the basis of 
“any responsible adult” will in particular be 
problematic in this regard.
People not living in private households
One population group that may be of high policy 
interest, but which is not typically covered in house-
hold surveys, is people not living in private house-
holds. This group includes people living in institu-
tions, including prisons, hospitals or residential care 
facilities, as well as people with no fixed residence, 
such as the homeless. These groups raise two issues 
with respect to the measurement of subjective well-
being. The first problem is common to all attempts 
to collect statistical information on such groups 
– that such population groups tend to be excluded 
from standard household survey sample frames. 
This means that, at a minimum, specific data collec-
tion efforts may be required to reach these groups, 
based on a sample frame designed to cover the 
relevant institutions. In some cases, such as for the 
homeless, it may be difficult to develop any statisti-
cally representative sampling approach at all.
A more significant challenge faced in the measure-
ment of subjective well-being is that many of the 
people in the relevant groups may not be able to 
respond on their own behalf. This is particularly the 
case for people institutionalized for health-related 
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reasons that affect mental functioning (including 
people with some mental illnesses, with physical 
illnesses limiting the ability to communicate, and 
the very old). In these cases it is not possible to 
collect information on a person’s subjective well-
being. Proxy responses, which might be ap-
propriate for some types of data (income, marital 
status, age), are not valid with respect to subjec-
tive well-being.
Frequency and duration of enumeration
The frequency with which data is collected 
typically involves a trade-off between survey goals 
and available resources. All other things being 
equal, more frequent collection of data will 
improve the timeliness of estimates available to 
analysts and policy makers, and will make it 
easier to discern trends in the data over time. 
More frequent enumeration, however, is more 
costly both in terms of the resources involved in 
conducting the data collection and in terms of the 
burden placed upon respondents. It is therefore 
important that decisions around the frequency of 
data collection are made with a clear view to the 
relationship between the timeliness and frequency 
of the data produced and the goals of the data 
collection exercise.
Aggregate measures of subjective well-being 
generally tend to change only slowly over time. 
This reflects the relatively slow movements in 
most of the social outcomes that affect subjective 
well-being and the fact that many changes only 
impact on a small proportion of the population. 
For example, the experience of unemployment— 
which is associated with a change in life satisfaction 
of between 0.7 and 1 on a 0 to 10 scale for the 
person experiencing it 20— typically affects between 
3% and 10% of the adult population. Thus, even 
a large shift in the unemployment rate — say, an 
increase of five percentage points — will translate 
only into a small change in measures of average 
subjective well-being21 via its direct impact on 
the unemployed (there may also be an additional 
impact on the employed population if they feel 
less secure in their jobs).
The slow rate of change in measures of subjective 
well-being might suggest that such measures do 
not need to be collected frequently. However, the 
small absolute size of changes in subjective 
well-being also means that standard errors tend 
to be large relative to observed changes. A number 
of observations are therefore needed to distinguish 
between a genuine trend over time and simply 
noise in the data. Box 3 illustrates this point. For 
this reason, despite (or indeed, because of) the 
relatively slow rate of change in subjective well-
being data, it is desirable that measures are 
collected on a regular and timely basis. For the 
most important measures used in monitoring 
well-being, annual time series should be regarded 
as the essential minimum in terms of frequency 
of enumeration. More frequent monthly or 
weekly data is, however, likely to be of lower 
value. It should be pointed out, however, that 
frequent, or rolling sample, surveys increase the 
possibilities for identifying the causal impacts of 
other factors whose dates of occurrence can be 
identified.22 
Duration of enumeration
The duration of the enumeration period (i.e. the 
period of time over which information is collected) 
is very important for measures of subjective well-
being. Unlike measures of educational attainment 
or marital status, for which it does not usually 
matter at what point during the year the data 
are collected, the precise timing of the collection 
period can have a significant impact on measured 
subjective well-being.23 For example, measures of 
positive affect are higher on weekends and holidays 
than on week days.24 
The fact of being sensitive to the point in time at 
which they are collected is not unique to measures 
of subjective well-being. Many core labor market 
statistics, for example, have a pronounced 
seasonality, and published statistics usually adjust 
for this. However, such adjustments require 
collecting data over the course of a whole year in 
order to produce the information required for 
seasonal adjustments.
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If measures of subjective well-being change only slowly over time, it might seem logical that 
they should be measured only infrequently. Figure 7.2 below illustrates why this assumption 
does not necessarily hold. The figure plots time series changes of life satisfaction in the Netherlands 
using data collected in the Eurobarometer from 1977 to 1997. Because the Eurobarometer has a 
relatively small sample size, the error is large relative to the size of changes over time. Between 
1977 and 1997, life satisfaction in the Netherlands was largely static. Despite large fluctuations 
in the annual time series, the trend line for this 20-year period is almost flat.
Two additional lines included in Figure 7.2 illustrate what would emerge if information had 
been collected only every 10 years. If the base year were 1977, then a 10-yearly collection would 
show a slight decline in life satisfaction between 1977 and 1987, followed by a substantial increase 
from 1987 to 1997. The net effect over 20 years would be seen to be a significant increase in life 
satisfaction. Changing the base year to 1978 produces a different pattern, with life satisfaction 
declining from 1978 to 1988, before flattening out from 1988 to 1998. The overall effect over 20 
years this time would be a slight decrease in life satisfaction. None of these 10-yearly patterns 
reproduces the pattern highlighted by annual data.
Box 3. Identifying trends in subjective well-being: implications for frequency of measurement
Figure 7.2. Life satisfaction in the Netherlands 1977-1997: Eurobarometer
Source: Eurobarometer
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The fact that some aspects of subjective well-
being vary over the year suggests strongly that 
a long enumeration period is desirable. Ideally, 
enumeration would take place over a full year, 
and would include all days of the week, including 
holidays. This would ensure that measures of 
subjective well-being provide an accurate picture 
of subjective well-being across the whole year. 
Where a year-long enumeration period is not 
possible, enumeration should, as far as is possible, 
be spread proportionately over all the days of the 
week. All days of the week need to be covered 
because day of the week can matter, especially 
in the case of daily affect measures.25 Any attempt 
to measure the “typical” level of subjective 
well-being for a group would need to account 
for regular variations over time, and it may be 
necessary to develop a specific set of weights to 
ensure that responses from all days contribute 
equally to the final estimate.
Holidays (and to some degree the incidence of 
annual leave) are more problematic to deal with 
in that they tend to be distributed unevenly over 
the course of the year. Thus, if enumeration cannot 
be spread over a whole year, there is a risk that an 
incidence of holidays during the enumeration 
period that is higher or lower than normal might 
bias the survey results. For this reason, it is 
essential in the case of surveys collected with 
relatively short enumeration periods that data 
producers assess the impact of the inclusion of 
data collected during any holidays. While it may 
not be necessary to omit data collected during 
holidays if the impact is negligible or weak, the 
available evidence on the impact of some holidays 
suggests that testing for potential bias from this 
source is important. What constitutes a holiday 
will need to be considered with respect to the 
context in which the survey is collected. However, it 
is worth noting that Deaton finds a large effect on 
survey measures of subjective well-being for 
Valentine’s Day in the United States, despite the 
day not being a public or bank holiday.26
Sample size
Large samples are highly desirable in any survey, 
as they reduce the standard error of estimates and 
allow both more precise estimates as well as a 
greater degree of freedom with respect to producing 
cross-tabulations and analysis of results for 
population sub-groups. With measures of subjective 
well-being, sample size is particularly important 
because of the relatively small changes in subjec-
tive well-being associated with many areas of 
analytical interest. Deaton, for example, notes that 
the expected decline in life satisfaction due to the 
changes in household incomes and unemployment 
associated with the 2008 financial crisis is less 
than the standard error on a sample of 1,000 
respondents, and only three times larger than the 
standard error on a sample of 30,000 respondents. 
Although it is impossible to give precise guidelines 
for what is an appropriate sample size, some 
general criteria can be noted. Most of the factors 
that should be taken into account in the planning 
of any survey also apply when collecting informa-
tion on subjective well-being. Available resources, 
respondent burden, sample design (a stratified 
sample will have a different sample size to a random 
sample with the same objectives, all other things 
equal), anticipated response rate and the required 
output will all influence the desirable sample size. 
The need for sub-national estimates, in particular, 
will play an important role in determining the 
minimum required sample.
Beyond the general considerations mentioned 
above, which apply to all surveys, some features 
specific to measures of subjective well-being will 
influence the desired sample size. On a 0 to 10 
scale, a change of one point of subjective well-being 
associated with a given change in the status of 
one of the drivers of subjective well-being (such as 
being unemployed rather than employed) implies 
a very large effect.27 Changes over time in average 
levels of subjective well-being tend to be even 
smaller than affects at the individual level. The 
analysis of subjective well-being data therefore 
requires a relatively large sample size in order to 
achieve the statistical precision required.28
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Survey Mode
Surveys can be carried out in a number of dif-
ferent modes. Because the mode of collection 
influences survey costs and respondent burden 
and can induce mode effects in responses, the 
choice of mode is an important decision when 
collecting data. The two modes most commonly 
used to collect information on subjective well-
being are Computer-Assisted Telephone Inter-
viewing (CATI), conducted by an interview over 
the telephone, and Computer-Assisted Personal 
Interviewing (CAPI), where the interviewer is 
personally present when recording the data. Com-
puter-Assisted Self-Interview (CASI) surveys can oc-
cur in the presence of an interviewer, when the 
interviewer is on hand but the respondent enters 
their own data into a computer, or without an 
interviewer present, such as when the respondent 
completes an internet survey. For some purposes, 
traditional paper-based self-complete surveys are 
still likely to be relevant. Most time-use diaries, 
for example, are self-completed paper diaries 
filled in by the respondent. 
There is good evidence that the collection mode has 
a significant impact on responses to subjective well-
being questions.29 In general, the use of CASI as a 
mode tends to produce lower positive self-reports 
than the use of CAPI, and this is assumed to be 
because interviewer-led approaches are more likely 
to prompt more socially desirable responding. CATI 
is viewed as the least reliable way to collect consis-
tent subjective well-being data, because in these 
conditions the interviewer is unaware of whether the 
respondent is answering in a private setting or not, 
and it is more challenging for interviewers to build 
rapport with respondents.
As with other features of survey design, the 
choice of the survey mode will be influenced by a 
variety of factors, including resource constraints. 
However, the balance of evidence suggests that, 
where resources permit, CAPI is likely to produce 
the highest data quality. This is probably due in 
part to the rapport that interviewers can build in 
face-to-face situations. However, CAPI also provides 
the opportunity to use show cards, which CATI 
lacks. Show cards that include verbal labels for 
the scale end-points are particularly valuable in 
collecting information on subjective well-being 
where the meaning of the scale end-points 
changes between questions, as this can impose 
a significant cognitive burden on respondents.30 
For example, respondents may find that show 
cards assist in helping keep clear that a 10 on a 
question about happiness yesterday means happy 
“all of the time” yesterday (a good thing) but that 
a 10 on a question about being worried means 
that they were worried “all of the time” yesterday 
(a bad thing).
In terms of data quality, CAPI with show cards 
should be considered best practice for collecting 
subjective well-being data. Where other modes 
are used it is important that data producers collect 
information to enable the impact of mode effects 
to be estimated. National statistical agencies, in 
particular, should consider experimentally testing 
the impact of the survey mode on responses to 
the core measures of subjective well-being recom-
mended by the OECD and publishing the results 
along with any evidence on the mode effect associ-
ated with CATI or CASI31 surveys. 
Questionnaire design
Questionnaire design is an iterative process 
involving questionnaire designers, those responsible 
for determining survey content, and data users. A 
questionnaire designer must balance the cognitive 
burden on the respondent, a limited time budget 
for the survey, and the need to have a questionnaire 
that is clear, comprehensible and flows well, with 
different (and often competing) data needs. Some 
general guidance on issues affecting the inclusion 
of measures of subjective well-being into a survey is 
provided below. In particular, the section focuses on 
issues of question placement, question order and 
translation.
Question placement 
Question order and the context in which a 
question is asked can have a significant impact 
on responses to subjective questions. Although 
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measures of subjective well-being are not uniquely 
susceptible to such effects – question order and 
context will impact on all survey responses to 
some extent – the effect is relatively large in the 
case of subjective well-being. Several well-known 
examples suggest that such effects do need to be 
taken into account when incorporating questions 
on subjective well-being into a survey.
In general, question order effects appear to occur 
not because the question was early or late in the 
questionnaire per se, but because of the contextual 
impact of the immediately preceding questions. 
Thus, the key issue is to identify the most effective 
way to isolate questions on subjective well-being 
from the contextual impact of preceding questions. 
The most direct way of managing contextual 
effects of this sort is to put questions on subjective 
well-being as early in the survey as possible. 
Ideally, such questions should come immediately 
after the screening and household demographics 
questions that establish respondent eligibility to 
participate in the survey. This practice should 
eliminate many of the contextual effects and 
ensure that those that cannot be eliminated in this 
way are consistent from survey to survey.32 
However, this cannot be a general response to the 
issue of dealing with contextual effects for two rea-
sons. First, there will be instances when questions 
on subjective well-being are added to well-estab-
lished surveys. In these conditions, changing the 
flow of the questionnaire would impose significant 
costs in terms of both resources and data quality. 
For example, introducing questions on subjective 
well-being early in such a survey might ensure that 
contextual effects do not impact on responses, but 
this might come at the expense of creating signifi-
cant contextual effects for the following questions 
not related to subjective well-being. Second, in 
cases where there are several such questions in the 
survey, they cannot all be first.
With these factors in mind, four key recommen-
dations emerge with regard to the placement of 
subjective well-being questions in surveys. These 
are as follows:
tPlace important subjective well-being questions 
near the start of the survey. Although, as noted 
above, placing questions early in a survey does 
not eliminate all of the problems associated with 
context effects, it is the best strategy available and 
should be pursued where possible. In particular, 
for the core measures of subjective well-being, 
for which international or time series com-
parisons are an important consideration, it is 
desirable to place the questions directly after 
the initial screening questions. The OECD core 
measures are intended to be placed at the start 
of a survey in this way.
t Avoid placing the subjective well-being questions 
immediately after questions likely to elicit a strong 
emotional response or that respondents might use 
as a heuristic for determining their response to the 
subjective well-being question. This would include 
questions on income, social contact, labor 
force status, victimization, political beliefs or 
any questions suggesting social ranking. The 
best questions to precede subjective ques-
tions might be relatively neutral factual demo-
graphic questions.
tMake use of transition questions to refocus 
respondent attention. One technique that has been 
used to address contextual effects resulting from 
a preceding question on a subjective well-being 
question is using a transition question designed 
to focus the respondent’s attention on their 
personal life. The introduction of such a question 
in the Gallup Healthways Well-being Index in 
2009 eliminated over 80% of the impact from a 
preceding question on politics on the subsequent 
life evaluation measure.33 However, it is important 
to consider that an additional question will add 
to the length of the survey and that there is still 
a risk that transition questions might introduce 
their own context effects. For example, drawing 
attention to a respondent’s personal life may 
lead them to focus on personal relationships or 
family when answering subsequent questions 
about life overall. Development of effective 
transition questions should be a priority for 
future work. 
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tUse of introductory text to distinguish between 
question topics. Well-worded text that precedes 
each question or topic can serve as a buffer 
between measures of subjective well-being and 
sensitive questions. However, there is little 
hard evidence on the degree of effectiveness or 
optimal phrasing of such introductory text. A 
standard introductory text has been included in 
each of the OECD question modules. Consis-
tent use of it should help reduce context effects 
(and will eliminate bias caused by inconsis-
tent introductory text). Further cognitive testing 
or experimental analysis of the impact of 
different types of introductory text would, 
however, be of high value.
Question order within and between subjective well-
being modules
Questions on subjective well-being can be affected 
by previous subjective well-being questions just as 
easily as by questions on other topics. This has im-
plications for the structure of subjective well-being 
question modules (particularly where more than one 
aspect of subjective well-being is addressed), as well 
as for the presentation of questions within modules 
and whether it is advisable to include several 
questions that address similar topics. 
In terms of ordering question modules themselves, 
the evidence suggests that moving from the 
general to the specific may be the best approach.34 
This implies that overall life evaluations should 
be assessed first, followed by eudaimonic well-
being, then by more specific questions about recent 
affective experiences, and finally by domain-specific 
evaluative questions. Domain-specific measures 
in particular risk focusing respondent attention 
on those domains included in the questions, rather 
than thinking about their lives and experiences 
more broadly. 
Question order within a battery of questions can 
also be important – particularly where a group 
of questions includes both positive and negative 
constructs (such as in the case of affect and some 
measures of eudaimonia). Although full ran-
domization of such questions may be optimal, in 
practice switching between positive and negative 
items may prove confusing for respondents, who 
may deal more easily with clusters of questions 
of the same valence. More evidence is needed to 
resolve this trade-off. In the meantime, consis-
tency in the presentation (whether randomized 
or clustered) across all surveys will be important, 
particularly in terms of whether positive or negative 
constructs are measured first. In the question 
modules included in the OECD Guidelines, a clus-
tered approach has been adopted.
Finally, asking two questions about a similar 
construct can be confusing for respondents, leading 
them to provide different answers because they 
anticipate that different answers must be required of 
them. This means that including several 
similar questions about life evaluations, for 
example, could lead respondents to react differently 
to these questions than when each question is 
presented in isolation. This underscores the 
importance of consistency in the number of 
measures used to assess a given construct, and in 
the order in which those measures are used. 
Translation
The exact question wording used in collecting 
information on subjective well-being matters 
a lot for responses. A standardized approach 
to question wording is therefore important for 
comparisons over time or between groups. This 
is relatively straight-forward where all surveys 
are in the same language. However, international 
comparisons or studies in multi-lingual countries 
raise the issue of translation. This is a non-trivial 
matter. Translating survey questionnaires to work 
in different languages is challenging for any sur-
vey, and the potential sensitivity of subjective well-
being questions to differences in wording only 
reinforces this issue.
Potential issues arising from translation cannot 
be entirely eliminated, but they can be managed 
through an effective translation process. An 
example of good practice in the translation of survey 
questionnaires is provided by the Guidelines for the 
development and criteria for the adoption of Health 
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Survey Instruments.35 Although focused on health 
survey instruments, the framework for translation 
presented there has broader applicability, and is 
highly relevant to the measurement of subjective 
well-being. The health survey guidelines identify 
four main steps to the translation procedure:
tInitial or forward translation of the questionnaire 
from the source document to the target language
tIndependent review of the translated survey 
instrument
tAdjudication of the translated survey instrument 
by a committee to produce a final version of the 
translated survey instrument
t Back translation of the final version of the  
translated survey instrument into the source  
language.
Back translation is somewhat controversial in the 
literature on survey design, with some experts 
recommending it and others not.36 The effect of 
back translation is generally to shift the focus 
onto literal translation issues rather than the 
conceptual equivalent of the original instrument. 
In the case of the measurement of subjective 
well-being, back translation is strongly advised. 
This reflects the sensitivity of subjective well-
being measures to question wording. 
Survey implementation
How a survey is implemented is crucial to its 
effectiveness. A poorly-implemented survey will 
result in low-quality and unreliable data regardless 
of the quality of the underlying questionnaire. 
In general, the features relevant to the effective 
implementation of any household survey also 
hold for those collecting information on subjective 
well-being.
Interviewer training
Interviewer training is crucial to the quality of 
responses in any survey. However, the measure-
ment of subjective well-being raises additional is-
sues because the subject matter may be unfamil-
iar to interviewers. This is, ironically, particularly 
so for national statistical agencies with a perma-
nent force of field interviewers. Although a body 
of trained interviewers will generally contribute 
to higher response rates and better responses, 
interviewers may struggle with questions if they 
cannot explain adequately to respondents why 
collecting such information is important and how 
it will be used. Anecdotal evidence and feedback 
from cognitive testing shows that this can be an 
issue with some subjective measures, particularly 
measures of affect.37 In some cases, respondents 
may find it difficult to understand why govern-
ments might want to collect this information and 
that the concept that the survey intends to collect 
is their recently-experienced affective state rather 
than their “normal” state.
To manage risks around respondent attitudes to 
questions on subjective well-being, it is imperative 
that interviewers are well-briefed, not just on 
what concepts the questions are trying to measure, 
but also on how the information collected will be 
used. This is essential for interviewers to build a 
rapport with respondents and can be expected to 
improve compliance by respondents and the qual-
ity of responses. The OECD Guidelines contain an 
extensive discussion on the policy uses of subjec-
tive well-being measures and this can be used to 
complement information from data users in build-
ing a briefing for interviewers on the rationale for 
the data collection (see Box 4).
Ethical issues
Evidence suggests that measures of subjective 
well-being are relatively non-problematic for re-
spondents to answer. Rates of refusal to respond 
are low, both for life evaluations and for measures 
of affect.38 In general, item-specific non-response 
rates for subjective well-being measures are similar 
to those for marital status, education and labor 
market status, and much lower than those for 
measures of household income.39 Cognitive test-
ing of measures of subjective well-being supports 
the conclusions reached from an examination 
of item-specific non-response rates,40 with some 
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Official statistical agencies are under increasing 
resource pressures. This takes the form of both 
budget cuts, which preclude collecting all the 
information for which there is a potential de-
mand, and issues of response burden. Even 
where funding exists to collect information, 
official statistical agencies must be careful not to 
over-burden respondents and jeopardize the good 
will on which high-quality responses depend. 
Because of this, collecting measures of subjective 
well-being will have an opportunity cost in terms 
of other data that will not be collected in order to 
produce such measures. If subjective well-being 
measures are to be included in official statistics, 
therefore, it is essential to be clear about how they 
will be used.
It is also important to be clear about how subjective 
well-being measures will be used for purely technical 
reasons. The field of subjective well-being covers 
a wide range of different concepts and measures. 
Choosing which measures should be the focus 
of collection efforts requires knowing what the 
measures will be used for. Different measures of 
subjective well-being will be better suited to dif-
ferent purposes, and it is therefore important to 
identify the right measures needed given the core 
policy- and public-uses for the data.
Measures of subjective well-being have a wide 
variety of potential uses and audiences. For the 
purposes of these Guidelines it is useful to clas-
sify the possible uses of subjective well-being 
measures under a general framework. The fol-
lowing framework identifies three main ways in 
which measures of subjective well-being are used 
and notes what the measures are used for, why 
the information is valuable, who the target audi-
ence is, and what the key issues at stake are. 
Box 4. The policy uses of subjective well-being data
Data Use What Why Who Key Interpretive 
Issues
(1) Comple-
menting exist-
ing measures of 
well-being
Core measures/ head-
line indicators used to 
examine:
(i) national trends over 
time
(ii) distribution of out-
comes across different 
groups within society
(iii) distribution of 
outcomes across 
countries
Includes indicators 
of central tendency 
or “level,” as well as 
distribution, and the 
relative rate of rise or 
decline over time
To know if the changes 
affecting society have 
an impact on subjective 
well-being
To identify vulnerable 
groups and areas of 
suffering – highlight-
ing where key drivers 
of subjective well-being 
may lie – and where 
there may be opportuni-
ties for policy interven-
tions
To conduct interna-
tional benchmarking, 
assist in the interpreta-
tion of national data, 
and identify where 
countries may be able 
to learn from others’ 
experiences
Governments (central, 
regional, local)
Wider public
Public, private and 
third sector organiza-
tions
Researchers interested 
in country-level drivers 
of national well-being
Individuals and orga-
nizations – e.g. making 
decisions about where 
to live and work
(i) What size of differ-
ence between groups 
or over time can be 
expected?
(ii) What alternative 
explanations should be 
considered for observed 
differences?
(iii) What is the role 
of culture and cultural 
bias in cross-country 
comparisons?
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(2) Better 
understanding 
the drivers of 
subjective well-
being
Analyses based on 
national and interna-
tional micro-data, with 
subjective well-being 
used as the dependent 
variable, to:
 (i) examine the 
relationship between 
subjective well-being 
and other important 
life circumstances, 
such as income and 
health
(ii) inform policy op-
tions appraisal, design 
and evaluation
(iii) inform policy 
trade-offs
To improve our under-
standing of well-being 
overall, by examin-
ing the relationship 
between subjective well-
being, life circumstanc-
es, and other important 
well-being outcomes
To highlight areas of 
policy with the greatest 
potential to improve 
subjective well-being, 
and the life events/ 
circumstances most 
likely to put subjective 
well-being at risk 
To assist in govern-
ment decision-making 
processes, including the 
allocation of resources 
and the design ele-
ments of policies 
To inform the public 
and employers about 
the likely drivers of 
individual subjective 
well-being, providing 
better information for 
individual and organiza-
tional decision-making 
Governments
Researchers
Individuals wanting 
better information 
to support decision-
making
Employers wanting 
to understand and 
improve employee 
well-being
(i) What size of impact 
can be expected? 
(ii) How can the 
impacts of different 
drivers be compared? 
(3) Subjective 
well-being as 
an input for 
other analyses, 
particularly cost-
benefit analysis
Micro-data on subjec-
tive well-being, used 
as an input for other 
analyses, including: 
(i) as an explanatory 
variable for other ele-
ments of well-being or 
behavior
(ii) used to estimate 
the value of non-mar-
ket goods and services, 
for the purposes of 
cost-benefit analyses
To better understand 
how subjective well-
being can contribute to 
other well-being out-
comes and shed light 
on human decision-
making processes, 
including the various 
biases that may be 
present
To provide an alter-
native to traditional 
economic approaches 
to estimating the value 
of non-market goods, 
supporting government 
(and other organiza-
tions) in making deci-
sions about complex 
social choices
Researchers
Governments
Individuals wanting 
better information 
to support decision-
making
Employers wanting 
to understand and 
improve employee 
well-being
(i) The sensitivity of 
subjective well-being 
data to non-market 
goods
(ii) Measurement error 
and its impact on valu-
ations
(iii) Covariates to 
include in regression 
models
(iv) Time horizons for 
study
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notable exceptions. In particular, the ONS found 
that eudaimonic questions relating to whether 
respondents felt that what they did in their life 
was worthwhile and the experience of loneliness 
caused visible distress in some respondents, 
particularly among disabled and unemployed 
respondents.
Best practice suggests that statistical providers 
should consider how to manage the risks associated 
with questions that are distressing to respondents.41 
Although it is important not to overstate the risks — 
they apply mainly to eudaimonic questions, and 
to a small proportion of respondents – such issues 
should be dealt with effectively. A complicating 
factor is that it might not be evident at the time of 
the interview whether a respondent has been 
affected by the questioning. One approach to 
managing this issue proposed by the ONS is to 
distribute a leaflet at the time of the interview 
giving respondents information on the purpose 
of the survey and reiterating the confidentiality of 
the data collected.42 The leaflet would also contain 
information for distressed respondents about 
where to seek help.
Coding and data processing
The coding of information on subjective well-being 
is generally straightforward. In general, numerical 
scales should be coded as numbers, even if the 
scale bounds have labels. Much analysis of 
subjective well-being data is likely to be quantitative 
and will involve manipulating the data as if they 
were cardinal. “Don’t know” and “refused to answer” 
responses should be coded separately from each 
other as the differences between them are of meth-
odological interest.
Normal data-cleaning procedures include looking 
for obvious errors such as data coders transposing 
numbers, duplicate records, loss of records, 
incomplete responses, out-of-range responses or 
failure to follow correct skip patterns. Some issues 
are of particular relevance to subjective data. In 
particular, where a module comprising several 
questions with the same scale is used, data cleaning 
should also involve checking for response sets. 
Response sets occur when a respondent provides 
identical ratings to a series of different items. For 
example, a respondent may answer “0” to all ques-
tions. This typically suggests that the respondent is 
not, in fact, responding meaningfully to the 
question and is simply moving through the 
questionnaire as rapidly as possible. Such responses 
should be treated as a non-response and discarded. 
In addition, interviewer comments provide an 
opportunity to identify whether the respondent was 
responding correctly, and a robust survey process 
will make provision for allowing such responses to 
be flagged without wiping the data record.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that much of 
the value from collecting measures of subjective 
well-being comes from micro-data analysis. In 
particular, analysis of the joint distribution of sub-
jective well-being and other outcomes, and the use 
of subjective well-being measures in cost-benefit 
analysis (see Box 4 on policy uses) cannot usually 
be accomplished through tables of aggregate 
data. Because of this, a clear and comprehensive 
data dictionary is an essential output in any 
project focusing on subjective well-being. This 
data dictionary should have information on 
survey methodology, sampling frame and correct 
application of survey weights, as well as a descrip-
tion of each variable (covering the variable name, 
the question used to collect it and how the data 
are coded). If a variable is collected from only part 
of the survey sample due to question routing, this 
should be clearly noted in the data dictionary.
National initiatives to measure        
subjective well-being
Although the OECD Guidelines were only released in 
March 2013, there has been substantial progress 
in collecting measures of subjective well-being in 
official statistics. Although the Guidelines them-
selves cannot take direct credit for these initiatives, 
extensive work by both the OECD and national 
statistical offices has ensured that the measures 
collected in national surveys are broadly comparable 
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and align both with each other and with the 
OECD core measures.
When the OECD produced the first How’s Life? 
report in 2011, providing a broad measure of 
progress in OECD countries, the chapter on subjec-
tive well-being had to draw entirely on non-official 
sources of data. At the time, France and Canada 
were the only two OECD countries with high quality 
official measures of life evaluation similar to that 
which was eventually selected as the primary mea-
sure in the Guidelines. In the two years since then, 
leading up to the publication of the Guidelines in 
2013, the situation has significantly changed. Table 
7.1 lists the OECD countries that are either currently 
producing official measures of subjective well-being 
that align with the OECD Guidelines or that are 
currently in the process of planning for such a 
collection within the next 12 to 18 months. In 
particular, the table focuses on those countries that 
collect either the OECD primary measure or some-
thing directly equivalent to it.
One of the most important developments identi-
fied in Table 7.1 is the European Union inclusion 
of a well-being module as an add-on to the main 
EU survey of living conditions (EU-SILC). This 
module includes a question on life evaluation 
directly comparable to the OECD primary measure 
and a eudaimonic question that is very close to the 
one in the OECD core measures. As EU-SILC 
covers 27 EU countries as well as Croatia, Iceland, 
Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey, this will extend 
the available data from approximately a quarter of 
the OECD (those countries listed in Table 7.1) to 
the majority of the OECD, albeit with data updated 
only when the well-being module is run every six 
years. More importantly, although the decision 
has not been finalized, Eurostat (the EU Statisti-
cal Agency) has indicated that it is also consider-
ing including the primary life evaluation measure 
in the core of EU-SILC. This would make high 
quality annual data on life satisfaction available for 
the majority of the OECD.
The information contained in Table 7.1 is limited 
to those countries either currently producing 
data in line with the OECD Guidelines or that are 
already well advanced in the process of planning 
for such a collection. Beyond this there is consid-
erable interest in subjective data from many other 
countries both within the OECD and beyond. It 
is to be expected that over the next 18 months a 
significant number of additional countries will be 
able to be added to the table.
Future directions
The OECD Guidelines mark an important step for-
ward in the measurement of subjective well-being, 
but do not provide the “final word” on the subject. 
Although some aspects of the measurement of 
subjective well-being – such as questions on overall 
satisfaction with life – are well understood, other 
potentially important measures currently draw 
on much weaker evidence. It is expected that the 
evidence base on subjective well-being will develop 
rapidly over the next few years. In particular, to the 
extent that national statistical offices start regularly 
collecting and publishing data on subjective well-
being, many methodological questions are likely to 
be resolved as better data become available, and an 
increasing body of knowledge will accumulate on 
the policy uses of these data.
The OECD Guidelines already identify a number 
of important issues that should inform future 
work by national statistical offices. Two issues in 
particular stand out: (1) the use of experimental 
techniques by national statistical offices; and (2) 
the necessity of collecting better income data 
alongside subjective well-being measures. Both 
issues are discussed further.
Experimentation
One important lesson has been the value of sys-
tematic experiments by national statistical offices. 
While the Guidelines were being drafted, the UK 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) was in the 
process of developing and collecting its first of-
ficial measures of subjective well-being. Typically, 
national statistical offices invest in considerable 
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Table 7.1. Availability of official national statistics on subjective well-being 
* In line with the OECD Guidelines on Measuring Subjective Well-being
** Intend to be in line with the OECD Guidelines on Measuring Subjective Well-being
*** The US included subjective well-being indicators on experienced Affect and Eudaimonia in the American Time Use Survey 2011 
(ATUS). These use a 0 to 6 scale but otherwise adopt a similar methodology to the OECD (and informed the OECD Guidelines).
Country Primary measure Other core measures Periodicity Date for 
compa-
rable data
Source
(Life   
evaluation) (Affect) (Eudaimonia)
Australia Yes** No No
Every four 
years 
2014 
General Social Survey, Australian 
Bureau of Statistics
Canada Yes* Yes** No Yearly 1985
General Social Survey (GSS), Statistics 
Canada 
France
Yes* No No
To be de-
termined 
2011 L’enquête sur la qualité de la vie, INSEE
No Yes* No
To be de-
termined 
2010 L’enquête Emploi du temps, INSEE
Italy Yes* No No Yearly 2012
Annual survey, Aspects of everyday life 
(Indagine multiscopo Aspetti della vita 
quotidiana), ISTAT
Mexico
Yes* Yes* No
Every two 
years
2012 
Encuesta Nacional de Gastos de los Hog-
ares, Subjective well-being (Bienestar 
Autorreportado – BIARE), INEGI
No No Yes* Quarterly 2013
Consumer Confidence Survey (ENCO), 
INEGI
Morocco Yes* No No
To be de-
termined
2012 
Enquête Nationale sur le Bien-être, 
Haut Commissariat au Plan
New Zealand Yes** No Yes** 
Every two 
years 
2014
New Zealand General Social Survey 
(NZGSS), Statistics New Zealand
United  
Kingdom
Yes* Yes* Yes* Quarterly 2011 
Annual Population Survey (APS), 
Office for National Statistics 
Yes* Yes* Yes* Yearly 2012
Crime Survey for England and Wales, 
Office for National Statistics
Yes* Yes* Yes* Yearly 2011
Wealth and Assets Survey, Office for 
National Statistics
United States No Yes*** Yes***
To be de-
termined
2011
American Time Use Survey, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics
European 
Union 
Yes* Yes** Yes*
To be de-
termined 
(poten-
tially every 
six years)
2013 EU SILC 2013, Module Well-being
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methodological research up-front before collect-
ing a new measure, but then implement collec-
tion in a homogenous way.
In developing their measures of subjective well-
being the ONS deviated from this process 
significantly. Although the ONS did invest in 
methodological work before proceeding to mea-
surement, rather than standardize on a single 
measure immediately, the ONS took an experi-
mental approach by splitting the sample in their 
Household Opinion Survey and using this to test 
different questions, question order, and other 
methodological points. 
The experimental approach adopted by the ONS 
has had an important impact with respect to 
knowledge of the validity and reliability of subjec-
tive well-being measures and best practice with 
respect to question design. However, the gains 
from the experimental approach are not limited 
to subjective well-being, and national statistical 
offices should look for opportunities to implement 
such an approach more widely.
Income measures
A second issue that emerged during the develop-
ment of the Guidelines was the lack of high quality 
income measures in surveys that include subjec-
tive well-being questions. The relationship 
between income and subjective well-being has 
been a subject of interest since 1974 when Rich-
ard Easterlin identified the so-called “Easterlin 
paradox”: that higher income is associated with 
higher happiness both between individuals and 
across countries, but there is no evidence that 
average happiness increases as average income 
increases over time.43 Understanding the causes 
of the Easterlin paradox is a high research priority 
because of the implications the paradox has for a 
range of policies. On a more technical level, one 
of the main policy uses for measures of subjec-
tive well-being is estimating the value of non-mar-
ket outcomes. This involves obtaining precise 
measures of the impact of people’s own income 
on their subjective well-being and comparing 
this to the impact of marginal change in the 
non-market outcome in question on subjective 
well-being.
For both better understanding the Easterlin 
paradox and estimating the value of non-market 
outcomes, the quality of income measures in 
surveys is at least as important as the quality of 
subjective well-being measures. While national 
statistical offices collect high quality information 
on household income, and are increasingly 
collecting measures of subjective well-being, 
there are currently few data sources that bring the 
two together. Those surveys – both official and 
non-official – that include measures of subjective 
well-being typically collect income only in broad 
bands, and in the case of non-official surveys, often 
also have very high item-specific non-response 
rates for the income question. Filling this gap is a 
priority for the near future.
Next steps
It is envisaged that the OECD Guidelines will be 
followed up by a review of progress on the mea-
surement of subjective well-being over the next 
few years, with a view to deciding whether the 
guidelines need revising and whether it is pos-
sible and desirable to move towards a greater 
degree of international standardization. The 
intent is that this review will build on information 
collected by national statistical agencies, and will 
consider the feasibility of moving towards a more 
formal international standard for the measurement 
of subjective well-being.
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1 In particular, the Commission noted that: Recent research 
has shown that it is possible to collect meaningful and reliable 
data on subjective well-being. Subjective well-being encompasses 
three different aspects: cognitive evaluations of one’s life, positive 
emotions (joy, pride), and negative ones (pain, anger, worry). 
While these aspects of subjective well-being have different deter-
minants, in all cases these determinants go well beyond people’s 
income and material conditions… All these aspects of subjec-
tive well-being should be measured separately to derive a more 
comprehensive measure of people’s quality of life and to allow 
a better understanding of its determinants (including people’s 
objective conditions). National statistical agencies should 
incorporate questions on subjective well-being in their standard 
surveys to capture people’s life evaluations, hedonic experiences 
and life priorities. (p216). Stiglitz et al. (2009).
2 OECD (2013). Guidelines on measuring subjective well-being. 
Paris: OECD. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/statistics/
Guidelines on Measuring Subjective Well-being.pdf 
3 The definition used here draws largely on Diener et al. (2006).
4 e.g. Deaton (2011).
5 Please imagine a ladder with steps numbered from 0 at the bot-
tom to 10 at the top. Suppose we say that the top of the ladder 
represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the lad-
der represents the worst possible life for you. If the top step is 10 
and the bottom step is 0, on which step of the ladder do you feel 
you personally stand at the present time?
6 Overall, how satisfied are you with your life nowadays?
7 Bjornskov (2010).
8 Some versions of the satisfaction with life question use 
different response scales, such as a 5-point labelled Likert 
scale or a 1 to 10 scale. Based on the conclusions from 
OECD Guidelines (OECD, 2013), the core module uses a 0 
to 10 end-labelled scale.
9 Technically the Circumplex model implies that positive and 
negative affect are ends of a single dimension rather than a 
way of grouping several independent types of feeling. Here 
the Circumplex model is used as an organzing framework 
to help impose some structure on the range of different 
affective states, without assuming continuity on the positive/
negative axis. See Larson & Fredrickson (1999).
10 Derived from Russell (1980).
11 Kahneman & Deaton (2010).
12  Davern et al. (2007).
13 The European Social Survey “flourishing” module contains 
questions on competence, engagement, meaning, optimism, 
positive relationships, resilience, self-esteem, emotional 
stability, vitality, and positive emotion. See Huppert & So 
(2008) for more detail.
14 Abdallah & Shah (2012).
15 OECD (2013).
16 UNICEF (2007).
17 “Frame of reference” refers to the situation or group on 
which respondents base comparisons when formulating a 
judgement about their lives or feelings. The respondents’ 
knowledge of how others live and their own prior experi-
ences can influence the basis on which judgements are 
reached about the respondents’ current status. 
18 This is not, in fact, beyond the realm of possibility. Many 
government agencies may have an interest in collecting 
measures of client satisfaction. However, the case for col-
lecting general measures of subjective well-being as a stan-
dard part of interactions with government service delivery 
agencies is beyond the scope of this paper. 
19 UN (1986).
20 Winkelmann & Winkelmann (1998), Lucas et al. (2004).
21 Deaton (2011).
22 It was only the daily frequency of observations that made 
it possible to discover and eliminate the question-order 
effects in Deaton (2011).
23 Deaton (2011).
24 Helliwell & Wang (2011a), Deaton (2011).
25 See Helliwell & Wang (2011a).
26 Deaton (2011).
27 Boarini et al. (2012).
28 The need for a relatively large sample size is one reason to 
prefer a simple measure of subjective well-being with a low 
respondent burden in place of a technically more reliable 
multi-item measure with a higher respondent burden. 
The quality gains from a more detailed measure need to 
be assessed carefully against the quality losses associated 
with any reduction in sample size associated with a longer 
measure.
29 OECD (2013).
30 ONS (2012).
31 Internet surveys are, from this perspective, a way of imple-
menting CASI. 
32 OECD (2013).
33 See Deaton (2011). In this case the precise transition question 
used was: “Now thinking about your personal life, are you 
satisfied with your personal life today,” and the subjective well-
being measure that followed was the Cantril self-anchoring 
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ladder of life measure. It does not follow that the same 
transition question will work in other contexts, and transition 
questions should be tested empirically before being relied on. 
34 OECD (2013).
35 Eurostat (2005).
36 Eurostat (2005).
37 ONS (2012).
38  Smith (2013).
39  Smith (2013).
40  ONS (2012).
41  OECD (2013).
42  ONS (2012).
43  Easterlin (1974). 
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Those who are interested in promoting the col-
lection and use of subjective well-being data often 
cite the importance of such data to help balance 
the attention placed on indicators of macroeco-
nomic activity, such as Gross Domestic Product, 
as metrics for national progress or development.1 
The same concerns played a formative role in the 
conception of the human development approach.2 
Two economists, Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya 
Sen, developed the approach as an alternative 
to seeing economic growth as the sole measure 
of development. As the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme’s (UNDP) first Human 
Development Report said, “This Report is about 
people — and about how development enlarges 
their choices. It is about more than GNP growth, 
more than income and wealth and more than 
producing commodities and accumulating capi-
tal. A person’s access to income may be one of 
the choices, but it is not the sum total of human 
endeavour.”3 And so, at the outset of this chapter, 
it is important to note that the two approaches 
are not antithetical to each other: they were both 
developed, in part at least, as ways to tackle the 
same problem. 
Nor should the quest for human development be 
seen as competing with the quest for increasing 
happiness: by looking at the human condition 
through different lenses, the two approaches can 
provide alternate, but complementary, pictures 
of — and improvements to — human lives. One of 
the insights that subjective data can bring to many 
aspects of life is the ability to compare people’s 
perceptions with the objective evidence. As an 
aside, some would argue that the term “objective 
evidence” is often misleading as such data are 
often partly subjective and gathered from 
self-reported data collected through personal or 
household surveys. Consider, for instance the 
unemployment rate, which is officially calculated 
by asking people whether they were “actively 
looking for work” and those who answer “no” are 
not treated as unemployed. Interpretations of both 
“actively” and “looking” are inherently subjective: 
is a weekly scan of the situation vacant adverts 
as active as sending off a dozen resumes to 
prospective employers? 
In any case, it is usually people’s own perceptions 
of the state of the world, rather than other’s mea-
surements – or perceptions — of the “facts,” that 
drive individual behavior. And so contrasting the 
objective data with perceptions is often necessary 
for understanding the nature of a problem and 
the ways in which it should be tackled. In other 
words, “measures of both objective and subjective 
well-being provide key information about people’s 
quality of life.”4 
Crime is a good example. Consider, for instance, 
two communities with identical crime rates. But 
in one people are terrified to leave their homes, 
and in the other people don’t bother to lock their 
doors. Different strategies are required in each 
to improve well-being: crime should be tackled 
in both, but in the former community citizens 
might need to be encouraged to be less fearful. 
In the latter they might be encouraged to take 
more appropriate precautions. And both behavior 
changes could also help to reduce crime rates.
And so it is that data on subjective well-being — 
and especially life evaluations — can help answer 
important questions about human development, 
while data on human development can help us 
to understand differences in life evaluations. 
This chapter of the report looks at the similarities 
between the approaches and the differences too. 
It will emphasize how the two approaches can 
complement one another by looking at the world 
through different lenses: as an Indian proverb 
says, it is better to be blind than to see things 
only from one point of view.
Defining Human Development 
The human development approach arose in part 
as a result of growing criticism to the approaches 
prevailing in the 1980s, which presumed a close 
link between national economic growth and 
greater well-being. As Amartya Sen said, “Human 
development, as an approach, is concerned with 
what I take to be the basic development idea: 
namely, advancing the richness of human life, 
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rather than the richness of the economy in which 
human beings live, which is only a part of it.”5 
The human development approach is based on 
the twin – and related – concepts of functionings 
and capabilities. Functionings can be broadly 
defined as people’s “beings and doings”: those 
things that together describe our lives. Being 
fed, being sheltered, being hungry, being cold 
are examples of the group of being functionings. 
Travelling, working, attending the cinema, voting 
are examples of the doing group. Sen described 
five broad categories of functionings: political 
freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, 
transparency guarantees, and protective security.6
Capabilities, broadly defined as freedoms to “lead 
the kinds of lives we have reason to value,”7 are 
people’s opportunities to achieve desirable 
functionings. Freedom, or agency, is central to the 
human development approach, and so both 
capabilities and functionings are important. 
Being well-nourished or being under-nourished 
are different functionings. But if the latter arises 
from poverty then it is a more undesirable out-
come than if it is comes through choice (from 
fasting, say). So here, Sen would argue, it is the 
capability to enjoy an adequate diet that is the 
true measure of development, not simply whether 
an individual chooses to make use of that opportu-
nity and actually eat.
Some functionings compete for resources against 
one another and so the human development 
approach sees that each person chooses a set of 
functionings (a life path) from among those they 
are capable of achieving given the capabilities 
they possess. For instance, people may be able to 
exercise the freedom to travel the world and have 
the skills to find a job in a different country, but 
choosing this path may come at the expense of 
being able to spend time with one’s family. Simi-
larly, enjoying freedom to choose from different 
options can come with the expense of greater 
complexity in life.  This ability to choose from 
different functionings is an integral part of the hu-
man development approach.
The definition of human development has al-
ways been flexible and open-ended and there 
are as many dimensions of human development 
as there are ways of enlarging people’s choices. 
But applying the approach generally requires 
one to identify things that matter to a particular 
community at a point in time and the Human 
Development Reports, since the first in 1990, 
have published the Human Development Index 
(HDI) as a measure of human development. The 
authors of the reports have always recognized, 
however, that the concept of human development 
is much broader than the HDI. It is impossible to 
come up with a comprehensive measure, or even 
a comprehensive set of indicators, because many 
vital dimensions of human development are non-
quantifiable. But while a comprehensive single 
indicator is impossible, progress is being made on 
identifying indicator sets covering issues that are 
widely recognized as important around the world.8 
That said, some core dimensions of human devel-
opment include:9
• Education, Health and Command over resources 
(income and nutrition).
• Participation and freedom: particularly empower-
ment; democratic governance; gender equality; 
civil and political rights; and cultural liberty; 
particularly for marginalized groups defined 
by urban-rural, gender, age, religion, ethnicity, 
physical/mental parameters, etc. Social support 
is also included here.
• Human security : security in daily life against 
such chronic threats as hunger and abrupt dis-
ruptions including joblessness, famine, conflict, 
crime, etc.
• Equity: in the distribution of all of the above.
• Sustainability: for future generations in ecological, 
economic and social terms.
This chapter will return to some of these areas in 
due course.
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Measuring Human Development
Human development can be measured in many 
ways but the best-known measure is UNDP’s 
Human Development Index (HDI), developed by 
Amartya Sen and Mahbub Ul Haq back in the 
early 1990s as an attempt to challenge GDP’s 
hegemony in development discourse. The HDI was 
introduced explicitly to challenge that orthodoxy.10 
Though it was always seen as a crude measure 
that missed many aspects of human development, 
such as equity and sustainable development, it 
did recognize the multifaceted nature of human 
well-being by going beyond income alone. Indeed 
the HDI has helped transform the debate about 
development by demonstrating that while economic 
growth may foreshadow progress in health and 
education, this is not guaranteed. Moreover, a 
number of countries have seen relatively weak 
economic growth in recent years but enjoyed 
strong progress in health and education, as the 
figure from the 2010 Human Development 
Report shows below.
The left panel shows a positive association —though 
with substantial variation — suggesting that growth 
and improvements in human development are 
positively associated. Remember, however, that 
income is part of the HDI; thus, by construction, 
a third of the changes in the HDI come from 
economic growth, guaranteeing a positive asso-
ciation. A more useful exercise is to compare 
income growth with changes in the non-income 
dimensions of human development. The 2010 
HDR did this using an index similar to the HDI 
but calculated with only the health and education 
component indicators of the HDI to compare its 
changes with economic growth. The non-income 
HDI is presented in the right panel of the figure 
below. The correlation is remarkably weak and 
statistically insignificant.11
Weak relationship between economic growth and changes in health and education
Relationship between economic growth and the HDI and its non-income components, 1970-2010
Note: Based on the analysis of deviation from fit (see Human Development Report 2010, box 2.1.) Income is per capita GDP.
Thicker regression line indicates relationship is statistically significant.
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2010, figure 3.1. (HDRO calculations using data from the HDRO database)
Income growth Income growth
HDI change Nonincome HDI change
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Previous studies have found the same result. One 
of the first scholars to study this link systematically 
was US demographer Samuel Preston, who showed 
that the correlation between changes in income and 
changes in life expectancy over 30 years for 30 coun-
tries was not statistically significant.12
The links between human develop-
ment and happiness
Although, as already explained in this chapter, 
the two approaches share much in common, a 
key difference between them is that while human 
development is first and foremost a conceptual 
approach, subjective well-being is an empirical 
one. And so while an increase in human devel-
opment must be — by definition — desirable, it 
is not so simple to tell whether such increases 
have happened. Instead human development is 
recognized as an open-ended concept which can 
be measured only partially using indices like the 
HDI. It is an approach that uses multiple dimen-
sions and non-monetary measures of well-being 
to assess development; stresses the importance 
of freedom and opportunity; and recognizes that 
people convert their capabilities into well-being at 
different rates. 
On the other hand, while it is possible to directly 
measure an individual’s subjective well-being, it 
is not possible to be certain that improvements in 
subjective well-being are always socially (or indi-
vidually) desirable because subjective well-being 
is defined empirically (just because someone 
feels happier doesn’t necessarily mean they have 
more to feel genuinely happy about). These differ-
ences have been used by experts on either side 
to criticize the other approach. But these differ-
ences also demonstrate why the two approaches 
complement each other: using information about 
both human development and subjective well-
being together can strengthen understanding of 
the whole picture.
As noted above, human development is broadly 
defined as endowing people with the opportunities 
to live a life “they have reason to value.” This 
raises a rather obvious question: do people 
actually value their experience of living in the 
ways that human development practitioners 
believe they should?  This question has been a 
key criticism of the capability approach, as the 
approach offers “no guidance” on how to decide 
which aspects of people’s lives (functionings) 
constitute welfare.13,14 And so it is possible that 
those who human development economists 
believe are living lives they should value highly do 
not actually share that assessment. As a result the 
approach has been labeled by some as “paternal-
istic.”15 This criticism is the equal — but opposite 
— of that made by Amartya Sen against relying on 
happiness as a measure of development: namely 
that “a grumbling rich man may well be less 
happy than a contented peasant, but he does have 
a higher standard of living than that peasant.”16 
In other words, both arguments show that life 
satisfaction is not necessarily the same as human 
development. This (potential) difference could be 
a problem for proponents of subjective well-being 
who feel that indicators of life satisfaction are 
indicative of broad development. And it could be 
a problem for proponents of human development 
who define human development as offering 
people the opportunity to lead lives they value.
However, while both arguments are logically pos-
sible, are they likely in reality? What do we know 
about the conditions under which people can 
achieve a higher level of human development but 
not see their overall life satisfaction increase, and 
vice versa? 
Reassuringly many of the key determinants for 
human happiness — tested on the basis of empirical 
relationships — are also central to the human 
development concept, as research from over 30 
years has demonstrated.
Chapter 3 of the first World Happiness Report described 
the factors that affect happiness and misery, 
noting that income, education, health and work 
were all important, as were personal and economic 
security, the quality of people’s relationships, 
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corruption (or rather a lack of it), and personal 
freedom, the rule of law and the quality of the 
environment.17 Chapter 2 of this year’s report 
finds that six variables together explain some 75% 
of differences in average happiness across countries 
and time. Four of these six variables are typical 
measures of human development, namely income 
(measured by log of GDP per capita), healthy life 
expectancy at birth, freedom to make life choices 
and social support.  The other two measures 
— corruption and generosity — while not always 
seen as measures of human development are 
certainly not contradictory to the human develop-
ment approach. Indeed one could argue that 
corruption in particular is a measure of human 
development as it reduces people’s freedoms to 
live their lives in the way they want, while there is 
a growing literature on the links between altruism 
and human progress.18 And so, as one might 
expect given their shared origins, there seems 
much to unite the two approaches.
Meanwhile, using data from the United Kingdom, 
Paul Anand and colleagues examined the relation-
ship between subjective well-being and people’s 
capabilities, concluding that “life satisfaction is 
highly multivariate with respect to capabilities” and 
that the relationships were “reasonably robust” 
among different age groups and between men 
and women.19
Given the very considerable similarities between the 
thinking about human development and happiness 
it is difficult to understand why the two schools of 
thought are not more closely aligned. Perhaps one 
reason is that when human development experts 
hear the word “happiness” they think of the positive 
affect of day to day emotions (happiness in the emo-
tional sense), rather than happiness defined in terms 
of overall life evaluation (happiness in the evaluative 
sense). In this chapter the word happiness is used to 
mean longer term life evaluations, a meaning which 
has closer conceptual links to the human develop-
ment approach (remember, lives they have reason to 
value).20
What Do The Data Show?
As argued, measures of human development 
and life evaluations should, in theory, be closely 
related. Three questions on the conceptual and 
empirical links between the two approaches are 
investigated. 
1. Do those countries with higher human devel-
opment according to the HDI (and therefore, 
as UNDP believes, with citizens who highly 
value the lives they lead) actually report higher 
life evaluations? 
2. What are the empirical links between other 
aspects of human development, beyond the 
HDI, and overall life evaluations? 
3. How do the variables that correlate strongly 
with life evaluation relate conceptually to human 
development theory? 
All of the analysis that follows, other than the 
exceptions noted,21 uses annual national data 
averaged over the period 2010-12, in common 
with Chapter 2. The numbers of countries in the 
sample range from 124 to 152 depending on the 
variables used.
Question 1: Do those countries with higher human 
development according to the HDI (and therefore, as 
UNDP believes, with citizens who have a higher 
reason to value the lives they lead) actually enjoy 
higher life evaluation? 
Human development is an open-ended concept, 
and many things could be treated as dimensions 
of human development because they represent 
capabilities or functionings. Let’s start with the 
HDI, which is the measure used by UNDP to 
rank countries but is, as the UNDP recognizes, 
only a partial measure of human development. 
Health, income and education are all included in 
the HDI. Recall that the measures comprising the 
HDI are life expectancy at birth (as a proxy mea-
sure of overall health); both expected and mean 
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years of education (as proxies for how educated a 
country is and how educated it will be); and Gross 
National Income (GNI) per capita (as a proxy for 
command over resources), though the HDI uses 
the natural logarithm of GNI to account for the 
diminishing returns to scale associated with 
higher income: an extra dollar in the pocket of 
someone earning $100 a year is far more impor-
tant to their command over goods and resources 
than it would be for someone earning $50,000 a 
year.
The following graphs and data show that the 
components of the HDI all correlate strongly with 
better life evaluations. Country life evaluations 
are measured using average national responses 
(2010-2012) to the Gallup World Poll Question: 
Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from 
zero at the bottom to ten at the top. Suppose we say 
that the top of the ladder represents the best possible 
life for you, and the bottom of the ladder represents 
the worst possible life for you. On which step of the 
ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at 
this time, assuming that the higher the step the better 
you feel about your life, and the lower the step the 
worse you feel about it? Which step comes closest to 
the way you feel?
Higher life expectancy at birth is strongly correlated 
with higher life evaluations, with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.70.
Expected years22 and mean years23 of schooling 
are, unsurprisingly, quite strongly correlated with 
each other (a correlation coefficient of 0.84) with 
expected years of schooling rather more correlated 
with higher life evaluation (0.69) than mean 
years of schooling (0.63). 
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The shape of the scatter plot for GNI versus life 
evaluation (with a correlation of 0.73) suggests 
that taking the logarithm transform is also 
important here. 
And the following graph confirms that, with a 
correlation of 0.78.
Finally the correlation between HDI and life 
evaluation is, at 0.77, similar to the correlation 
between life evaluation and log GNI.
Chapter 2 investigates the trends, explanations 
and distribution of world happiness. It finds that 
income (measured with the log of Gross Domestic 
Product) is an important explanatory variable 
for life evaluation (see the equation of Table 2.1). 
Income is also, of course, a component of the 
HDI. So a natural question is to ask whether the 
correlation between life evaluation and the HDI 
is being driven by the correlation with income.
To test this we can look at the links between the 
non-income components of the HDI (i.e. the 
index computed from the health and education 
indicators only) and the life evaluation data after 
controlling for the explanatory effect of income on 
the data using the results in Chapter 2 (i.e. sub-
tracting, from each life evaluation score, the log 
of per capita GDP multiplied by the coefficient for 
income as given in the equation of Table 2.1).
There remains a strong correlation (0.67) 
between life evaluation (after adjusting for the 
effect of income) and non-income HDI. So there 
is a strong relationship between the HDI and life 
evaluation, even after the effect of income has 
been controlled for.24
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Question 2: What are the empirical links between life 
evaluations and other aspects of human development 
beyond the HDI? 
Which other aspects of human development, 
beyond the HDI, might be considered in this 
analysis? The 1990 Human Development 
Report listed several important aspects of human 
development, noting that “people often value 
achievements that do not show up at all, or not 
immediately, in higher measured income or 
growth figures: better nutrition and health services, 
greater access to knowledge, more secure liveli-
hoods, better working conditions, security 
against crime and physical violence, satisfying 
leisure hours, and a sense of participating in the 
economic, cultural and political activities of their 
communities.”25 
Many more aspects of human development could be 
considered because there are as many variables for 
human development as there are ways of enlarging 
people’s choices. But for this analysis we will con-
sider some of the key examples that were included 
in the very first Human Development Report in 
1990 — namely work, security, and participation in 
economic and political life.26 And we also included 
freedom (which is intrinsic to the very notion of 
human development) and inequality. 
Some of these aspects are more amenable to 
direct measurement than others, and the mea-
sures in the analysis that follow are only partial 
proxies for each component of human develop-
ment with which they are linked. 
Better Working Conditions
International data on overall working conditions 
per se are not available, however data on job satis-
faction are available as the percentage of respon-
dents answering “satisfied” to the Gallup World 
Poll question, “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied 
with your job?” While not a summary measure of 
overall working conditions it is arguably at least a 
partial indicator of them. There is a quite strong 
correlation between job satisfaction and overall 
life evaluation (0.78), though this ought not to be 
surprising given the impact work has on many 
people’s overall quality of life.
Security Against Crime and Physical Violence
Data on security against crime and violence are 
difficult to analyze at an international level in a 
single indicator because of difficulties in adding 
together different types of crimes into one indicator 
(homicide is far more serious than petty theft but 
how can they be combined?), while differences in 
police reporting practices also hamper genuine 
comparison. Instead one might use a perception-
based measure of safety, which in any case might be 
a better measure of human development. An 
individual’s perception of their own security 
arguably has the greater effect on their capabilities: 
if we feel unsafe we are less likely to leave the 
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house at night, no matter what the official crime 
rate is. Here the data are from the Gallup World 
Poll based on the percentage of respondents 
answering “yes” to the Gallup World Poll ques-
tion, “Do you feel safe walking alone at night in 
the city or area where you live?”
Somewhat surprisingly, the overall correlation 
with life evaluation is not strong (0.23), though 
that is not to say that safety doesn’t help explain 
life evaluations once other measures of human 
development have been controlled for.
Participation in Economic and Political Activities
A sense of participating in “economic, cultural and 
political” activities is not available directly from 
international data sets. However one might believe 
that measures of satisfaction and trust from the 
Gallup World Poll could shed some light on this.
The percentage of respondents answering “better” 
(as opposed to “the same” or “worse” ) to the 
Gallup World Poll question, “Right now, do you 
think that economic conditions in the city or 
area where you live, as a whole, are getting better 
or getting worse?” might be somewhat linked 
to people’s sense of economic participation but 
there is very little correlation (0.16) between that 
question and overall life evaluation. This is not 
altogether surprising as the conceptual link between 
changes in economic conditions and economic 
participation is not particularly strong.
Trust in national government, based on the per-
centage of respondents answering “yes” to the 
Gallup World Poll question, “In this country, do 
you have confidence in the national government?” 
might link to a sense of participation in political 
activities. There is no apparent correlation between 
this question and overall life evaluations.27
However, the World Bank publishes Worldwide 
Governance Indicators based on the perceptions 
of “the views on the quality of governance provided 
by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert 
survey respondents in industrial and developing 
countries.” The government effectiveness indicator 
“reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, 
the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality 
of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to such 
policies.”28 These data are strongly correlated with 
life evaluations with a coefficient of 0.73.
Freedom
Freedom is an important part of human develop-
ment with Amartya Sen himself seeing it as both 
a means to development and an end in itself.29 
The 2013 Human Development Report presented 
data from the Gallup World Poll on the proportion 
of people answering “yes” to the question “In this 
country, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your 
freedom to choose what you do with your life?”(the 
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most recent available annual data during the 
period 2007-11). This has a correlation coefficient 
with overall life evaluation of 0.56. 
Inequality
Inequality is often seen as an important component 
of human development overall. Inequality in 
human development can be measured using 
UNDP’s Inequality Adjusted Human Develop-
ment Index (IHDI) which adjusts the HDI for 
inequalities in its three basic measures. The 
overall potential loss in human development can 
then be calculated and is based on the percentage 
difference between the HDI and the IHDI. This 
measure of overall potential loss is used here.
Once again a quite strong correlation is apparent 
from the graph (coefficient of -0.58).
Results for each variable regressed separately 
against life evaluation are as follows in Table 8.1:
Each variable, other than trust in government, was 
significant, with the HDI, job satisfaction and gov-
ernment effectiveness each accounting for over half 
of variance in life evaluations with an adjusted 
R-squared value of over 0.5, followed by freedom of 
choice and inequality each explaining around a 
third of the variation. The other variables — economic 
conditions and perception of safety  — explained very 
little of the variation.
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HDI Job 
Satisfaction
Perceptions 
of Safety
Economic 
Conditions
Trust in 
Government 
Government 
Effectiveness
Freedom 
of choice
Inequality
Coefficient 4.813*** 6.305*** 1.685*** 1.08* -0.595 0.818*** 4.454*** -6.027***
Constant 2.167*** 0.705* 4.342*** 5.00*** 5.734*** 5.429*** 2.208*** 6.694***
Adj- RSq 0.584 0.599 0.049 0.02 0.002 0.535 0.312 0.335
N. 152 152 148 151 133 152 151 124
*** Significant at 0.1% ** Significant at 1% * Significant at 5%
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While there are significant correlations between 
these variables across the sample of all countries 
(which vary from 124 to 152 countries depending 
on the variable in question), it is also informative 
to investigate the relationships between variables 
when countries are divided into four groups 
according to their level of human development.
Table 8.2 below looks at the different mean levels 
of each variable for the four groups and whether 
the values are significantly different from the 
average in the group of countries with low hu-
man development. 
The story here is rather interesting. The very high 
human development (HD) group of countries scores 
significantly better than the other countries in most 
aspects, save for trust in government and optimism 
over economic conditions, where there is no signifi-
cant difference. There is less difference, however, 
between the high and medium HD groups of 
countries: these two groups differ significantly 
only in their life evaluations, assessed effectiveness of 
government, and their potential loss in human 
development to inequality: in each case the high 
HD group of countries do better. 
Looking at each variable in turn:
Average life evaluation is significantly different 
among all four groups of countries, with higher 
human development associated with higher life 
evaluation.
Average job satisfaction in the very high HD group 
of countries is significantly higher than in the other 
groups. There is no significant difference between 
levels in the high and medium HD groups, 
although both groups have significantly higher job 
satisfaction than the low HD group of countries.
Average perceptions of safety are significantly 
higher in the very high HD group of countries than 
the others, though there is no significant difference 
in average levels among the other three groups.
Average satisfaction with economic conditions in the 
medium HD group of countries is significantly 
higher than in very high and low HD groups, but 
not significantly higher than in the high group. 
There is no significant difference between levels 
in the other groups.
Average trust in government is significantly different 
only between the very high HD and medium HD 
groups of countries, with the medium group 
having more trust in government.
Average government effectiveness, as assessed by the 
World Bank, does differ significantly between 
each HD group countries, with more human 
development corresponding to more effective 
government.
Table 8.2 Average levels of key variables across the different quartiles of human development
HD Group Life   
Evaluation
Job        
Satisfaction
Perceptions 
of Safety
Economic 
Conditions
Trust in    
Government 
Government 
Effectiveness
Freedom of 
choice
Inequality
Very High 6.56*** 86.6*** 72.1*** 35.7 44.6 1.308*** 80.4*** 9.0***
High 5.57*** 75.9*** 60.4 39.0 51.6 -0.104*** 68.6 16.9***
Medium 5.10*** 75.8*** 59.3 46.0* 58.7 -0.454*** 73.9*** 23.5***
Low 4.32 60.1 58.1 36.7 52.7 -0.961 65.5 34.8***
Significance levels refer to whether the average for each group is significantly different from the average among the low human development 
group of countries.
*** Significant at 0.1% ** Significant at 1% * Significant at 5%
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Average satisfaction with freedom of choice in the 
very high HD group of countries is significantly 
higher than in the other groups. Average satisfac-
tion in the medium HD group is also significantly 
different to the low HD group of countries. 
The high group of countries has lower levels of 
satisfaction than the medium group, and is not 
significantly different to either the medium or the 
low groups.
Average loss of HD to inequality is significantly 
different for all groups with losses worsening as 
average HD levels decrease. The strong relation-
ship here is due, at least in part, to the high levels 
of infant mortality and very low levels of schooling 
in the lower HD country groupings, which have a 
strong effect on the inequality measure.
Question 3: How do the variables that correlate 
strongly with life evaluation relate conceptually to hu-
man development theory? 
We have tested how different aspects of human 
development correlate with overall life evaluation 
measures. But, looking in the other direction, do 
the factors that explain life evaluation also repre-
sent human development?
The analysis in Chapter 2 shows that income, 
social support, healthy life expectancy at birth, 
freedom to make life choices, generosity, and 
corruption are all significant in explaining life 
evaluations. But while there is a strong empiri-
cal relationship between these variables and life 
evaluations, what are their conceptual links with 
human development?
As already discussed in this chapter, income, health, 
and freedom to make life choices are widely seen as 
key components of human development. An 
absence of corruption is also important to human 
development and to an individual’s capabilities: 
corruption fetters people’s freedoms to function, 
so this too is important to human development. 
Likewise, social support —having someone to 
count on in times of trouble — is arguably important 
to human development: having the security of 
some form of safety net can allow people to make 
choices (such as certain career paths) they might 
otherwise feel they were not in a position to make. 
Generosity is not as frequently discussed in terms 
of human development though it would be 
difficult to argue it was somehow contrary to 
human development and, indeed, some of the 
literature on the importance of altruism demon-
strates how greater altruism within a society can 
lead to broader benefits (within the household or 
community).30
There are many other factors that relate to sub-
jective well-being. Though there is not space to 
cover them all here, mental health, the focus of 
Chapter 3, deserves a special mention. Mental illness 
is, the chapter notes, not solely the preserve of 
rich countries, with common mental disorders 
such as anxiety and depression affecting one in 
10 people on the planet at any time. Such disorders 
have an obvious impact on human development, 
particularly on an individual’s ability to turn their 
capabilities into well-being: a physically fit and 
educated person who suffers from severe anxiety 
or depression is surely less able to join the labor 
force, for example, than someone not suffering 
from such disorders.
Conclusions
This chapter has sought to investigate the concep-
tual and empirical relationships between human 
development and life evaluation. 
Conceptually the two areas are quite similar. Both 
approaches were, at least in part, motivated by a 
desire to consider progress and development in 
ways that went beyond GDP, and to put people at 
the center of the new metrics. And the two areas 
are importantly connected in two ways. First, 
human development has a place for happiness: a 
society that is becoming unhappier is not making 
progress against at least one important criterion. 
Second, there is very considerable overlap between 
the determinants of happiness and the goals of 
human development. Many aspects of human 
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development are frequently used as key variables 
to explain subjective well-being. And, vice versa, 
the key explanators of overall life evaluation are 
all (to varying degrees) aspects of human develop-
ment.
Human development is, at heart, a conceptual 
approach. And while increases in human devel-
opment are – by definition – desirable, the broad-
ness of the concept means it is not possible to 
measure completely the extent of human devel-
opment across a society. On the other hand, while 
one can measure changes in subjective well-being 
across a population, one cannot, with certainty, 
claim that an increase is always desirable. The 
two disciplines therefore offer alternative views of 
development which, when taken together, could 
complement one another. Using the human 
development lens and metrics can help assess 
whether genuine progress has occurred if subjec-
tive well-being has increased. Using the subjec-
tive well-being lens and metrics can help assess 
whether progress has indeed occurred if the 
(partial) metrics of human development suggest 
it appears to have. 
Amartya Sen has argued that happiness is both an 
important human functioning, and one that can 
provide evidence about whether we are achieving 
our objectives in general.31 The empirical analysis in 
this chapter adds weight to this argument, show-
ing that among the 150 countries analyzed there 
is broad correlation between life evaluation and 
several key measures of human development, as 
one might expect. However, this is not the case 
for all measures of human development, nor is it 
the case for all countries. And it is perhaps these 
differences that are most interesting for those 
working on improving human development and 
well-being: if the metrics from each approach 
give conflicting pictures of development it is 
natural to look more closely and wonder why.
The findings in Chapter 2 demonstrate that most 
of the key factors that together explain happiness 
levels across the world are also textbook human 
development variables. This also adds weight to 
the arguments that each approach can benefit 
from a better understanding of the other.
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the income component), is a highly significant +0.667, 
p<.0001.
25 See UNDP (1990).
26 Ibid.
27 Frey & Stutzer (2005) found, for instance, evidence that 
Swiss citizens living in areas with the rights for greater 
political participation also had higher subjective well-
being.
28 See World Bank (2011).
29 Sen (1999). 
30 A broader discussion of this is outside this chapter. But 
see, for example, Becker (1981).
31 See Sen (2008). He also stresses his view that happiness 
does not represent all that is important.
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